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Abstract
This thesis studies the interaction between the real economy and assets like hous-
ing and bonds, and provide a new methodology to assess more accurately the
spillovers from financial markets to the real economy.
The first chapter analyses of the role of expectations of future fundamentals in
the housing market and their macroeconomic implications. News represent the
component of expectations that proves to be correct in the future. Noise consti-
tutes the component of expectations that does not materialize in the future. I find
that fundamentals in the housing market are aligned with the real economy and
that news shocks are the dominant driver of the housing market in the long run.
However, the bulk of fluctuations in housing prices at high-medium frequencies is
generated by noise. Notably, the latest housing cycle of the 2000s is entirely driven
by expectations unrelated with fundamentals.
The second chapter, jointly written with Alejandro Vicondoa, develops a novel
methodology, called Bridge Proxy-SVAR, to study the relationship between time
series sampled at different frequencies. Instead of using a joint system, we rely
on two systems at different frequencies and bridge them through an instrumental
variable approach. We carry out identification at the highest available frequency
and study the responses of the macroeconomic aggregates in a second stage. Our
analytical, simulation and empirical results show that the Bridge Proxy-SVAR sig-
nificantly mitigates temporal aggregation biases and it is particularly appealing to
study the financial spillovers to the real economy.
In fact, in the third chapter, jointly written with Alejandro Vicondoa, we provide
novel evidence on the large macroeconomic spillovers from changes in the liquidity
of bonds. In particular, we analyze Italian sovereigns and find that liquidity shocks,
orthogonal to changes in default risk, generate strong recessionary effect. Liquidity
and default risk affect the real economy through different channels. By analyzing
survey data, we find that liquidity shocks, differently from spikes in yields, do no
lead to an increase in the rate requested by banks for loans. On the other hand,
banks make their deadlines tighter and reduce the amount available for loan be-
cause they report problems with the liquidity and asset position.
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Chapter 1
News and Noise Bubbles in the
Housing Market
”[...] Long-term expectations [...] are arguably the more important determinants
of housing demand. [...] Long-term expectations have been consistently more
optimistic than short-term expectations across both time and location. [...] It is
from these nebulous and relatively slow-moving expectations that the bubble
took much of its impetus, and that future home price movements will as well.”
from Case, Shiller and Thompson (2014) “What they have been thinking? Home Buyer
Behavior in Hot and Cold Markets”
1.1 Introduction
The recent boom-bust in the US housing market is a crucial event in contempora-
neous economic history. Similar episodes have lately occurred in Spain, Ireland
and China. In the US, housing prices rose between 40% and 70% between 2000
and 2006 according to different measures. Then they fell, even more steeply, by
similar spectacular amounts after 2006. Housing starts dropped by roughly 80%
while the mortgage industry and financial system were stricken very hard begin-
ning of the Great Recession.
To understand this phenomenon, economists have explored important ex-
planatory factors like excessive lending, global imbalances, loosen monetary pol-
icy, financial innovations, etc. Case et al. (2015) highlight that, one the other hand,
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the role of expectations in the housing market has been significantly underesti-
mated. They analyze the behavior of homebuyers expectations of housing prices
from 2003 through 2014 through surveys and highlight some key findings. First,
short-term (1 year) expectations have not been over-optimistic but, if anything,
have under-reacted to new available information. Second, the roots of the housing
boom lie in the long-term (10 year) expectations that were abnormally optimistic.
Understanding the housing market and its drivers is valuable because, due to
the its strong ties with the mortgage and the banking industry, housing is par-
ticularly important from a macrofinancial stability perspective.1 While the dot-
com bubble lead only to a mild recession, boom-bust episodes in the housing
market endanger the stability of the financial system and macroeconomic growth
(Crowe et al., 2013; Dell’Ariccia et al., 2016). For example, by using data from
1870 on 17 countries, Jorda et al. (2015, forth) find strong evidence on the pre-
dictive power of the housing cycle for financial crisis (especially after WWII). In
particular, they compare the consequence of asset price bubbles (equity and hous-
ing) and find that the most harmful macroeconomic consequences are generated
from leveraged housing bubbles. Finally, Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2016) show
the asymmetric effect of housing cycles due to occasionally binding constraint in
a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model. Housing cycles lead to
output losses because busts (e.g. 2007-2009) produce larger spillovers than booms
(e.g. 2001-2006).
This paper shares the view of Case et al. (2015) on the determinants of housing
price. Since homebuyers own their home for many years, purchasing decisions
are driven by long-terms expectations. But what determines long-term expecta-
tions? Purchase a house means buying a flow of future services, i.e. rents. The
fundamental role of rents for housing prices has been studied widely. Among
recent contributions, Gallin (2008), Campbell et al. (2009) stand out for studying
US data. On the other hand, Ambrose et al. (2013) and Eichholtz et al. (2012) use
1Housing is more closely linked to the real economy than other assets because of its unique
features. First, housing is the main asset of households and changes in housing wealth have much
stronger wealth effect than other assets, e.g. stocks (Case et al. (2005, 2012)). Second, housing is
employed as collateral in the mortgage industry. Third, the construction sector, that is mostly labor
intensive, comprises an important part of the industrial sector in every economy.
By taking a pure accounting view on US data, housing contributes to GDP in two basic ways:
through private residential investment, 5% of GDP, and consumption spending on housing ser-
vices, 12-13% of GDP, for a total 17-18%. In 2013, the housing stock owned by households and
non-profit organization was valued $21.6 trillions, whereas the capitalization of the stock market
was $20.3 trillions.
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historical data on the housing market of Amsterdam. Gallin (2008) analyze MSAs
in the US from 1978 to 2011 and find that pricing error account for half of hous-
ing prices volatility. Campbell et al. (2009) study the US housing market and find
that expected rent growth is a relevant driver of the rent-price ratio from 1975 to
1997 (together with the expected premia) and by far the main driver from 1997
and 2007. Ambrose et al. (2013) studies 355 years on the housing market in Am-
sterdam and report two main findings. First, real housing prices and rents are
cointegrated and share common fundamentals. Second, deviations from the fun-
damental housing prices can occur over long periods. Eichholtz et al. (2012) find
that rents link the housing market to the real economy by analyzing the housing
market of Amsterdam over the period 1550-1850.
Therefore, I take an asset pricing view of housing as the value of housing has
to be aligned with the present discount value of rents in the long run. However,
because the future is uncertain, expected future rents can be different from the
actual ones. In other words, I assume that agents dispose of noisy information on
future rents. In this setup, bubbles can arise in the housing market due to imper-
fect information on future fundamentals. The paper contributes to the literature
by analyzing boom-bust episodes in the housing market from a new perspective,
with special emphasis on the macroeconomic implications.
I decompose housing price into the correct information (news) and the wrong
information (noise) on future rents and analyze their macroeconomic conse-
quences. The identification exploits the non-standard structural Vector Autore-
gression (SVAR) technique proposed by Forni et al. (2016, forth) (FGLS hence-
forth). Contrary to DSGE models, this SVAR methodology relies on a minimal set
of assumptions and consists of two steps.2 First, common SVAR estimation and
identification procedure are used to recover shocks to expectations about future
fundamentals from agents’ information set. Second, shocks to expectations are
decomposed in news and noise by employing future data on fundamentals, out-
side agents’ information set. I draw the identification assumptions from a simple
present value model of housing prices under imperfect information.
News driven business cycle has recently return in vogue thanks to the work
of Cochrane (1994) and Beaudry and Portier (2006). Some authors have claimed
that news provide noisy information about the future. For instance, Lorenzoni
2These assumptions can lead to significantly different results as showed by the opposite con-
clusions reached by Barsky and Sims (2012) and Blanchard et al. (2013).
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(2009), Angeletos and La’O (2013), and Blanchard et al. (2013) study this infor-
mational structure in theoretical models. Building upon the work of Lippi and
Reichlin (1994), and by simplifying the information structure, Forni et al. (2016)
have developed an identification scheme based on dynamic rotations of reduced
form residuals to empirically recover news and noise shocks in the stock market.
In a companion paper, Forni et al. (forth) study how news and noise drive the
business cycle in the US.3
My empirical results suggest that fundamentals in the housing market are
aligned with the macroeconomy in the long-run. In fact, news (anticipated and
realized information about fundamentals) are a major source of fluctuations for
rents, housing prices, GDP and stock prices at low frequencies. On the other hand,
noise (anticipated but not materialized information about fundamentals) is the
most relevant component for short-term fluctuations of housing prices, GDP and
residential investment. The historical decomposition suggests that noisy bubbles
were a main driver of housing market since the ’70s. In particular, the boom-bust
occurred in the 2000s is entirely driven by noise, with estimated deviations from
the fundamental value in the order of 45%.
My approach is consistent with excess volatility that housing prices exhibit
compared to fundamentals (Glaeser et al., 2014). Moreover, I do not take any
stance on how agents expectations are formed, but only that information on rents,
anticipated or unanticipated, matters for housing prices. Thus both rational and
irrational interpretation are compatible with my analysis. In fact, the literature has
proposed different way to explain housing price cycles. Zhao (2015) employs an
overlapping generation model within a rational framework. Departing from full
rationality, Glaeser et al. (2014) propose an extrapolative model of housing prices
formation. Adam et al. (2012) and Caines (2015) resort to adaptive learning to
explain the dynamic of housing prices. Gelain and Lansing (2014) and Granziera
and Kozicki (2015) compare different models of expectations formation on hous-
ing prices. While both find that fully rational expectations model under-predict
the volatility in housing prices, near rational solutions are instead able to repli-
cation the empirical patterns. Engsted et al. (2016) study the explosive behavior
of housing prices in OECD countries between 1970 to 2013 and find evidence in
favor of the bubble hypothesis for all countries but Germany and Italy. Finally,
3Mertens and Ravn (2010) show an application to fiscal policy.
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the explanatory power of the model build by Garriga et al. (2012) increases dra-
matically through shocks to expectations.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 presents a simple present value
model of housing prices. Section 1.3 illustrates the identification strategy. Sec-
tion 1.4 describes the data, the empirical results and their historical interpretation.
Section 1.5 concludes.
1.2 A Present Value Model of Housing under Imper-
fect Information
In this section, I describe a simple partial equilibrium model of housing. The
model can be characterized as a present value model of housing under imperfect
information. Housing is an asset that provides a flow of housing services as stocks
provide a flow of dividends. Housing services may be traded on the market and
produce rental income or they may be directly enjoyed by the owner.4 The present
value model implies that housing prices are the sum of the expected discounted
flow of future rents.
Formally, the relationship between prices and rents is determined as:
pt = Et [βt,t+1 (pt+1 + rt+1)] (1.1)
where βt,t+1 is the stochastic discount discount factor between t and t + 1 that
depends on expected returns.

























4Notice that in both cases those housing services have a market value: an actual value in the
former and an imputed value computed by public authorities for accounting/taxation purposes
in the latter.
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→ 0 that ensures a stable path.5 Eq.(1.2) states that
changes in housing prices may be driven by changes in expected rents and by
variations in the discount factor. The discount factor depends on expected returns
that can be further decomposed into two components: risk free rate Rr f and a risk
premium over the risk free rate ϕ
βt,t+i =
1
Rr ft,t+i + ϕt,t+i
(1.3)
While the stochastic discount factor cannot be measure exactly, we can roughly
account for it with the appropriate long term interest rates. A rate of horizon k is
captures fluctuations in the stochastic discount factor from 1 to k period ahead.6
Moreover, this assumption is necessary to maintain the analysis based on observ-
ables.
I introduce a crucial novelty with respect to the previous analyses on housing
prices. Purchasing a house means buying a flow of future service whose value
is uncertain. Consequently, I assume that agents receive a noisy signal of future
rents. This assumption implies that agents’ expectations are in part correct and
in part wrong. Under this assumption, the process of rents is subject to the news
shock ft, anticipated according to the lag polynomial C(L)with L the lag operator:
rt = rt−1 + C(L) ft (1.4)
For the sake of clarity, let us simplify the process for rents by considering an
innovation anticipated only one period ahead:7
rt = rt−1 + ft−1 (1.5)
However, agents cannot directly observe this anticipated shock, but only a
noisy signal. The noisy component is labeled noise shock nt. Consequently,
agents’ expectation can be decomposed as the sum of two gaussian white noise
components orthogonal at all lags and leads:
5Giglio et al. (2016) provide evidence against violations in the transversality condition in the
housing markets of UK and Singapore, even during periods of sizable bubbles.
6See Campbell and Shiller (1988)
7 Notice that the identification strategy will use instead a wide horizon (40 quarters, i.e. 10
years)
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Due to the delayed impact of the news shock ft on rents, agents cannot disen-
tangle the two components of the signal contemporaneously at time t. Therefore,
agents discount the signal according to ψ, which represents the variance of the
news relative to the variance of the signal. They will only be able to draw in-
formation about the composition of the past signal st−1 by observing the level of
current rents rt. In fact, by construction ∆rt = ft−1 because the dynamics of rents
is affected only by news but not by noise. Only by observing current rents, agents
(and so the econometrician) can learn about past news and noise. Importantly, in
this setup learning does not regard the knowledge of agents on the true structure
of the economy but only the past realizations of news and noise.8
In other words, agents learn their past noise contained in the signal by observ-
ing their prediction error on rents ut:
ut = ∆rt −Et−1 [∆rt] (1.8)
= ∆rt − ψst−1
ut represents the unanticipated shock to rents and can be rewritten in terms
of ft−1 and nt−1 as ut = ft−1 (1− ψ) + ψnt−1. Equations 1.5 to 1.8 provide the
theoretical interpretations of the shocks that are recovered through the identifica-
tion strategy in Section 1.3. In sum, housing prices are affect by three components
that are fundamental: news, risk free rate and risk premia. The fourth component,
noise, can be interpreted as a bubble component driven by imperfect information.
In a first approach, I impose directly, even if loosely, the present value rela-
tionship by assuming that housing prices are themselves a signal of future rents.
However, compared to the equity market and to the bond market, the housing
8Agents discount the signal based on its reliability. The more the signal is driven by news, the




Consequently, noise shocks do not have any effect in two cases. First, when the noise shock does
not exist σn = 0. Second, when the signal is completely unreliable σf = σs. On the other hand, the
maximum impact of noise shocks corresponds to the case σf ≈ σn as noise is a significant driver
of the signal and the signal contains useful information on future fundamentals.
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market features unique characteristics that make it regulated and relatively ineffi-
cient. While a vast part of the asset pricing literature on housing as neglected these
issues, some key features may lead to departures from the present value relation-
ship. Asset pricing model builds upon the no arbitrage assumption. However,
the no arbitrage assumption might not be satisfied due to some special features of
housing: I) Houses are sold only entirely and cannot be divided in smaller pieces
(indivisibility). Consequently, it is hard to short them; I I) The housing market
is characterized by borrowing constraints, illiquidity and transaction costs; I I I)
Housing is a collateralizable asset; IV) The housing market is heavily regulated
both for purchasing and for renting; I I I) In the short run, renting and purchas-
ing are substitutes and the two markets are segmented; IV) The time to build in
residential investment.9
Due to these features, housing prices might not reflect instantaneously the pre-
sented discounted value of future rents. To tackle this concerns, I show that I
obtain the similar results by relaxing the present value relationship. In differ-
ent robustness exercises, I exploit other variables as measures of expectation in
the housing market and I check ex-post whether the present value relationship is
supported by the data. I employ variables that arguably take into account new
information immediately as the consumer and home builders surveys and stock
prices of home builder companies.
Other potentially relevant issues are fiscal treatment of owning, renting and
the tax deductibility of mortgage interests. While those points are impossible to
address properly as the data on the subject is poor, I check ex-post whether the
shocks that I identify are correlated with changes in the tax rate.10
1.3 Identification Strategy
The following moving average (MA) representation expresses the relationship be-
tween the variables introduced in Section 1.2: the change in rents ∆rt, housing
9See Piazzesi and Schneider (2016).
10Property tax data are available only annually and, consequently, the following exercise is per-
formed at this frequency. More in detail, I take the OECD data on property taxes an build a
measure of implicit tax rate dividing the revenues by housing prices. I regress the news and noise
shock that I identify on the property tax and I do not find a significant relationship. For both news
and noise shocks, the coefficient is negative but not even significant at the 10% level. These results
are available upon request.
CHAPTER 1. NEWS AND NOISE BUBBLES IN THE HOUSING MARKET 9
















where c(L), θ(L), γ(L) are lag polynomials. By construction the news shock
ft has a lagged impact on rt, C(0) = 0 while further lags are different from 0. For
example, the representation in eq.(1.5) entails C(L) = L. Unfortunately, C(0) = 0
implies that the three variables at time t do not provide useful information to
recover ft and nt. In other words, the VAR estimated using
[
∆rt pt − rt Xt
]′
cannot be inverted to recover the MA representation in eq.(1.9) as the determinant
of the matrix is 0.
At time t, there are two sources of information. First, we observe housing
prices pt that measure the available information on future rents. Second, the dif-
ference between the current realization of rents and agents’ expectations yield the
past forecast error of agents. In the stylized model presented in Section 1.2, this
means ut = ∆rt −Et−1 [∆rt] = ∆rt − ψst−1.
However, only by employing future values of the surprise shock ut it is pos-
sible to recover ft and nt. Intuitively, by checking whether agents’ expectations
of future rents were correct or wrong we can infer whether changes in the signal
were driven by news or noise. This is possible because the noise shock does not
affect rents at all. Therefore, observing future rents provide perfect information
on past news.
The identification strategy consists of two steps.























11Or anyway a signal of future rents that may be different from housing prices. I test the robust-
ness of relaxing the implicit present value relationship in the empirical analysis.
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is invertible. The ordering in eq.(1.10) implies that changes in discounting,
e.g. risk premia, do not affect contemporaneously housing prices or alternative
signals. In the empirical analysis, I will also clean signal shocks from changes in
risk premia by ordering Xt before pt.
Second, we want to exploit future realization of rt to decompose the signal into
news and noise. At this aim, we have to decompose c(L) into two components:
c(L) = b(L)d(L). The decomposition is achieved by means of Blaschke matrices
as shown in Lippi and Reichlin (1994) and FGLS.12 b(L) incorporates the roots
of c(L) lying inside the unit circle, while d(L) collects the roots of c(L) inside the
unit circle. Intuitively, b(L) extracts the information that is available only from the
future realizations of rt, while d(L) represents the new information that agents
receive by observing the current value of rt. This decomposition allows us to
express the surprise shocks in the general case as ut = ∆rtd(L) − ψc(L)st = b(L) ft −
ψb(L)st.13















that links the shocks that can be recovered through standard SVAR tools, be-









, which belong to the future information set. By construc-
tion, b(L) contains the roots of c(L) lying inside the unit circle and, consequently,
cannot be inverted in the past but only in the future: b(L)−1 = b(L−1) = b(F)















Another important point arises from the derivations presented hereby. In fact,
after the shocks ut and st are identified with standard VAR tools, the other shocks
εxt are not employed in the identification of news and noise shocks. Basically, Xt
12Blaschke matrices are complex value operators that conserve the orthonormality of the vectors
to which they are applied.
13The stylized case mentioned above corresponds to the case d(L) = 1 and c(L) = L.
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is directly relevant only for the identification of ut and st. On the other hand, Xt
enters only indirectly the identification of ft and nt, but there is no direct link with
news and noise shocks.
Finally, the present value model in Section 1.2 is a useful tool to guide the
analysis and interpret the empirical results. However, in the empirical analysis I
depart from a strict interpretation of the the present value model. The economic
framework that guides the empirical investigation can be summarized by: (a) ex-
pectations of futures rents are relevant for housing prices such that agents respond
to new information on rents coming from news shocks ft and surprise shocks ut;
(b) the logarithms of rents and housing prices are cointegrated.
Starting from these premises, the econometric assumptions are: I) The news
shock ft produce a permanent effect on rents; I I) The noise nt shock does not affect
rents at any lead. I I I) The signal shock14 is the sum of the news shock ft and of
the noise shock nt; IV) The only shock affecting rents on impact is the surprise
shock ut. Additional shocks affect rents only with a lag and are observed.15
Some of the assumptions enumerated above are actually not imposed but used
for testing the validity of the theoretical framework. In particular, assumption (b)
is not imposed. In this way, I can test whether the news shock ft, which gen-
erates a permanent effect on rents by (I), also produces a permanent effect on
housing prices. In the same spirit, it can be checked ex-post whether noise shocks,
which following (I I) have no effect on rents, do not generate permanent effects in
housing prices. Moreover, assumption (I I) is imposed only on impact and in the
long run (40 quarters), but intermediate horizons are used to test whether such
an assumption is supported by the data. To conclude, the identification imposes
restrictions on the effect of the news shock ft and of the noise shock nt on rents
while leaving the implications of those shocks on housing prices completely un-
restricted.16
14A shock to housing prices in the baseline analysis.
15Rents are a slow moving variable and usually rental contracts last at least for one year.
16For a Monte Carlo test of the methodology, see FGLS.
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1.4 Empirical Analysis
1.4.1 The Data
I employ US quarterly data from 1963:Q1 - 2016:Q3. I build a measures of to-
tal rents multiplying the rents personal consumption expenditures (PCE) price
index (FRED: DHUTRC1Q027SBEA) by the rents PCE quantity index (FRED:
DTENRA3). Then, I divide this series by the PCE implicit price deflator
(FRED: DPCERD3Q086SBEA) and population aged 16 years or more (FRED:
NP16OV_NBD19480101). In the end, I obtain a measure of real per capita rents
that I transform in logs.17 As a measure of housing prices, I use the log of the
Average Price of Houses Sold (FRED: ASPUS) deflated by the GDP implicit price
deflator (FRED: GDPDEF).18 As first alternative signal of future rents, I use sur-
vey variables. In order to measure demand side expectations, I employ the log of
Buying Conditions for Houses (Table 41 in the Michigan Survey of Consumers).
For the supply side, I take the National Home Builders Association market survey
concerning the expected new single family home sales in next 6 months. (Datas-
tream: USNAHB1E). Moreover, I also combine these two variables through a
principal component analysis. As second alternative signal, I exploit information
on home builders from the stock market through the Datastream Home Builders
Stock Price Index (Datastream: HOMESUS). I deflate this variable by the GDP
implicit price deflator and take logs.
The risk free interest rate employed in my baseline specification is the 3-Month
Treasury Bill, Secondary Market Rate (FRED: TB3MS). The interest rate that in-
corporates a risk premium component is the Moody’s Seasoned Aaa Corporate
Bond Yield (FRED: AAA). As a robustness exercises, I also use interest rates more
closely related to the housing market. In particular, I take the 30 years Fixed Rate
Mortgage (FRED: MORTGAGE30US) as measure including a risk premium and
the corresponding maturity of the Treasury Yield (FRED: USTYCO30R) as risk free
measure.19
In the macroeconomic analysis, I include additional variables as the log of the
Real Gross Domestic Product (FRED: GDPC1), the log of Real Private Residential
17Notice that this measure is equivalent to the total per capita dividends employed in FGLS.
18Similar results hold by using the Case Shiller S&P Corelogic Home Price Index (FRED:
CSUSHPISA) or the series available on the website of R. Shiller.
19Or the equivalent 20 years maturity that spans a longer sample.
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Fixed Investment (FRED: PRFIC1) deflated by the GDP implicit price deflator,
and the log of the Standard & Poor’s Index of 500 Common Stocks (Datastream:
US500STK) deflated by the GDP implicit price deflator.
I use the variables in log-levels to avoid cointegration problems following
Stock et al. (1990). I include 2 lags as consistently suggested by the three infor-
mation criteria AIC, BIC, HQC. Variables are downloaded as seasonally adjusted
if possible. Otherwise, I employ the Census X13 to remove the seasonality (if nec-
essary).
1.4.2 Decomposition of Housing Prices
This first stage concerns the decomposition of housing prices in the four compo-
nents highlighted in Section 1.2. I include rents, housing prices, a risk free rate
and rate including risk premia and identify four corresponding shocks in the cur-
rent information set. The shocks are a surprise shock to rents, a shock to housing
prices (signal shock), a risk free rate shock (3 months T-Bill rate) and finally a risk
premia shock (Aaa Moody’s Corporate Bond Yield). While I present the results
using short-term rates, the same results hold using longer rates (e.g. rates closely
related to the housing market as the mortgage rate).20 The only role of variables
other than rents and housing prices concerns the identification of surprise and
signal shocks. Figure 1.1 display the impulse response functions (IRFs) to the sur-
prise and signal shock.21
Next, I use the procedure explained in Section 1.3 to identify news and noise
shocks as a linear combination of future surprise and signal shocks. The other
shocks identified in the VAR, i.e. risk free rate shocks and risk premia shocks do
not enter directly this additional computation. The IRFs are reported in Figure 1.2.
The news shock is identified as a shock to housing prices that produces a delayed
but permanent increase in (future) rents. On the other hand, the noise shock is a
shock to housing prices without impact and long-run effect on rents. Recall that
the response of housing prices to news and noise shocks is left completely uncon-
strained. Figure 1.2 suggests that the news shock generates a permanent effect on
20Including the risk premia explicitly as spread or as implicit component in the mortgage rate
yields the same results.
21The effects of risk free and risk premia shocks are reported in Figure A.1 Appendix. These
shock produce negligible effects on rents and a negative response of housing prices in line with
economic theory.
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housing while the noise shock produce a strong response that dies out after about
20 quarters. Even if not statistically different, the estimate impact responses of
housing prices to the noise shock is greater than the response to the news shock.
Finally, the forecast error variance decomposition (FEVD) in Figure 1.3 high-
lights that, consistently with the identifying assumptions, the noise shock explains
a marginal share of the variability in rents, while news shock explains the great
majority of it. For what concerns housing prices, the role of the noise shock is
dominant up to 15 quarters (ranging from 68% to 20%) and gradually dies out
after this horizon. The news shock contributes to the volatility of housing prices
for 38% on impact and 82% after 40 quarters.
The information set employed in this exercise poses a potential concern. While
Forni et al. (2016) find that the equivalent four variable VAR for the stock market
is informationally sufficient, the housing market is more closely related to the real
economy for multiple reasons (see also Section 1.2). In fact, the Granger test pro-
posed by Forni and Gambetti (2014) reject the orthogonality of the shocks to lags
of potentially informative variables excluded from the VAR (Table A.2).22 This is
problematic because the shocks might be not correctly identified. To tackle this
concern, in the next Section I append the VAR with key macroeconomic aggre-
gates.
1.4.3 Macroeconomic Analysis
In this second stage, I include macroeconomic aggregates like GDP, residential
investment and the stock price index for multiple reasons. I repeat the Granger
test already applied in Section 1.4.2. The test now suggests that the shocks are
orthogonal to agents’ information set (Table A.3). Thus, the appended VAR is
informationally sufficient. There are other two key reasons to extend the analysis.
First, the goal of the paper is to assess the macroeconomic effects on news and
noise shocks. In particular, we can assess the impact of housing bubbles on the
macroeconomy as the identification isolates the bubble component in the housing
market. Second, I investigate whether the fundamentals in the housing market
are aligned with the macroeconomy in the long-run. I analyze whether a news
shock that has a permanent impact on rents has a similar effect on GDP and stock
22The variables are reported in Table A.1. Notice that Canova and Sahneh (2016) propose a dif-
ferent test. They claim that Granger tests may detect omitted variables but are not strictly related
to non-fundamentalness.
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prices. In this specification, I include only the Aaa Moody’s Corporate Bond Yield
and remove the 3-month T-Bill rate to avoid inflating the dimensionality of the
system.
I employ three different measures of expectations in the housing market. The
most natural consists of housing prices themselves (as in Section 1.4.2). In this
way, housing prices are assumed to incorporate all the available information
about future rents.
However, there may be departures from this framework because of the vari-
ous reasons discussed in Section 1.2. Therefore, I show that similar results hold
by employing two alternative variables as signal of future rents. First, I employ
the Buying Conditions for Houses from the Michigan Survey of Consumers. I
also include supply side expectations by using surveys from the Home Builders
National Association. Second, I assume that expectations in the housing market
can be (partially) proxied by the Home Builders Stock Prices Index. The three dif-
ferent signals produce very similar results. In particular, it is worth highlighting
that across all cases, a news shock produces a permanent effect both on rents and
on housing prices. Moreover, a noise shock generates significant responses on
housing prices and on macroeconomic aggregates.
1.4.4 Housing Prices as Signal
This section present the results obtained by using housing prices as signal of fu-
ture rents as implied by the present value relationship in equation 1.2. Notice that
the present value relationship is not imposed in a strict way, but I only assume
that new information on rent affects housing prices.
In this case, I include the following variables [RENTS, HOUSING PRICES, GDP,
RESIDENTIAL INVESTMENT, AAA MOODY’S CORPORATE YIELD, S&P INDEX] as
described in Section 1.4.1. The ordering matters for the identification of the sur-
prise shock and the signal shock as they are recovered through recursive zero
short-run restrictions (Choleski). I explore the sensitivity of the analysis to two
alternative orderings finding comparable results. I order housing prices second
after rents, but I also check the robustness of the results by placing them second
to last (before stock prices).
Figure 1.4 display the IRFs to a surprise shock and to a signal shocks. The
surprise shock generates a permanent effect on rents, housing prices, GDP and
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stock prices. There is no significant permanent effect residential investment as for
this series the trend is dominated by huge cyclical fluctuations. The signal shock is
a mixture of news and noise as represented in equation 1.6. It predicts an increase
in rents, GDP and stock prices because it incorporates news. However, for GDP
and housing prices this permanent effect is not statistically significant because the
signal shock is also incorporating noise.
Figure 1.5 reports the IRFs to news and noise shocks.23 First, the noise shock
does not have any significant effect on rents. I am imposing that the noise shock
does not have an impact and long-run (40 quarters) effect on rents, but at inter-
mediate horizon the response is unconstrained. Therefore, we can use the IRF at
intermediate horizon as a diagnostic of the identification strategy. In fact, the key
assumption is that rents allow to infer the past values of news and noise as they
are not affected by noise. Conversely, the news shock has a lagged but persistent
effect on rents. The lagged response of rents after the news shock is another good
indication of the identification. The news shock is constrained to have a delayed
effect on rents. The gradual increase of rent after a news shock suggests that the
identification is supported by the data.24 Housing prices react in a stronger way
to the noise shock than to the news shock on impact and in the short-run. This
means that the estimated variance of the noise shock is bigger than the variance
of the news shock. On the other hand, while the news shock lead to a permanent
change in the response of housing prices, the effect of a noise shock gradually dies
out and reaches zero after 15 quarters.
Regarding the macroeconomic effects, the news shock has the same permanent
effect on rents, housing prices GDP and stock prices. This means that the funda-
mentals in the housing market are in line with the macroeconomy. The noise shock
produces sizable but temporary effects on GDP, residential investment and stock
prices.
23The empirical results are consistent with DSGE model similar to Iacoviello and Neri (2010)
that includes also a rental market. News and noise shock to housing preference, or simply as a
reduced form shocks to rents, produce similar response of the corresponding VAR variables.
24The analysis may be biased if we think that the economy may be hit by transitory fundamental
shocks. These kind of shocks are are neglected in this identification strategy but, if relevant, they
would still be captured by the noise shock. The reason lies in the fact that also transitory funda-
mental shocks have zero long run effect on rents, but, differently from the noise shock itself, they
should affect rents at intermediate horizons. Given that noise shocks have no relevant effect on
rents at any horizon, we can conclude that identified noise shock does not contain also transitory
fundamental shocks.
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The quantitative implications of news and noise shocks are reported through
the FEVD in Figure 1.6. Rents are explained entirely by the news shock while the
noise shock has a marginal effect. The decomposition suggests that the bubble
component is the main drive of housing prices at high frequency (75% on impact)
but the news is the major driven in the long run, consistently with theory. In
fact, after 15 quarters the effect of the noise shock on housing prices dies out. A
similar picture holds for GDP. News is the main driver in the long-run, but in
the first five quarters noise dominates by explaining about 10% of the volatility
of GDP. Finally, residential investment is strongly affected by noise both at short
and medium horizons (up to 20%) while in the long run news plays a major role.
Due to the huge cyclical fluctuations, there is no significant permanent effect of
any shocks on residential investment.
1.4.4.1 Historical Decomposition
Figure 1.7 conveys the historical implication of the analysis. In this figure, I de-
compose the series of housing prices in a two orthogonal components: the funda-
mental component and bubble-noise component. The latter is expressed in per-
centage deviations from the fundamental component. The first important feature
is the increasing role of the noise component over the sample. In particular, the
noise component turns out to be more important after the deregulation of the
1980s.
In the 1970s, the housing market experienced a boom after the first oil price
shock in 1973 that is associated with a 25% noisy component.25 The downturn in
the US housing market of the 1990s was driven by noise (32%).
The largest housing cycle in the sample, which spans from 2000 to 2012, is
driven by a huge bubble, not related with future rents. The noisy component ac-
counts for sizable deviations of housing prices from fundamentals both during the
build-up and the collapse of the real estate market. The peak occurs in 2003 and
accounts for 45% deviation from fundamentals. The through explains about 40%
25Poterba (1984, 1991) relates this boom to demographics and the relationship between high
expected inflation and mortgage tax deductions. Piazzesi and Schneider (2009a) add the role of
inter-generational heterogeneity (baby boomers) to the high inflation explanation Demographics
factors are characterized as news as they are arguably expected to move future rents. This explana-
tory factor might be erroneously captured as a noise component. However, the estimation on the
sample 1985-2016 yield the same IRFs. Moreover, I control for inflation expectations by including
the inflation expectations from the Michigan Survey of consumers (Table 32) finding similar results
to the ones reported. These results are available upon request.
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of deviations from fundamentals and occurs in 2009. The same historical decom-
position of the Case & Shiller Corelogic Home Price Index points at an exceptional
role of noise during the 2000s. Therefore, expectations unrelated with fundamen-
tals are a key driver both of the housing boom that preceded the Great Recession
and of the following bust. Investigating the underlying reasons for those changes
in expectations is beyond the scope of this analysis, but this perspective should
receive more attention as already mentioned in Case et al. (2015).
These results are consistent with other existing works. For example, Agnello
and Schuknecht (2011) estimate a housing bust phase over 1990-97 (24% magni-
tude) and a boom from 1998-2005 (42% magnitude).26
Another important feature is the higher volatility of the noisy component with
respect to the actual housing price series. The excess volatility steams from the
highly volatile housing price series employed in the baseline analysis (which is
much more volatile than rents). This excess volatility disappears when using the
Case & Shiller Corelogic Home Price Index or other signals, whereas the key find-
ings from the historical decomposition hold still.
1.4.5 Alternative Signals
In two robustness exercises, I proxy the expectations in the housing market using
two alternative variables. This allows me to relax the assumption that housing
prices capture instantaneously all the available information on future rents. In
this way, we are able to test whether the results in Section 1.4.4 are driven by this
assumption.
First, I use survey information from the Buying Conditions for Houses from
the Michigan Survey of Consumer as signal. This variable captures demand side
expectations without a specific horizon.27 In order to include a proxy for the sup-
ply side expectations, I employ the National Home Builders Association market
survey (new single family home sales in next 6 months). Using this variable,
available only on a restricted sample, I find similar results. Finally, employing
together demand side and supply side expectations through a principal compo-
nent analysis yields consistent results. In this case, the VAR features the following
26They use the turning point methodology developed by Harding and Pagan (2002).
27Ideally, we would like to use a measure of exclusively long-term expectations that, unfortu-
nately, is not available
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variables [RENTS, SURVEY, GDP, RESIDENTIAL INVESTMENT, HOUSING PRICES,
AAA MOODY’S CORPORATE YIELD, S&P 500].
Second, I exploit the information contained in Home Builders Stock Price In-
dex. This variable contains the stock price of quoted home builders firms. This
variable arguably captures instantaneously all the available information. On the
other hand, there are also some disadvantages: i) stocks are an alternative asset,
with some dynamics that may be unrelated to the housing market at high frequen-
cies;28 ii) home builders are related exclusively with new houses built. In this case,
the VAR includes [RENTS, HOME BUILDERS STOCK PRICE INDEX, GDP, RESI-
DENTIAL INVESTMENT, HOUSING PRICES, AAA MOODY’S CORPORATE YIELD,
S&P 500]
The signal shock is now identified from these two alternative variables and
not directly from housing prices. Nonetheless, the results are comparable to the
findings presented in Section 1.4.4 (Figure A.3-A.7). In particular, the news shock
generates a permanent increase in rents and housing prices, GDP and stock prices.
The noise shock produces significant transitory responses in housing prices, GDP,
residential investment and stock prices. On the other, rents do not respond signif-
icantly to a noise shock.
These two alternative variables captures only partially expectations in the
housing market by construction. They convey information exclusively on con-
sumers’ expectations or home builders stock prices. Thus, while the results are
qualitatively very similar across all the specifications, the FEVD display a smaller
role for the noise shock compared to Section 1.4.4 (Figure A.4-A.8). Noise accounts
for a maximum of about 10% of the volatility of housing prices using the demand
side survey or the HBSPI. However, noise shocks still produce sizable macroe-
conomic implications as it is reflected in 15% (5%) of variability in GDP and in
20% (5%) residential investment using the survey (HBSPI). On the other hand, the
principal component of the demand and supply surveys captures expectations in
a more complete fashion. In this case, the quantitative role of noise raises consid-
erably for housing prices (25%), GDP (17%) and residential investment (30%).
Finally, the historical decomposition of housing prices (Figure A.5-A.9) dis-
plays some phase shift in the noise component comparing to Figure 1.7. However,
the main episode in the early 2000s is consistently decomposed across the three
28I obtain comparable results if I use as signal the HBSPI orthogonalized to the general stock
price index.
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different approaches. Using these two alternative signals, the noise component
explains 20% deviation of housing prices from the fundamental value.
1.4.6 Additional Robustness Exercises
I have performed additional robustness exercises: i) The most important concerns
the interest rate used which account for changes in discounting. Employing the
long-term interest rate, both risk free and including a risk premium, produces very
similar results to the baseline analysis; ii) I have included the amount of mortgages
(or total loans) to control for the quantity side of credit conditions; iii) There might
be concerns that the results are driven by the bust in the housing market after
2007. Similar results, with lower statistical significance, are obtained by running
the same exercise on the sample cut in 2006; iv) Finally, I have employed also
the Case & Shiller Corelogic Home Price Index instead of the Census measure of
housing prices on a restricted sample obtaining consistent results.
1.5 Conclusions
In this paper, I explore the role of long-term expectations in the housing market in
line with Case et al. (2015). I argue that long-term expectations have to be aligned
with future rents that represent the dividends from housing. However, since the
future is uncertain, expectations of future rents are noisy. Therefore, I introduce
imperfect information in a present value model of housing prices. Agents receive
noisy signals about future fundamentals and, as a result, bubbles can arise due to
this informational incompleteness. The approach is compatible both with rational
and irrational agents.
From a stylized present value model, I have derived identifying restrictions to
apply the non-standard structural VAR procedure developed by Forni et al. (2016,
forth). This methodology employs dynamic rotations of the reduced form resid-
uals to recover shocks related (news) and not related (noise) to future rents. The
identification exploits future rents to determine whether shocks to housing prices
are fundamental or noisy. At the same time, I roughly control for changes in dis-
counting by including different measures of interest rates (risk free and containing
a risk premium).
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The empirical results provide different insights on the dynamics of the hous-
ing market in the US. First, fundamentals in the housing market are aligned with
the macroeconomy. In fact, a news shock produces a permanent increase in rents,
housing prices, GDP and stock prices. Second, expectations not related to funda-
mentals are a relevant source of fluctuations for the housing market and macroe-
conomy. Noise shocks generate sizable responses in housing prices, GDP and
residential investment at the business cycle frequency but without permanent ef-
fects. In terms of forecast error variance, the noise shock is dominant in explaining
housing prices, GDP and residential investment at high frequency, but dies out af-
ter about 15 quarters. The historical decomposition shows that the role of noisy
bubbles, threatening macroeconomic stability, has increases over time. In particu-
lar, the boom-bust in the housing market during 2000s was entirely due to a noisy
bubble. Moreover, also the boom in 1970s and the depression in 1990s was driven
by a significant noise component.
The results are robust to different specifications. In particular, I relax the
present value hypothesis and rely on other variables to proxy expectations in the
housing market. On the one hand, I employ survey variables from consumers
(demand side) and home builders (supply side). On the other hand, I rely on the
stock prices of home builder companies. In both cases, the results are comparable
to the baseline specification.
The analysis sheds light on a relevant source of macrofinancial instability that
arises from the housing market. This finding is particularly meaningful in light of
the asymmetric spillovers from the housing market to the macroeconomy. Guer-
rieri and Iacoviello (2016) show the implications of the occasionally binding col-
lateral constraint on housing. The contribution of the housing boom (2001-2006)
to consumption growth was small. On the other hand, the (negative) implications
for consumption became much largest during the bust as the collateral constraint
become binding (2007-2009). Consequently, macro-prudential policies with a sta-
bilizing role may have the potential to reduce the harmful consequences of busts
and the excess volatility introduced by informational incompleteness. Exploring
this venue remains open for future research.
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1.6 Figures
Figure 1.1: IRFs to Surprise and Signal Shocks - Decomposition
IRFs to a surprise shock to rents and to a signal shock. The responses are reported in terms of the standard deviation of
the variables in the system. The solid blue line is the median, the dark and light blue shaded areas represents 68% and
90% confidence bands respectively (2000 bootstrap replications). The shocks are identified through the following
ordering: [Rents, Housing Prices, 3 Months Bill Rate, Aaa Moody’s Corporate Bond Yield]. The red line reports the
median IRFs obtained by the recursive ordering [Rents, 3 Months Bill Rate, Aaa Moody’s Corporate Bond Yield, Housing
Prices]. Sample: 1963:Q1 - 2016:Q3.
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Figure 1.2: IRFs to News and Noise Shocks - Decomposition
IRFs to news and noise shocks. The responses are reported in terms of the standard deviation of the variables in the
system. The solid red line is the median, the dark and light red shaded areas represents 68% and 90% confidence bands
respectively (2000 bootstrap replications). The shocks are identified through the following ordering: [Rents, Housing
Prices, 3 Months Bill Rate, Aaa Moody’s Corporate Bond Yield]. The blue dotted line reports the median IRFs obtained by
the recursive ordering [Rents, 3 Months Bill Rate, Aaa Moody’s Corporate Bond Yield, Housing Prices]. Sample: 1963:Q1 -
2016:Q3.
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Figure 1.3: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition
Forecast error variance decomposition of the variables in the system. The plot display the share of the variance explained
by news and noise at each horizon (not cumulatively). The shocks are identified through the following ordering: [Rents,
Housing Prices, 3 Months Bill Rate, Aaa Moody’s Corporate Bond Yield]. Sample: 1963:Q1 - 2016Q3.
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Figure 1.4: IRFs Surprise and Signal Shocks - Macro Analysis
IRFs to a surprise shock to rents and to a signal shock. The responses are reported in terms of the standard deviation of
the variables in the system. The solid blue line is the median, the dark and light blue shaded areas represents 68% and
90% confidence bands respectively (2000 bootstrap replications). The shocks are identified through the following
ordering: [Rents, Housing Prices, GDP, Residential Investment, Aaa Moody’s Corporate Bond Yield, S&P Index]. Sample:
1963:Q1 - 2016:Q3.
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Figure 1.5: IRFs News and Noise Shocks - Macro Analysis
IRFs to news and noise shocks. The responses are reported in terms of the standard deviation of the variables in the
system. The solid red line is the median, the dark and light red shaded areas represents 68% and 90% confidence bands
respectively (2000 bootstrap replications). The shocks are identified through the following ordering: [Rents, Housing
Prices, GDP, Residential Investment, Aaa Moody’s Corporate Bond Yield, S&P Index]. The blue dotted line reports the
median IRFs obtained by the recursive ordering [Rents, GDP, Residential Investment, Aaa Moody’s Corporate Bond
Yield, Housing Prices, S&P Index]. Sample: 1963:Q1 - 2016:Q3.
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Figure 1.6: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition - Macro Analysis
Forecast error variance decomposition of the variables in the system. The plot display the share of the variance explained
by news and noise at each horizon (not cumulatively). The shocks are identified through the following ordering: [Rents,
Housing Prices, GDP, Residential Investment, Aaa Moody’s Corporate Bond Yield, S&P Index]. Sample: 1963:Q1 -
2016Q3.
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Figure 1.7: Historical Decomposition - Macro Analysis
Historical decomposition of housing prices (dotted blue) into a fundamental component (blue) and noisy component
(orange). The shocks are identified through the following ordering: [Rents, Housing Prices, GDP, Residential Investment,
Aaa Moody’s Corporate Bond Yield, S&P Index]. Sample: 1963:Q1 - 2016Q3.
Chapter 2
Proxy-SVAR as a Bridge between
Mixed Frequencies
Joint with Alejandro Vicondoa
2.1 Introduction
Macroeconomists increasingly incorporate information from financial markets,
media, and the Web in their empirical analysis and models. The availability of
this type of data, in particular from financial markets, allows researchers to draw
information that was not available some years ago. Futures markets, for exam-
ple, provide real-time information on expected policy decisions. Additionally,
financial variables attract more attention due to the importance of recent financial-
related events like the Great Recession or the European Sovereign debt crisis.
However, while macroeconomic aggregates are available only at the monthly
or quarterly frequency, information from financial markets, media and Web is
collected in real time or on a daily basis. When facing data sampled at differ-
ent frequencies, the dominant approach still relies on temporal aggregation. The
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variables sampled at higher frequencies are converted to the lowest sampling fre-
quency.1 In this procedure, many properties of the original series are lost. Of par-
ticular interest for macroeconomists, temporal aggregation exacerbates the simul-
taneity problem that generates identification challenges in structural Vector Au-
toregressions (SVARs). More specifically, impulse response functions are not in-
variant to time aggregation as both the contemporaneous covariance of the resid-
uals and the parameters of the Wold representation change. Therefore, analyses
which rely on temporal aggregation can be strongly biased (see Marcellino, 1999).2
Mixed frequency techniques have consequently attracted a growing interest in
recent years. Mixed Data Sampling (MIDAS) and Mixed-Frequency Vector Au-
toregressions (MF-VARs) are two popular tools designed to deal with mixed fre-
quency data (for a survey on the topic see Foroni, Ghysels, and Marcellino, 2013).
Both, however, exhibit some shortcomings due to feasibility and computational
constraints. For example, the mismatch in frequencies cannot be too wide and/or
the number of high/low frequency variables cannot be too large. An alternative
approach, originally developed to overcome identification challenges in VARs,
actually constitutes a remedy for temporal aggregation biases. This methodol-
ogy, called high frequency identification in Proxy-SVAR (HFI-PSVAR), identifies
exogenous variations in high frequency variables around particular events and
uses them as proxies for the structural shocks of interest (e.g. Gertler and Karadi,
2015). Essentially, the researcher exploits the proxy together with the reduced
form residuals of a VAR to identify a shock of interest.3 However, selecting key
events for the phenomenon of interest is seldom straightforward and always ar-
bitrary to a certain degree. Moreover, the Proxy-SVAR assumes that the proxy is
orthogonal to the other structural shocks driving the system. Violations of this
exclusion restriction would bias the analysis.
1This aggregation usually follows either skip-sampling or averaging. Skip-sampling, or point-
in-time sampling, is usually applied to stocks. In this case, the variables available at the higher
frequency are converted to the lower frequency simply by taking the last value within the low
frequency period (for example the last monthly observation within a quarter). In the averaging
case, the variables are averaged over the lower frequency period and then observed only once for
each of those low frequency periods (for example, the quarterly average of monthly data).
2Intuitively, the severity of the simultaneity problem that we face in time series analysis is
decreasing with the sampling frequency. At the extreme, temporal aggregation can introduce si-
multaneity where there is none. Consider for example a monetary policy setup. By aggregating
the daily interest rate to the monthly frequency, the interest rate series will incorporate the en-
dogenous reaction of the central bank to the daily changes in (for example) inflation expectations,
which occurred within the month.
3This identification can be intuitively interpreted as an instrumental variable approach to VARs.
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In this paper, we propose a new methodology, labeled “Bridge Proxy-SVAR”,
that links data sampled at different frequencies, i.e. high frequency and low fre-
quency variables, through the Proxy-SVAR.4 First, we identify the structural shock
of interest in high frequency (HF) systems which are not subject to time aggrega-
tion and so characterized by less severe identification challenges (simultaneity).
Second, we aggregate the series of shocks at the lower frequency, e.g. monthly or
quarterly for macro variables. Third, we use the aggregated series of shocks as a
proxy for the corresponding structural shock at this lower frequency (LF). Namely,
we draw identifying restrictions for the LF representation from HF information.
Our methodology builds upon a crucial proposition: identification prior to tem-
poral aggregation is superior to identification post temporal aggregation. We il-
lustrate that this proposition holds analytically in a tractable case. In a bivariate
setup where the frequency mismatch is two, we prove that, if the HF shocks are
correctly identified, our methodology recovers the correct impact matrix. Monte
Carlo experiments generalize the test of the methodology to a variety of cases
and data generating processes (DGPs). In evaluating the performances, we focus
on the Impulse Response Functions (IRFs) that summarize the relevant informa-
tion from the estimation of VARs. Importantly, the Monte Carlo simulations also
allow us to compare the Bridge Proxy-SVAR with the common naive practice of
time aggregation (LF-VAR) and with the best possible estimation (HF-VAR). In
the LF-VAR, HF variables are introduced as time aggregated so all the available
information is compressed at LF. The HF-VAR, instead, is a counter-factual esti-
mation where the LF variables are observable at HF. As such, the HF-VAR also
provides the upper bound for the performances of the MF-VAR.
Our results show that the Bridge Proxy-SVAR (Bridge) is a suitable method for
approximating the true underlying responses under different data generating pro-
cesses. First, the Bridge greatly outperforms the LF-VAR in all case and yields simi-
lar but less precise estimates to the HF-VAR. Second, our procedure can be applied
in a simple manner, without computational burdens, even when the dimension-
ality of the system is large and when the frequency mismatch is wide. Third,
we apply our methodology to assess the effect of monetary policy shocks in the
US. Our benchmark is Gertler and Karadi (2015) as they apply the Proxy-SVAR.
4In what follows, we consider a standard VAR for the high frequency estimation but the anal-
ysis can apply any econometric model more suitable for high frequency data. What matters is the
identification of an unpredictable shock, orthogonal to other components.
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Their proxy consists of the series of monetary policy surprises built by Gurkaynak,
Sack, and Swanson (2005). While this identification exploits key events for mon-
etary policy, i.e. Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meeting days, we do
not impose a priori any special role for these dates. Nonetheless, we find ex-post
that the Bridge identifies shocks that are abnormally sizable on FOMC meeting
days vis-à-vis non-FOMC days. Our series of shocks produces similar macroeco-
nomic effects to those found in Gertler and Karadi (2015). Moreover, the monetary
policy shocks we identify are immune to some criticisms posed in the literature
on Gertler and Karadi (2015). This is related to the structural identification we
employ and to the wide information set included in our HF-VAR. Finally, within
our framework we can naturally take a further step consistent with the most re-
cent works on monetary policy. In particular, Gertler and Karadi (2015) capture
two distinct components on the path of interest rates, current and future, in their
measure of monetary policy surprises, with opposite macroeconomic effect in the
pre-crisis sample due to a strong informational content associated with shocks to
the future rate.
This paper originated from a companion (applied) paper: Gazzani and Vicon-
doa (2016), which disentangles the macroeconomic effects of liquidity shocks in
the Italian sovereign debt market. Two main identification challenges character-
ized that setup: first, the daily sampling frequency of financial variables opposed
to the monthly frequency of macroeconomic aggregates; second, a severe simul-
taneity characterizes liquidity and default risk. Moreover, other shocks can con-
temporaneously hit indicators of liquidity and default risk, further complicating
the analysis. In this framework, MF techniques proved to be unfeasible due to
frequency and dimensionality reasons. In particular, the daily frequency is crucial
for financial variables and we did not want to rely on aggregation to the weekly
frequency.5 Additionally, the inclusion of other financial indicators was necessary
to define a sufficient information set. In that setup, we could not find convinc-
ing events that could be exploited for identification through the Proxy-SVAR.6
5This data transformation is usually applied to employ financial and macroeconomic data in a
MF setup.
6Obviously, relevant events are available for the European Sovereign debt crisis (e.g. narrative
events). However, they are not convincing for identification because there are no events that are
mainly related with liquidity but not with default risk. A proxy build from this type of events,
which is practically used as an instrument for the identification, would not satisfy the exclusion
restriction being correlated with other structural shock (in particular default risk shocks).
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Instead, we developed the Bridge Proxy-SVAR: estimate a daily VAR and iden-
tify liquidity shocks in the Italian sovereign debt market, aggregate this series of
shocks to the monthly frequency, and use this monthly series as a proxy for the
liquidity shocks in a monthly VAR including macroeconomic variables.
The severity of temporal aggregation biases in VAR models is illustrated in
Marcellino (1999) and Foroni and Marcellino (2016). MF-VARs are the standard
tools to handle data sampled at different frequencies. There are two main ap-
proaches to estimating VARs with mixed frequency data. The most popular one,
developed by Zadrozny (1988), is based on a state space representation (a dynamic
linear model). The system is driven by latent shocks whose economic interpreta-
tion is not straightforward. The presence of latent shocks implies that the Forecast
Error Variance Decomposition (FEVD) of the system cannot be computed. Some
examples of this approach include Mariano and Murasawa (2010), Schofheide
and Song (2013), and Foroni, Ghysels, and Marcellino (2013). From a Bayesian
perspective, Eraker et al. (2015) and Bluwstein and Canova (2015) estimate the
state space representation via Gibbs sampler.7 The second approach, proposed
by Ghysels (2016), is more similar to standard VARs in being driven only by ob-
servable shocks. Contrary to model based on a state space representation, all the
usual VAR tools are at the researcher’s disposal. This particular VAR deals with
series sampled at different frequencies through stacking: a HF variable is decom-
posed into several LF variables and directly employed in the VAR. For example,
a monthly variable is introduced as three stacked series in a quarterly model. The
shortcoming consists of the curse of dimensionality, i.e. parameters proliferation.
Moreover, recovering the HF structural shocks from those in the stacked LF-VAR
is not necessarily straightforward. Importantly for structural analyses, Anderson
et al. (2016a) and Anderson et al. (2016b) study conditions for identifiability of the
HF representation of VARs from mixed frequency data.
Although MF-VARs are powerful tools that suit many analyses, they may not
be applicable in some cases. For example, the MF-VAR may not be a feasible
approach when the mismatch between high and low frequency variables is large
(e.g. 30 in the case of monthly-daily data). Additionally, also the dimensionality
of the system can be problematic. In fact, the stacked MF-VAR presents parameter
proliferation problems when the researcher has to include many HF variables.
7Some work as Angelini, Banbura, and Runstler (2010) have extended the mixed frequency
state space representation to Factor models.
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Computational problems may arise in the state space MF-VAR when there are
many unobservable states (LF variables).
The Bridge Proxy-SVAR is a useful alternative in these cases, since it provides
relevant computational advantages over the MF-VAR in terms of frequency mis-
match and dimensionality. On the other hand, the MF-VAR is a different econo-
metric model that improves, over a LF-VAR, the VAR estimates of both the autore-
gressive matrix and the impact matrix of the shocks.8 The Bridge Proxy-SVAR only
improves the impact matrix through information external to the LF-VAR, but still
relies on the same autoregressive matrix of the LF-VAR. Additionally, the MF-VAR
can assess the response of a HF variable on a LF variable, while the Bridge focuses
exclusively on the reversal. Finally, the Bridge Proxy-SVAR, as the method devel-
oped by Ghysels (2016), relies purely on observables and not on latent variables
and shocks as opposed to the state space MF-VAR.
The Proxy-SVAR methodology, developed by Stock and Watson (2012) and
Mertens and Ravn (2013), is a very recent development in the identification of
SVAR. This method employs exogenous variations in one variable, which is in-
cluded in the VAR system, as a proxy for the structural shock of interest. The
proxy is assumed to be correlated with a structural shock of interest but orthog-
onal to other structural shocks. In practice, the proxy constitutes an instrument
for the reduced form residuals of the VAR and is used for (partial) identifica-
tion of the covariance matrix of the structural shocks. The clear advantage of
this technique is that, as long as the proxy is a relevant and valid instrument, the
identification relies on a much weaker set of assumptions than other identifica-
tion schemes. For example, no assumptions are made on the contemporaneous
relationship among the variables in the system. Moreover, Carriero et al. (2015)
have shown through Monte Carlo experiments that the PSVAR is robust to mea-
surement errors. Lunsford (2015) provides a characterization of the asymptotic
statistical properties of the Proxy-SVAR estimator.9 When the proxy is a strong
(weak) instrument, the estimator for the impact of structural shocks is consistent
(inconsistent and biased towards zero). Ludvigson, Ma, and Ng (2015) employ an
iterative projection IV to jointly build multiple external instruments. Proxies are
8Respectively, the A and B matrices in eq.(2.3).
9In Jentsch and Lunsford (2016) the performances of different bootstrapping techniques are
compared for the Proxy-SVAR. The suggest that the moving block bootstrap is the best option.
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usually built from a narrative description of policy decisions10 or exploiting high
frequency identification around some key events as in the already mentioned case
of Gurkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005) and Gertler and Karadi (2015).
The Bridge Proxy-SVAR generalizes the HFI-PSVAR to those cases where there
are no key events or when their selection is troublesome and arbitrary. The ad-
vantage of this methodology lies in the high frequency identification that may be
cumbersome at low frequencies. At the same time, the high frequency shocks are
used to instrument the reduced form residuals (prediction errors) of a LF-VAR. In-
tuitively, the Bridge always employs more information than a naive LF-VAR. Our
approach remotely resembles the bridging equations which link data available
at different frequencies through linear regression to produce nowcast and short-
term forecast; e.g. Baffigi, Golinelli, and Parigi (2004) and Diron (2008). However,
we exclusively focus on structural analysis and employ an instrumental variable
approach.
After weighing pros and cons of our methodology versus the existing alterna-
tives, we regard the Bridge as a particularly suitable tool for structural analysis on
macro-financial linkages.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes the
Bridge Proxy-SVAR methodology. Section 2.3 presents the Monte Carlo experi-
ments employed for testing. In Section 2.4, we apply the Bridge to study monetary
policy in the US. Finally, Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Methodology
We introduce our methodology by summarizing the Proxy-SVAR identifica-
tion (Section 2.2.1). In Section 2.2.2, we explain the steps that constitute the Bridge
Proxy-SVAR methodology. First, we provide a general description of the identifica-
tion. Second, an illustrative example shows how the Bridge can recover the correct
impact matrix B in the VAR representation. On the other hand, when working
with temporally aggregated data (LF-VAR) even the correct identification scheme
cannot recover the true B matrix.
10See for example Stock and Watson (2012), Mertens and Ravn (2013) and Mertens and Ravn
(2014).
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2.2.1 Proxy-SVAR
Consider the simplest possible VAR representation:
Yt = AYt−1 + ut ut ∼ N (0,Σu) (2.1)
where Yt and ut are respectively n-dimensional vectors of endogenous variables
and reduced form residuals with variance-covariance matrix Σu. The objective is
to recover the structural form of the VAR, characterized by the vector of structural
shocks εt = B−1ut:
Yt = AYt−1 + Bεt εt ∼ N (0, I) (2.2)
Let us consider a bivariate VAR system, where X may represent a collection of





























represent the impact response (IRFs) of the system to
a structural innovation in the variable y. The Proxy-SVAR exploits the external
information to the VAR system contained in zt. zt is assumed to be a proxy for,
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The unknown parameter µ represents the share of the information in εy captured
by zt. B22 can be recovered only if µ is known, which in practice reflects the as-
sumption µ = 1⇒ zt = εy. Otherwise, we cannot uniquely identify B22 and, as a







meaning that B12 is identified up to B22. We can interpret this procedure through
an instrumental variable approach, in particular as two stages least squares
(2SLS):
First Stage: regress uyt on zt that yields βˆ I = B22µ and uˆ
y
t = B̂22µzt
Second Stage: regress uXt on uˆ
y
t where βˆ I I =
B12
B22
by applying the definition of
OLS.





IRFXn = An−1IRFXn−1 ∀n > 0 (2.9)
2.2.2 Bridge Proxy-SVAR
Traditionally, studies on monetary and fiscal policy have exploited narrative series
or key events for identification. Such a strategy is hardly extendable to other areas
of research. We therefore propose a more general and structural approach that em-
ploys HF information and, in this way, attenuates the time aggregation bias (see
Section 2.2.3). Unlike the literature on mixed frequency, we do not model jointly
the relationship between HF and LF variables, instead we exploit HF information
to draw identification restrictions for the LF-VAR. As we show in Section 2.2.3.1,
our approach exploits the superiority of identification prior to temporal aggrega-
tion over identification post temporal aggregation. First of all, we describe the
steps in the Bridge Proxy-SVAR identification.
1. Define two VARs:
(a) The first VAR, labeled High Frequency VAR (HF-VAR), incorporates the
high frequency variables relevant for the analysis (e.g. financial daily).
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It includes the variable of interest y and all the other variables necessary
for the identification of the shocks. We define this collection of other
variables as the information set Ψ. Potentially, the researcher can use
other (more appropriate, depending on the case) econometric models
for HF data. Moreover, the applied identification scheme should follow
from economic theory.11 If these conditions are satisfied, then εˆyt ≈ ε
y
t .
(b) The second VAR, defined Low Frequency VAR (LF-VAR), includes vari-
ables at lower frequency. It features presumably macroeconomic aggre-
gates and the variable yt aggregated at lower frequency yτ either by
skip-sampling or averaging. The estimation of the LF-VAR yields the
















i averaging time aggregation
zτ = εˆ
y
mt skip-sampling time aggregation
where m is the number of HF periods contained in a LF frequency period.
If all sub-periods are the same then, in the averaging case, the correct ag-
gregation scheme is actually given by zτ = εˆ
y
t (the shock in the first HF
sub-period). If the assumptions in (1a) are satisfied, then, by construction,










3. Use zτ as a proxy for the structural shock of interest: instrument u
y
τ with
zτ and estimate the impact effect of a shock in y. This means that we are
identifying the second column in the B matrix in eq.(2.2). We can see this

















11The higher the frequency at which they are imposed, the less identifying restrictions constrain
the data and the more they are likely to hold.
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so that the impact response to εyτ is identified up to the impact effect on y
itself. If we are confident that εˆt = εt, then µ = 1 and we can estimate the
size of the shock from the standard deviation of the series obtained from the
first stage regression.
Notice that the assumption in point 1, εˆyt ≈ ε
y
t , is far more stringent than what
we actually need. In fact, assume that the structural shock of interest can be de-




t = µ1ςt + µ2φt ςt ⊥ φt (2.11)
As explained in Section 2.2.1, the PSVAR partially identifies the B matrix and con-
sequently we need to recover only a component of the HF shock εyt , for example
ςt. Once again, this feature resembles a standard IV case where we exploit an ex-
ogenous variation in a variable of interest and not the whole exogenous variation.
Recall indeed that eq. (2.4) does not assume the correlation being equal to 1, but
only different from 0.
Next, we analyze how the Bridge Proxy-SVAR deals with data sampled at
mixed frequencies. Starting from a general case, we move to a tractable exam-
ple where, if a component of the structural shocks is correctly identified at HF,
our proxy recovers the correct true impact matrix B.
2.2.3 Time Aggregation
As a first step, following Foroni and Marcellino (2016), we illustrate the most gen-
eral formulation. The objective of the analysis is to recover the IRF of the VAR
system to a shock in the HF variable. The common practice consists of trans-
forming the HF (indexed by t) at LF (indexed by τ) and running a VAR on time
aggregated data. For the sake of simplicity, we consider a stationary case without
deterministic components:
Yt = A(L)Yt + Bεt εt ∼ N (0, I), t = 1, 2, ..., T
[I − A(L)]Yt = Bεt εt ∼ N (0, I) (2.12)
Time aggregation is generally a two-step filter. First, the data is transformed
through the filter w(L) and, second, the series is made observable only every
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m periods through the filter D(L). We consider the time aggregated represen-
tation under skip-sampling (or point-in-time sampling) since average sampling
introduces an higher order MA component that further complicates the analysis.
Nonetheless, we report in Appendix B.3 the same derivations for the averaging
scheme and show that similar results hold in our Monte Carlo simulations. In the
skip-sampling case, the filter w(L) = 1 does not produce any change. We apply
the filter D(L) = I + AL + ... + AmLm so that the researcher can observe certain
variables only once every m periods:
D(L) [I − A(L)]Yt = D(L)Bεt
Yτ = C(L)Yτ + Q(L)εt εt ∼ N (0, I), τ = mt, 2mt, ..., T
Yτ = C(L)Yτ + ξτ ξτ ∼ N (0,Ω) (2.13)
where C(L) = D(L)A(L) and Q(L) = D(L)B. Ω is given by the squared con-
temporaneous elements in the Q(L) matrix as the structural shocks are not auto-
correlated. Time aggregation mixes different structural shocks at different times
in ξτ.
2.2.3.1 An Illustrative Example
We focus now on a more specific case. We aim at assessing the effect of the shock
in y, observable at HF, on x, available only at LF. x is time aggregated through
skip-sampling. We consider a VAR(1) representation and a mismatch between
HF and LF equal to two, such that we can illustrate the methodology through
simple algebra:
Yt = AYt−1 + Bεt εt ∼ N (0, I)
(I − AL)Yt = Bεt εt ∼ N (0, I) (2.14)
To move to the time aggregated representation (under skip-sampling), we apply
the filter D(L) = I + AL:
D(L) (I − AL)Yt = D(L)Bεt(
I − A2L2
)
Yt = (I + AL)Bεt
Yτ = CYτ−1 + ξτ ξτ ∼ N (0, BB′ + ABB′A′)
Yτ = CYτ−1 + Q(L)εt εt ∼ N (0, I) (2.15)
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where C = A2 and Q(L) = (B + ABL). Let us consider the system in extended























so that we are in the standard
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In the temporal aggregation case, biases arise even if the identification exploits
the correct Cholesky decomposition of the variance-covariance matrix of the re-
duced form residuals. The problem originates from the variance-covariance ma-
trix observable at LF: Ω = BB′ + ABB′A′ which is different from the true BB′.
Intuitively, in the LF-VAR the zero restriction constrains εyt to have a zero effect
over x for m periods instead of one (in this simple case m = 2). An analytical
illustration of the time aggregation bias is reported in Appendix B.2.
Instead of imposing identification restrictions directly on the LF representa-
tion, we suggest identifying structural shocks from a HF system, which is not
subject to temporal aggregation biases. The (temporally aggregated) structural
shocks can be then employed to draw identifying assumptions in the LF-VAR
representation. As the variable x is not directly observable at HF, the goodness
of the identification is increasing in the amount of information included in the
HF-VAR (Ψ). Moreover, Ψ should contain all the variables necessary to achieve a
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correct identification at this HF stage, which depends on the specific cases under
examination.
In this stylized example, the HF system in the observables, assumed to be again

















The correct identification is fully achieved if xt is spanned by the collection of
variables that constitute the HF system and the LF-VAR (lagged):12
xt ∈ span {Ψt,Ψt−1, yt−1, xτ−1} (2.21)
Intuitively, the Proxy-SVAR uses information contained both in the HF system
and the LF-VAR. It is the union of these two information sets that has to provide
enough information on the unobservable xt to achieve the correct identification.
For simplicity, assume that Ψt perfectly incorporates the information contained
in xt. In applied research, if the HF system consists of financial variables, such
an assumption is motivated by financial markets incorporating all available infor-
mation. Moreover, a wide literature studies the reaction of financial markets to
macroeconomic data releases. Imposing a recursive structure where yt is ordered
after Ψt yields the correct impact matrix B. In this way, identification restrictions
do not rely on the temporally aggregated system but are drawn at HF.
Notice that, actually, we do not need to fully capture εyt but only a component
of it. In what follows, we assume that the proxy is given by a component of
the true structural shock as defined in eq. (2.11). In order to be consistent with
the skip-sampling temporal aggregation, we take the last HF shock within the LF
interval:
zτ = ςt
12Notice that those are the necessary requirements to achieve the correct identification. In order
to improve over the temporal aggregation practice, i.e. imposing restrictions directly on the LF-
VAR representation, the conditions are much milder.
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We can express the last stage in the Bridge either as a two stage least square (2SLS)




τ = β1szτ + ητ ητ ∼WN
where η is the error term, assumed to follow the distribution iidN (0, σ2).13


























If we employ the whole shock εyt , then βˆ1s = b22 which is the true parameter in







= βˆ1s = µ1b22 6= 0 IV relevance
E [εxt zτ] = 0 IV validity (by construction) (2.23)
The fitted value from the first stage are given by:
βˆ1szτ = µ1b22ςt (2.24)





































13Henceforth, white noise (WN) will point at the error term in simple OLS equations, assumed
to be distributed as iidN (0, σ2) and uncorrelated with the independent variables.
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meaning that the Bridge correctly recovers the Cholesky structure of the inno-

































Through this tractable case, we have shown analytically that the Bridge recov-
ers the true impact matrix, whereas the correct Cholesky ordering imposed at LF
introduces biases. The magnitude of these differences in a more general setup can
only quantified through Monte Carlo experiments, presented in Section 2.3. Fur-
thermore, we also test the robustness of the methodology to misspecifications and
to limited information in the HF system and LF system employed by the Bridge
(omitted variables).
2.3 Monte Carlo Experiments
Our design is similar to Foroni and Marcellino (2016) who compare the finite sam-
ple performances of the HF-VAR, LF-VAR (time aggregated), and the MF-VAR. In
the latter, one variable is unobservable at high frequency but the econometrician
only observes one out of three observations. We run the same experiment but
we substitute the MF-VAR with the Bridge. Notice that the HF-VAR constitutes a
“counter-factual” first best and an upper bound for the performances of the MF-
VAR. Temporal aggregation follows skip-sampling, while in Appendix B.3 we re-
port the main results under the averaging temporal aggregation scheme. We focus
on the IRFs that summarize the relevant information on the estimation of the sys-
tem. To be able to compare the IRFs under HF and LF representation, the IRFs
at HF have to be treated in a consistent manner with the temporal aggregation
scheme applied to the data.
The benchmark outline of the experiment is the following: we consider a
VAR(1) DGPs and, for thirteen representative parametrizations, generate 1000
replications of 3000 HF observations. In a first step, the frequency mismatch is
three, so that at LF we dispose of 1000 observations. For the sake of synthesis, we
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evaluate the performances of the three identifications through the lens of the Mean
Absolute Distance (MAD) which measures the distance between the estimated and
the true IRFs (cumulated over 8 horizons). For each replication, we compute the
MAD and then we average over the whole set of replications.
The analysis begins with a stylized case that highlights the time aggregation
bias alone. Then, one step at the time, we include further elements resembling the
identification challenges that economists face in applied research.
2.3.1 Pure Time Aggregation
The LF-VAR and the Bridge temporally aggregate information in antithetical ways.
In a LF-VAR, the aggregation occurs before identification while the Bridge identi-
fies structural shocks at HF and then compresses them at LF. We are implicitly
comparing the performances under these two temporal aggregation schemes.


























∼ N (0, I2). Basically, the innovations follow a recursive order-
ing structure that we correctly apply with the HF, LF and Bridge. We test 13 com-
binations of {ρ, δl, δh} that represent different possible structures of the DGP.14
Figure 2.1-2.2 display an example of IRFs recovered with the three identifica-
tions. The HF-VAR and the Bridge perfectly recover the true IRFs, while the LF-
VAR overestimates the size of the shock. Not surprisingly, Figure 2.3 points out
that the HF identification is the best possible identification. An infinitesimal bias
comes from the finite sample estimation of the HF-VAR system. The Bridge, which
is by construction a second best option, performs very closely to the HF-VAR.
Even if the Bridge and HF-VAR apply the same identification at HF, the Bridge is
inefficient due to the two stages in the estimation. The comparison resembles the
efficiency loss of the IV estimation with respect to OLS.
For nearly all cases, the Bridge recovers the IRFs with a smaller bias than the LF-
VAR. Under few DGPs, the exception consists of the shock to the second variable
y with zero impact on the first variable x. The zero restriction is imposed in the
14The parametrizations are reported in Appendix B.2.
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case of the HF-VAR and LF-VAR, while it is estimated from the first stage in the
case of the Bridge. Even if the median IRF is zero, the IRFs generated by the Bridge
across the 1000 replications may slightly differ from 0 due to finite sample bias.
As a result, when the MAD is generally very low, the Bridge may perform worse
than the LF-VAR.
While we present the main results of the Monte Carlo under averaging time
aggregation in Appendix B.1, Figure 2.4 provides an intuitive portrait of the biases
arising from this alternative time aggregation scheme. Even if the correct recursive
structure is imposed at LF on the variance-covariance matrix of the reduced form
residuals, the restriction constraints three HF periods instead of one. As a result,
the LF-VAR estimates strongly biased IRFs, whereas the Bridge correctly recover
them.
2.3.2 Time Aggregation and Misspecification
In applied research, the econometrician does not know the true DGP and, indeed,
the analysis aims at recovering information on it. In this light, the interaction
between temporal aggregation and misspecification deserves attention. The DGP
deviates from the recursive structure which, on the contrary, is still employed as
identifying restriction by HF-VAR, LF-VAR and Bridge. Additionally, we consider
two further issues: wider frequency mismatch and measurement error.
2.3.2.1 Contemporaneous Effects





















We present the results under {c1, c2} = {−0.3, 0.1}, but we have tested different
combinations obtaining similar results. In this case, the Bridge closely resembles
the performance of the HF-VAR whereas the LF-VAR leads to sizable biases (Fig-
ure 2.5).
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2.3.2.2 Wider Frequency Mismatch and Measurement Error
First, we now turn to a case in which the mismatch between HF and LF is sig-
nificantly wider, i.e. m = 30, which represent the monthly-daily case. Fig. B.7
compares the identifications over the 13 DGPs through the lens of MAD. The LF-
VAR induces a much larger bias with respect to the HF-VAR and Bridge.15
Second, we test the impact of measurement errors without finding any severe
effect for the Bridge, while LF-VAR suffers the most. The results reported in Fig.
B.8 refer to a case in which the first variable in the system is affected by a sizable
measurement error with standard error 0.3 (30% of the actual standard deviation
of the structural shocks).
2.3.3 A Practical Case - One LF and Two HF variables
Let us turn now to a more practical case: we consider a situation in which the
researcher observes two HF variables and one LF variable. x is observable only
at LF, whereas y and z are available at HF. We are interested in studying how the
shocks to the HF variables affect x (e.g. how financial shock affect the macroe-
conomy). Contrary to the previous MC exercises, in the first stage of the Bridge
we use only the two HF variables. In the second stage, we will include all three






































15Notice that the Bridge easily accommodates the daily-quarterly mismatch without relevant
computational costs.
16In this case, we rely on the conservative identification that is described in Appendix B.1.
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This parametrization represents the strong simultaneity among the variables
observed at HF (financial variables). The same pattern of the previous exercises
emerges also in this practical case (Figure 2.6). The HF identification of the Bridge,
not subject to temporal aggregation biases, employs only a subset of the actual
information. However, the missing variable is included in the LF-VAR represen-
tation whose reduced form residuals are instrumented in the second stage of the
Bridge. Consequently, we are using a richer information set than the LF-VAR.
Moreover, economists usually assume that financial markets incorporate with a
negligible lag all available information. In empirical implementations, the Bridge
is therefore unlikely to suffer from a problem of limited information at HF.
2.3.3.1 High Frequency not High enough?
A potential concern arises if the HF identification of the Bridge is implemented at
the wrong frequency. For example, the correct analysis for financial phenomena
could be though as intra-daily and not daily.17 To address this concern, we test
whether, by relying on a HF, which is not high enough, we can still mitigate time
aggregation biases. We repeat the same exercise of Section 2.3.3 but, while the HF-
VAR employs the correct frequency, the Bridge relies on mildly time aggregated
data (m = 3). The LF-VAR estimation is based on aggregation over nine periods
(m = 9). Figure B.9 depicts that the Bridge still attenuates the biases with respect
to the LF-VAR.
2.3.4 Large Systems
Until now, we have studied the performances of different identifications in small
systems with ad hoc parametrizations of the DGP. However, we know that many
events (shocks) hit economies at the same time and financial markets take this in-
formation nearly instantly into account. To represent this situation, we consider
a nine variables VAR as DGP. Moreover, in order to tackle any possible suspicion
of DGP “self-selection”, we randomly parametrized both the autoregressive ma-
trix A and the impact matrix B. The only constraints that we impose ensure the
stationary of the system and a mapping between variables and shocks.18 From
17In case relevant data is available at intra-daily frequency, the econometrician can recover
shocks at this frequency and link them with macro-variables through the Bridge. However, this
procedure may induce noise coming from the micro-structure of the market
18Each shock impacts the corresponding variable more than other variables.
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100 random parametrizations of the system, we generate 1000 data-points at LF
across 1000 simulations.19
We run this large experiment over three dimensions:
1. the time aggregation scheme: (a) skip-sampling
(b) averaging
2. information employed by the Bridge:
(a) partial information at LF: the HF stage of the Bridge employs full in-
formation but the LF stage (and LF-VAR) do not include the last two
variables in the system
(b) full information at LF:
i. full information at HF: all information is included both in the HF-
VAR and in the LF-VAR employed by the Bridge
ii. partial information at HF: the HF stage of the Bridge does not in-
clude the last two variables in the system
3. frequency mismatch: (a) quarterly-monthly (m = 3)
(b) monthly-daily (m = 30)
The case (2b) is a robustness check similar to the practical case presented in Section
2.3.3. However, we do not expect it to be particularly severe if the HF system
employs financial data.
The Bridge improves over the performances of the LF-VAR across all the cases
(Table 2.1). MAD percentage gains over the LF-VAR vary between 10% and 73%.
The gains are higher when the Bridge employs full information and under the av-
eraging scheme. In the latter case the biases from time aggregation are larger. Fig-
ure 2.7 displays examples of a heat-map of the MAD over the three identifications
for one of the 100 systems for all combinations of shocks and variables. The sim-
ilar results of the Bridge compared to the HF-VAR stand out immediately. At the
same time, the LF-VAR produce much worse estimates than the alternative meth-
ods. Figure 2.8 presents an example of IRFs. Even in this large system, the Bridge
performs very closely to the HF-VAR and it subject only to a loss in precision. In
conclusion, the Bridge greatly improves the performances of the analysis over the
19Similar results hold for 500 observations at LF.
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naive practice of time aggregation and it is often close to the performances of a
counter-factual HF-VAR. The more complete the information set is at HF in the
Bridge identification, the closer the results of the Bridge to the HF-VAR. On the
other hand, employing only partial information in the LF-VAR of the Bridge does
not produce too severe losses in performances. In fact, the information omitted
from the LF system does not affect the estimated B matrix but only the transmis-
sion of the shocks.
2.4 Application - Monetary Policy in the US
This section is devoted to an empirical application of our methodology. We choose
a popular empirical question in order to have benchmarks for comparison: the
macroeconomic effects of monetary policy shocks in the US. The related identi-
fication poses great problems due to various reasons and, in particular, due to
two challenges. First, the Federal Reserve (FED) often changes the policy rate in
response to current and expected economic conditions. Such responses cannot
obviously be considered exogenous. Second, agents anticipate a large component
of the changes in the policy rate (e.g. Vicondoa, 2016) and this anticipation can
lead to VAR failures. Romer and Romer (2004) and Gertler and Karadi (2015)
(RR and GK henceforth) employ two popular identification strategies and, con-
sequently, constitute our reference points. RR mainly tackle the first challenge,
analyzing US monetary policy through a narrative approach that takes into ac-
count the information contained in the Greenbook (FED forecasts). Their series
of monetary shocks have been updated, among others, by Coibion et al. (2012).
GK focus mainly on the second identification threat, using the series of mone-
tary policy surprise built by Gurkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005) as a proxy to
reach identification in a monthly VAR. Since GK employ the Proxy-SVAR, they
are the most natural comparison for the Bridge. Gurkaynak, Sack, and Swanson
(2005) measure monetary policy surprises as the change in the price of Fed Funds
(FF) future contracts around FOMC meetings days. While they exploit these key
events for monetary policy, we do not impose a priori any special role for these
dates. Nonetheless, we find ex-post that the Bridge identifies shocks that are ab-
normally sizable on FOMC meeting days vis-à-vis non-FOMC days. Our series
of shocks produces similar macroeconomic effects to those found in Gertler and
Karadi (2015). Moreover, the monetary policy shocks we identify are immune to
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some criticisms posed in the literature on Gertler and Karadi (2015). For example,
our measure of monetary policy shock is orthogonal to changes in risk premia
that may be captured by the FF futures. Finally, within our framework, we can
easily decompose two components captured by GK and defined in Gurkaynak,
Sack, and Swanson (2005) as two orthogonal factors: a “current federal funds
rate target” factor and a “future path of policy” factor. The future component is
not strictly a monetary policy shock since incorporates significant informational
content. This finding is consistent with recent papers by Campbell et al. (2012)
and Campbell et al. (2016) who introduced the distinction between Delphic and
Odyssean forward guidance.20
Instead of focusing on particular events, we estimate a daily VAR on the sam-
ple 1991m1-2008m6 to avoid any issue related with the zero lower bound. The
optimal number of lags based on the three most popular information criteria is 22.
Notice that we may employ more refined econometric models, suitable for finan-
cial data, ranging from a VAR featuring stochastic volatility to a SVAR-GARCH.21
Nonetheless, as we show in a few lines, a standard VAR suffices in this case. A
daily analysis over such a long horizon offers vast degrees of freedom allowing
us to include a large amount of variables to widen as much as possible the infor-
mation set.
2.4.1 Romer & Romer and Gertler & Karadi
The Target Fed Fund Rate (TFFR) and the price of the FF Future contract 3 months
ahead (FF4) constitute our monetary policy indicators. The TFFR allows us to
resemble the analysis of RR while the FF4 corresponds to the analysis of GK. In
the latter case, it is necessary to remove the TFFR from the HF-VAR in order to
capture a mixture of shocks to the current and future path. We identify monetary
policy shocks through a recursive ordering, placing our measure of monetary
policy last. In other words, we regress the TFFR (FF4) on the lags and contempo-
raneous values of the other financial variables (plus the TFFR-FF4 own lags). This
procedure orthogonalizes the reduced form residual in the TFFR (FF4) equation
20Lakdawala (2016) also studies the macroeconomic effect of current and future factors. How-
ever, in our case the decomposition does not exploit FOMC meetings explicitly and it is applied
directly within our daily VAR. Moreover, the current factor identified in Lakdawala (2016) leads
to a positive reaction of CPI that we find puzzling.
21See for example Lutkepohl and Milunovich (2015). Additionally, when using financial vari-
ables, identification itself can exploit changes in volatility.
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from all innovations in other financial variables. In this way, we ensure that
we clean our measure of monetary policy shocks from other innovations in the
system occurring in the same day. In an intuitive fashion, we define as mone-
tary policy shocks the new information that enters the system at time t uniquely
through our measures of monetary policy (TFFR-FF4). In this way, we clean the
residuals in the FF4 from non-monetary disturbances like the endogenous market
reaction to macroeconomic news.22 We are aware that a wide literature studies
the reaction of financial markets to monetary policy shocks. For example, stock
prices, bond yields and exchange rates respond to the decisions of the central
banks in the same day. However, as explained in Section 2.2.1-2.2.3.1, the Bridge
only requires a component of the true structural shock and not the whole struc-
tural shock to yield unbiased estimates of the impact matrix.23 On the other hand,
a more relaxed identification scheme would incorporate other structural shocks
in our measure of monetary policy shocks, violating the exclusion restriction and
biasing our analysis. This issue is particularly relevant for the FF4 as the price
of the FF Futures may incorporate information not strictly related with monetary
policy which can nonetheless affect the conduct of monetary policy in the future.24
Notice that the procedure applied in this case corresponds to the conservative
Bridge identification formally illustrated and tested in the Monte Carlo experi-
ments (Appendix B.1). Our results are robust to two alternative high frequency
identifications that do not rely on timing assumptions. First, we follow Rigobon
(2003) in applying the identification through heteroskedasticity: we exploit the
change in the volatility of monetary policy shocks between FOMC meeting days
and non-FOMC meeting day. Second, independent component analysis allow us
to identify structural shock by exploiting the non-normality of the reduced form
residuals.25
22If the information set in our HF system is wide enough, a common unobservable factor may
affect all the financial variables at the same time. The available information on macroeconomic
aggregates is a good and important candidate. By ordering our monetary policy indicator last, we
clean our measure of monetary policy shocks from this unobservable factor, i.e. from all available
information captured by financial markets, in particular related with macroeconomic aggregates.
23An exogenous variation and not the whole exogenous variation with an instrumental variable
terminology.
24For the TFFR, the ordering does not matter: the correlation between shocks identified placed
the TFFR last or first is 0.97, while repeating the same exercise for the FF4 the correlation falls to
0.7.
25Further details on these two alternative identifications are available in Section B.4.1.2 (Ap-
pendix).
CHAPTER 2. BRIDGE PROXY-SVAR 53
The full list of variables reads:
VAR: [Fed Fund Future 3 months; S&P500; VXO; Bid-Cover Ratio in Treasury Auc-
tions; Brent Crude Oil; Eurodollar Exchange Rate; Commodity Price Index; Gold
Price Index; BBA Corporate Spread; FED Cleveland Financial Stress Index; As-
set Backed Securities (price); 10y Treasure Spread; 5y Treasure Spread; 1y Treasure
Spread, Fixed Mortgage Rate; Oil Futures; Dollar-Pound Exchange Rate; Eurodol-
lar Futures; Target Fed Fund Rate]
We label the shocks identified from our daily VAR as Bridge Target FFR and Bridge
FF4 respectively. As a first diagnostic of our identification at HF, we study the re-
lationship between the identified shocks and FOMC meeting days. FOMC meet-
ing days prove to be special day for the size and volatility of the shocks vis-à-vis a
“normal” day. Quite reasonably, such a special role is more relevant for the shorter
horizon contracts, with the maximum for the TFFR. In Appendix B.4, we provide
a detailed account through descriptive statistics and regression analysis.
In a second diagnostic, we compare our shocks with RR and GK by restricting
our series to the FOMC meeting days only. Table 2.2 reports the contemporaneous
correlation across the four series of shocks during FOMC meeting days, while
Table 2.3 refers to the monthly aggregates.26
Notably, the Bridge TFFR shocks are highly correlated with both the RR series
(0.77) and the GK series (0.41). The FF4 shocks are correlated mainly with the
GK series (0.61) and less with the RR series (0.27). These correlations decrease
once we move from the FOMC dates to the monthly aggregates as we consider
all available days in our sample. However, the correlations remain positive and
statistically significant also at the monthly frequency.
The lack of correlation around FOMC meetings between the Bridge TFFR
shocks and the Bridge FF4 shocks follows by construction from the two estima-
tions at daily frequency. When identifying shocks in the TFFR, we include the FF4
in the VAR and order the TFFR after the FF4. Consequently, a shock to the TFFR
does not produce any change in the FF4 in the same day. On the other hand, our
26Figures B.17-B.18 display the comparison in monthly terms (in Appendix B.4). The predictive
power of our Bridge Target for the RR shocks is reported in Figure B.19. In Figure B.20 we show
that both the Bridge Target FFR and the Bridge FF4 contain relevant information to fit the GK
shock series.
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alternative identification exploits the unexpected daily changes in the FF4 (uncor-
related with the forecast errors of all other variables). As a consequence, the two
series of shocks are uncorrelated.
Finally, Table B.9 reports anecdotal evidence of the largest daily shocks from
our daily VAR.
We check some properties of our TFFR (FF4) series of shocks that Ramey (2016)
and others has found problematic in GK:
• zero mean: we test the null hypothesis that our monthly aggregated shocks
are drawn from N(0, σ) through the Kolmorogov-Smirnov test. We cannot
reject the null at any significance level (the sample mean is 0.0007 (0.0016))
• autocorrelation: we regress our proxy on its own previous lag and we do
not find a significance coefficient. Moreover, the R2 accounts for 0.02 (0.008)
• predictability: we regress our daily proxy, around FOMC meetings, on the
Greenbook variables used by the RR.
– When we perform this exercise on the TFFR shocks, we find some evi-
dence of predictability with the private FED information. Nonetheless,
the only significant coefficient related to the current level of output. In
our analysis using the sport FF (FF1), this predictability vanishes and
the adjusted R2 turns negative. This discordance is most likely due to
the discrete nature of the TFFR.
– For the FF4, we do not find any significant coefficient and the R2 is in
the order of 0.06, while the adjusted R2 is negative.
This dissonance between the predictability in GK versus our series maybe
due to the event-study approach of the former study. Using the change in
the FF futures around a tight window might not include enough information
as all the events across two FOMC meetings (and in other financial markets)
are completely discarded.27
The third diagnostic refers to the macroeconomic effect of monetary policy shocks:
we aggregate by averaging the TFFR and FF4 shocks at monthly frequency and
we use the Proxy-SVAR. Using both the shocks in FOMC meeting days only and
27These results hold both for the daily and monthly series.
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all the monthly shocks, our results are similar to the small scale VAR of GK as
reported in Figure 2.9-2.10.28 Figure 2.9 displays the IRFs computed by employing
the identified monetary policy shocks in all the days of the sample. Due to the
larger informational content included in the instrument, the confidence bands are
narrower than in GK who exploit exclusively monetary policy surprises in FOMC
meeting days. On the other hand, in Figure 2.10 we repeat the same exercise
but we use only the shocks identified on FOMC meeting days. Furthermore, we
do not impute a 30 days window to such shock as in GK and, consequently, the
confidence bands are wider than in GK.29
If we move to the medium scale system, we find comparable results (Figure
B.23).30 The major difference concerns the response of the excess bond premium:
the response is weaker and less persistent in our case. A possible explanation of
this finding relies on the risk component. In fact, while GK take the raw change
in the price of FF4 contracts, our identification cleans the proxy of the risk compo-
nent by including many measures of risk in the daily VAR.
Another relevant issue is the informational (Delphic) component that GK in-
clude in their measure of monetary policy shocks. Once we include the current
rate and the FF future contracts together, we are able to disentangle shocks to
the current and future path of interest rates (Figure 2.11). As exemplified by the
response of industrial production, a shock to the current rate produces the oppo-
site effects to a shock to the future rate. Moreover, the IRF in GK is exactly the
mean between the IRF generate by the two components. We believe that further
research should disentangle Odyssean and Delphic components for a better un-
derstanding of monetary policy. However, this task goes beyond the scopes of this
methodological paper.
28In Appendix B.4, we report the same exercise that employs all the daily shocks within a month.
We find very similar results.
29This implies that our instrument displays many zero entries in the months without FOMC
meetings.
30Lunsford (2015) provides the correct critical value of the F statistic for the Proxy-SVAR and
our first stage result always satisfy his criteria.
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2.5 Conclusions
Temporal aggregation is a severe issue in time series analysis, largely ignored in
the macroeconomic literature. To alleviate temporal aggregation biases, this pa-
per proposes a new methodology, the Bridge Proxy-SVAR, which deals with mixed
frequency data. Structural shocks are recovered in high frequency systems, aggre-
gated at the lower frequency, and used as a proxy for a structural shock of interest
in lower frequency VARs. By instrumenting the reduced form residuals of a VAR
at the macroeconomic frequency, the proxy provides identification restrictions.
Our methodology relies on the superiority of identification prior to temporal ag-
gregation over identification post temporal aggregation. In other words, our pro-
cedure exploits high frequency data for identification by controlling for the correct
information set of policy makers and agents when making announcements or de-
cisions.
The properties of the Bridge Proxy-SVAR are studied analytically and its per-
formances are tested through Monte Carlo simulations. Our methodology largely
outperforms a LF-VAR using temporally aggregated data, which is the common
naive practice in applied macroeconomics. The Bridge is also close to the perfor-
mances of a counter-factual HF-VAR, which constitutes the best possible estima-
tion. In particular, if the amount of information employed is large enough, the
Bridge replicates the estimation of a HF-VAR with lower precision. The biases in-
troduced by temporal aggregation and the potential gain from the Bridge increase
with the complexity of the stochastic process under examination. Unlike existing
mixed frequency techniques, our methodology can exploit daily data in large di-
mensional systems to improve the identification of SVARs. At the same time, the
MF-VAR is a different econometric model that also improves the autoregressive
matrix over a LF-VAR.
As an empirical application, we study the macroeconomic effects of mone-
tary policy in the US. Monetary policy shocks are identified from a large scale
daily VAR over the sample 1991m8-2008m6. Although we do not impose any
special role for FOMC meeting days, the Bridge neatly captures FOMC meeting
days as crucial dates. After aggregating the daily shocks at monthly frequency,
we use them to instrument the reduced form residuals of the Fed Fund Rate in
the monthly VAR of Gertler and Karadi (2015). Our analysis produces very sim-
ilar IRFs to theirs. Consistently with recent findings in the literature, we show
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that Gertler and Karadi (2015) identify a mixture of shocks to the current path
and future path of interest rate, where the latter includes relevant informational
content.31
Importantly for future research, the Bridge Proxy-SVAR exploits high frequency
information for the identification of SVARs without relying on a definite set of
events. The higher the frequency at which they are imposed, the less identifying
restrictions constrain the data and the more they are likely to hold. The Bridge
is particularly promising to improve structural analyses on macro-financial link-
ages, which are characterized by a wide frequency mismatch and need to take into
account a wide information set.
31A significant example of the potential of the Bridge Proxy-SVAR can be found in the companion
paper Gazzani and Vicondoa (2016) where we apply the methodology to identify liquidity shocks
in the Italian sovereign debt market.
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2.6 Tables





Full information at LF
HF-VAR 21.2% 41.4%
Bridge 20% 36.7%
Bridge - Partial Information at HF 10.3% 10.8%




Full information at LF
HF-VAR 70% 81.2%
Bridge 65.6% 72.6%
Bridge - Partial Information at HF 33.2% 47.5%
Partial Information at LF
HF-VAR 72.9% 84.7%
Bridge 58.7% 64%
Table 2.1: Performance comparison in Monte Carlo simulations
Performance comparison across the counter-factual HF-VAR, the LF-VAR and the Bridge Proxy-
SVAR. Performances are evaluated in terms of the Mean Absolute Distance (MAD) between the
true IRFs and the estimated IRFs in 100 randomly parametrized DGPs. One summary statistic is
computed based all the combinations of shocks-variables in the system. The gains are expressed
as percentage MAD gains over the LF-VAR. We analyze different cases for a VAR(1) DGP: I) the
frequency mismatch between HF and LF is 3: monthly-quarterly case. II) the frequency mismatch
between HF and LF is 30: monthly-daily case. For both I) and II) we study two sub-cases: a) The
Bridge employs full information at HF; b) The Bridge employs only partial information at HF (7
out of 9 variables). In this latter case, the Bridge employs the conservative identification discussed
in Appendix B.1. For case a) we also analyze: a.1) the LF stage of the Bridge and the LF-VAR use
all available information; a.2) the LF stage and the LF-VAR do not include all the variables in the
system (only 7 out of 9 variables).
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Bridge Target FFR Bridge FF4 Romer & Romer Gertler & Karadi
Bridge Target FFR 1 * * *
Bridge FF4 0 1 * *
Romer & Romer 0.77 0.27 1 *
Gertler & Karadi 0.49 0.61 0.32 1
Table 2.2: Correlation across different monetary policy shocks in FOMC meeting
days
Correlations among different monetary policy shocks in FOMC meetings days: 1) Shocks to the
Target FFR identified from our daily VAR; 2) Shocks to the Fed Future contracts (3 months ahead)
identified from our daily VAR; 3) Monetary policy shocks as in Romer and Romer (2004) shocks
extended by Coibion et al. (2012); 4) Monetary policy shocks as in Gertler and Karadi (2015). All
coefficients different from 0 are statistically significant at the 1% level.
Bridge Target FFR Bridge FF4 Romer & Romer Gertler & Karadi
Bridge Target FFR 1 * * *
Bridge FF4 0.1 1 * *
Romer & Romer 0.34* 0.18* 1 *
Gertler & Karadi 0.27* 0.23* 0.2* 1
Table 2.3: Correlation across different monetary policy shocks at monthly fre-
quency
Correlations among monthly measures of different monetary policy shocks: 1) Shocks to the
Target FFR identified from our daily VAR; 2) Shocks to the Fed Future contracts (3 months ahead)
identified from our daily VAR; 3) Monetary policy shocks as in Romer and Romer (2004) shocks
extended by Coibion et al. (2012); 4) Monetary policy shocks as in Gertler and Karadi (2015). *
denotes statistical significance at the 1% level.
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2.7 Figures
Figure 2.1: IRFs1 in the two variable case - skip sampling
IRFs to a shock in the first variable (x) in the bivariate system. The true IRF is represented by the dotted black line. The
shock is identified through the correct recursive structure in the HF system (blue), LF system (green) and Bridge Proxy
(red). Shaded areas correspond to the 90% confidence bands across 1000 replications. Time aggregation follows a
skip-sampling scheme.
Figure 2.2: IRFs2 in the two variable case - skip sampling
IRFs to a shock in the second variable (y) in the bivariate system. The true IRF is represented by the dotted black line. The
shock is identified through the correct recursive structure in the HF system (blue), LF system (green) and Bridge Proxy
(red). Shaded areas correspond to the 90% confidence bands across 1000 replications. Time aggregation follows a
skip-sampling scheme.
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Figure 2.3: MAD comparison in the two variable case - skip sampling
Mean Absolute Distance (MAD) between the true IRFs and the IRFs estimated by the HF-VAR, LF-VAR and Bridge
Proxy-SVAR (through the correct recursive scheme). Results are reported for 13 parametrization of the DGP. The MAD is
computed by averaging the MAD over the 1000 replications. Time aggregation follows a skip-sampling scheme.
Figure 2.4: IRFs2 in the two variable case - averaging
IRFs to a shock in the second variable (y) in the bivariate system. The true IRF is represented by the dotted black line. The
shock is identified through the correct recursive structure in the HF system (blue), LF system (green) and Bridge Proxy
(red). Shaded areas correspond to the 90% confidence bands across 1000 replications. Time aggregation follows an
averaging scheme.
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Figure 2.5: MAD comparison in the two variable case - averaging
Mean Absolute Distance (MAD) between the true IRFs and the IRFs estimated by the HF-VAR, LF-VAR and Bridge
Proxy-SVAR (through the non-correct recursive scheme). Results are reported for 13 parametrization of the DGP. The
MAD is computed by averaging the MAD over the 1000 replications. Time aggregation follows an averaging scheme.
Figure 2.6: MAD comparison in the practical case
Mean Absolute Distance (MAD) between the true IRFs and the IRFs estimated by the HF-VAR, LF-VAR and Bridge
Proxy-SVAR (through the correct recursive scheme). Results are reported for 13 parametrization of the DGP. The MAD is
computed by averaging the MAD over the 1000 replications. Time aggregation follows a skip-sampling scheme.
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Figure 2.7: MAD heatmap from large randomized Monte Carlo experiment
Mean Absolute Distance (MAD) between the true IRFs and the IRFs estimated by the HF-VAR, LF-VAR and Bridge
Proxy-SVAR in one of the 100 randomly parametrized DGPs. Results are reported for each combination of
shocks-variables in the system (81). The MAD is computed by averaging the MAD over the 1000 replications. Time
aggregation follows a skip-sampling scheme.
Figure 2.8: IRFs from large randomized Monte Carlo experiment
Example of the IRFs of the system to a shock in the first variable in the system, estimated by the HF-VAR, LF-VAR and
Bridge Proxy-SVAR in one of the 100 randomly parametrized DGPs. Shaded areas correspond to the 90% confidence
bands across 1000 replications. The true IRF is represented by the dotted black line. Time aggregation follows a
skip-sampling scheme.
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Figure 2.9: IRFs TFFR
IRFs to a monetary policy shock identified by instrumenting the Fed Fund Rate with our series of shocks in the Target Fed
Fund rate recovered from our daily VAR. From the first stage, F− stat = 11. The VAR includes [FFR, CPI, Industrial
Production, Excess Bond Premium] and it is estimated in log-levels including the optimal number of lags (2) and a
deterministic constant. Shaded areas correspond to 95% bootstrapped confidence bands from 1000 replications.
Figure 2.10: IRFs FF4 comparable with Gertler and Karadi (2015)
IRFs to a monetary policy shock identified by instrumenting the Fed Fund Rate with the series of shocks in the Fed Fund
Future 3 month ahead recovered from our daily VAR. We assign each FOMC meeting day only to the corresponding
month ( without imputing it to other months). From the first stage, F− stat = 7.5. We employ exactly the same
specification of Gertler and Karadi (2015): the VAR includes [FFR, CPI, Industrial Production, Excess Bond Premium] and
it is estimated in log-levels including 12 lags and a deterministic constant. Shaded areas correspond to 95% bootstrapped
confidence bands from 1000 replications.
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Figure 2.11: IRFs - current and future path
IRFs to a monetary policy shock identified by instrumenting the Fed Fund Rate (Fed Fund Future 3 month ahead ) in blue (green)
with the series of shocks in the Fed Fund Future 1 (Fed Fund Future 3) month ahead recovered from our daily VAR. From the first
stage, for FF1 F− stat = 16.2 and for FF4 F− stat = 25.6. The VAR includes [FFR, CPI, Industrial Production, Excess Bond
Premium] and it is estimated in log-levels with the optimal number of lags (2) and includes a deterministic constant. Shaded areas
correspond to 95% bootstrapped confidence bands from 1000 replications.
Chapter 3
The Real Effect of Liquidity Shocks
in Sovereign Debt Markets: Evidence
from Italy
Joint with Alejandro Vicondoa
3.1 Introduction
The sovereign debt crisis has dramatically affected European countries since 2010.
In particular, southern European countries like Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain
(GIPS) have been facing increasing unemployment rates and worsening credit
conditions for governments, households and firms. Both the media and economic
researchers have focused on the behavior of spreads in yields and credit default
swaps (CDS), which are supposed to reflect default risk. However, sovereign
bonds are highly demanded for their liquidity properties that have also fluctu-
ated during the crisis.
In this paper, we examine liquidity, understood as the ease in releasing an as-
set quickly without incurring additional costs (i.e. market liquidity), as a different
but complementary dimension of financial tensions. We measure liquidity by us-
ing the most popular measure: the Bid-Ask Spread (BAS). The BAS measures the
distance between the highest bid price and the lowest ask price for an asset. A
narrower BAS denotes liquidity because the lower the BAS the easier trading the
asset quickly without transaction costs. We also employ an alternative indicator
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which takes into account the volumes traded in secondary markets. Government
bonds are the most liquid assets in the economy, after money itself. European
banks hold large amounts of these assets in their portfolio due to their historical
low default risk and liquidity risk. Abrupt changes in the liquidity of sovereign
bonds could affect the lending decisions of banks.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first empirical investigation on the
macroeconomic effects of exogenous changes in liquidity in sovereign debt mar-
kets, which we call liquidity shocks. The Euro crisis constitutes an ideal laboratory
for such analysis because indicators of liquidity and default risk display different
patterns that can be used for identification. Figure 3.1 shows the evolution of the
Bid-Ask Spread (BAS), CDS and yield for Italy, which accounts for 26% of Euro-
pean sovereign debt, between 2004 and 2014.1 While during 2007-2011 the yield
and BAS move in opposite directions, between 2011-2012 both of them increase.
Moreover, the CDS displays different dynamics with respect to the other vari-
ables. Considering the fluctuations in Italian business cycle during this period,
we identify the effects and transmission channels of liquidity shocks. We base our
analysis on Vector Autoregression models (VAR) and our identification strategy
relies both on the standard recursive ordering and on the Proxy-SVAR methodol-
ogy. The latter uses exogenous changes in liquidity identified in a financial daily
VAR as an instrument for structural liquidity shocks.
Liquidity, as we show, has been a major driver for the Italian economy during
the sovereign debt crisis. The Forecast Error Variance (FEV) decomposition shows
that liquidity shocks explain a relevant share of the volatility of unemployment
(15%) and confidence indicators, like consumer confidence, business confidence
and stock prices. A BAS shock generates macroeconomic effects that are at least
as strong as the effects generated by a raise in yield spreads.2
In order to understand the transmission mechanism of liquidity shocks, we
turn to survey data. The Bank Lending Survey and the ISTAT Business Confidence
Survey reveal that liquidity shocks affect the lending behavior of banks through
their liquidity position and costs related to their capital position. Shocks to
1European sovereign debt markets are concentrated with Italy and France accounting for
roughly 50% of the total public debt. Source: European Central Bank Statistics. Italy: 26.4%,
France 22.7%, and Germany 18.3%. The three variables are expressed as monthly averages.
2The joint contribution of BAS and yield spread shocks to the FEV of unemployment is 20%
across 2004-2014 (15% + 5% respectively) and raises up to 30% aver 2009-2014 (15% + 15% respec-
tively).
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sovereign yield spreads do not generate worse lending conditions through the
same channels. Our findings are particularly relevant to improve the understand-
ing of the relationship between real economy and financial markets.
Our empirical results can be interpreted using the theoretical framework de-
veloped by Cui and Radde (2015). They build a real DSGE model with search
and matching frictions in asset markets, where the financial sector intermediates
between buyers and sellers of financial assets. In this framework, an exogenous
increase in financial intermediation costs affects the market participation of buyers
more than the one of sellers and induces a fall in the liquidity of financial assets.
Market liquidity produces relevant implications for the real economy by tighten-
ing the financial constraints of firms and reducing their financing possibilities.3
Cui and Radde (2015) mainly focus on private assets since, in the U.S., sovereign
bonds did not experience a fall in liquidity during the crisis. On the contrary,
as Figure 3.1 displays, in the European (Italian) case, the liquidity of sovereign
bonds has fluctuated significantly.4 Moreover, their setup can accommodate both
market-based and bank-based financial intermediation, with the latter character-
izing European economies. Our empirical findings and their theoretical results
are consistent in terms of: the observed fall in output, fall in consumption and
investment (proxied by business and consumer confidence indicators), turnover
(i.e. traded volume relative the outstanding amount of the asset), and asset prices.
The only (qualitative) difference consists in their responses being starker than our
IRFs because they rely on a model without nominal frictions. In a similar setup
to Cui and Radde (2015), Cui (2016) studies monetary and fiscal interactions with
market liquidity, and draws conclusions on optimal policies by considering gov-
ernment debt as provider of liquidity services.
Further works have also studied liquidity in theoretical frameworks: Del Ne-
gro et al. (2011) and Benigno and Nistico (2014) study the effects of shocks to an
exogenous liquidity constraint, which restricts the fraction of an asset which can
be used to purchase goods. While Del Negro et al. (2011) impose this constraint on
the fraction of equity holdings that a household can resale, Benigno and Nistico
3Notice that, contrary to the existing literature, they are able to generate the comovement be-
tween asset turnover and asset prices.
4Notice that we have also found similar macroeconomic results for the liquidity of corporate
bonds and for the spread in liquidity between corporate and sovereign bonds. Nonetheless, in
all the specifications, shocks to the liquidity of sovereign bonds induce sizeable macroeconomic
effects.
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(2014) restrict the fraction of government bonds that can be exchanged for goods.
Unlike Cui and Radde (2015), these papers do not endogenize the dynamics of
asset liquidity. Both papers conclude that liquidity shocks (i.e a decrease in the
release fraction of these assets) produce strong and negative effects on GDP and
prices, which in both cases are partially explained by a fall in private consump-
tion. These results differ from our empirical findings since we do not find that liq-
uidity shocks induce a significant effect on CPI inflation. Passadore and Xu (2014)
investigate how liquidity risk and credit risk explain sovereign spreads through
the optimal behavior of buyers and sellers. In an endowment economy with in-
complete markets and search and matching frictions in the sovereign debt mar-
kets, they find that the liquidity component can explain up to 50% of sovereign
spread during the Argentinian crisis in 2001. Although the model matches the
correlations and standard deviations of consumption and net exports, they do not
consider the effects on output. Overall, we contribute to this literature by char-
acterizing the empirical effects of liquidity shocks and by identifying its trans-
mission through the banking sector. In light of our empirical findings and of the
existing models, we believe that financial intermediation and search frictions are
a key feature to be taken into account when studying liquidity.
This paper is also related to the strand of the literature that analyzes the
macroeconomic effects of shocks to the spread in yields. Bahaj (2014) and Neri
and Ropele (2015) study the macroeconomic effects of yield shocks and find that
they explain a relevant fraction of business cycle fluctuations in European coun-
tries. However, they do not consider sovereign debt liquidity in their analysis and
this omitted dimension could affect their conclusions. Regarding the transmis-
sion channels, tensions in sovereign debt markets induce a tightening in credit
conditions through an increase in the funding costs of banks (De Marco (2016))
or through the Repo market (Boissel et al. (2014) and Mancini et al. (2014)). In
this paper, we show that liquidity shocks have strong macroeconomic effects and
identify its transmission through the banking sector. We find that liquidity is at
least as relevant as spread in yields to explain fluctuations in economic activity
in Italy and Spain and that commercial banks respond to liquidity shocks in a
different way than to a yield shock.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the
high frequency variables that characterize Italian sovereign debt market. Section
3.3 presents the empirical specification and results using different identification
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schemes. Section 3.4 investigates the transmission channels by exploiting survey
data. Section 3.5 compares the Italian results to France, Germany and Spain and
Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Data Description
Sovereign debt markets can be characterized by different indicators: Spread in
Yields (Spread), Credit Default Swaps (CDS), and Bid-Ask Spread (BAS). The
first one captures the difference in yields that a country has to pay in order to
issue sovereign debt with respect to a safe asset, which in this case is the German
sovereign bond with the same maturity. CDS is a proxy for credit risk. Finally, the
third is a widely-used indicator of sovereign debt liquidity (see for example Peri-
coli and Taboga (2015) and Pelizzon et al. (2015)).5 These variables enable us to
characterize the sovereign debt markets. For our analysis, we use data from Italy
for the period February 2004 until November 2014. The Italian sovereign debt
market is one of the most important in Europe, accounting for 26% of the Euro-
pean government debt.6 Before proceeding to the analysis, we describe briefly the
relationship between the three indicators. Table 3.1 displays the daily correlation
between these variables, both in levels and growth rates.
CDS is highly correlated (0.91) with the Spread while the BAS displays a rela-
tive low correlation with the other two variables. This fact also holds if we con-
sider the variables in daily growth rates instead of in levels. In particular, the daily
changes of the BAS are uncorrelated with the other financial variables while CDS
and Spread are positively correlated. From this preliminary description, we can
see that movements in Spread are more associated with credit risk (proxied by the
CDS) than liquidity risk, a similar finding with Pericoli and Taboga (2015).7 How-
ever, these variables maybe correlated with other financial ones like stock prices,
5Alternatively, people also look at the volume traded or at a combination of both. Figure A1
in Appendix C.1 displays the evolution of the volume traded together with the BAS. We use the
BAS for our empirical analysis and present the results using the Liquidity Index, which incorporates
both BAS and Turnover, in Appendix C.4.1.
6Source: European Central Bank Statistics.
7Notice that there is still no consensus in the finance literature. For example, Schwarz (2014)
highlights, through a novel measure of liquidity, that liquidity risk explains a large share of the
raising yields during the Euro crisis. Beber et al. (2009) show that, during period of market stress,
investors chase liquidity and not credit quality.
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interest rates or the equity implied volatility from options. Figure 3.2 displays the
evolution of these financial variables at daily frequency.8
The peaks in the VSTOXX index reflect the two main periods of financial stress:
the second part of 2008, associated with the collapse of Lehman Brothers, and
between the second half of 2011 and 2012, related to problems in the European
Sovereign Debt markets.9 These periods of stress are reflected in a different way
for each financial variable. On the one hand, the Italian stock price index (FTSE
MIB) falls with these two events and recover afterwards, without reaching the
peak of 2007. The response of the Eonia rate is similar and reflects the interest rate
decisions of the ECB and interbank market stress. On the other hand, financial
variables associated with sovereign debt markets display different dynamics. The
BAS spikes in 2009 and exhibits an abrupt change in volatility after January 14,
2011, when the Fitch agency downgraded Greek sovereign debt to junk status.10
The dynamics of CDS and Spread are similar during 2012, in line with the correla-
tions reported in Table 3.1, but the Spread declines at a lower pace after the spikes
than the CDS. During 2014, we observe some spikes in the BAS whereas Spread
and CDS decline steadily. The key point for identification is that the six financial
variables display different patterns.
Since in this paper we are going to focus on shocks to BAS, we analyze whether
fluctuations in this variable are associated with particular European events. This
analysis enables to us to understand better the underlying dynamics of this vari-
able and its sources of variation. Figure 3.3 displays the dynamics of the BAS to-
gether with some key events related to the European Sovereign debt crisis, which
are reported in Table C.1.
First of all, as we mentioned before, the series displays a clear change in volatil-
ity after January 14 2011. After that date, many events related to Portugal, Spain,
Greece, and Italy are reflected as spikes in this variable. Additionally, other Eu-
ropean events coincide with BAS local maxima or local minima. In particular,
the BAS reached a minimum, comparable to pre-crisis levels, when Mario Draghi
stated the “Whatever it takes to save the Euro”. Liquidity in the Italian sovereign
8We use the European Volatility Index (VSTOXX) instead of the one based on FTSE MIB index
because it is available for the whole period and it is representative also for the Italian economy.
Both indexes are highly correlated for the period when they coincide.
9In fact, the decline in the implied volatility happens after the famous speech of Mario Draghi,
president of the ECB, on July 26 2012.
10This fact holds for Spain only a few days later.
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debt market reflects important economic news, which is key for identification be-
cause many of those events can be considered as exogenous with respect to the
Italian economy.
3.3 Empirical Analysis
To analyze the effects of liquidity shocks we rely on different VAR specifications.
In Section 3.3.1, we estimate a small scale VAR used to identify the effects of liquid-
ity shocks. Then, we use an enlarged VAR for a better identification of the shocks
and to characterize in higher detail the results and the transmission mechanisms
(Section 3.3.2). Both specifications rely on the Cholesky decomposition to iden-
tify liquidity shocks. Given that imposing zero contemporaneous restrictions on
some financial variables can be controversial, in Section 3.3.3 we employ a more
agnostic identification strategy, the Proxy-SVAR, which places no restrictions on
the timing or sign of the responses. Finally, in Section 3.3.4 we present extensions
and additional exercises to further investigate liquidity and assess the robustness
of our findings.
3.3.1 Basic Specification
As a first step, we estimate the effect of BAS shocks on Italian business cycles
using a small scale VAR. In particular, we specify a VAR that includes the Unem-
ployment Rate, as a proxy for economic activity; Consumer Price Inflation expressed
as an annual rate, to capture price dynamics; FTSE MIB, which is the main index
of Stock Prices in Italy; Sovereign Spread; and BAS. While the first two variables
are useful to capture the transmission to the real economy, the last three are nec-
essary to identify a liquidity shock. Our sample runs from February 2004 through
November 2014. To deal with the different frequencies, we include the financial
variables as monthly averages in order to capture all the dynamics during the pe-
riod.11 Following Sims et al. (1990), we estimate the model in (log-)levels by OLS,
without explicitly modeling the possible cointegration relations among them.12
11In Appendix we report summary statistic of the main financial variables aggregated at
monthly frequency.
12Sims et al. (1990) show that if cointegration among the variables exists, the system’s dynamics
can be consistently estimated in a VAR in levels.
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In addition to a constant, we also include a deterministic trend. The lag order is
selected following the three information criteria and it is always one.13
We identify a liquidity shock using a standard Cholesky decomposition, which
is based on recursive ordering. The variables are ordered in the VAR from the
most exogenous to the most endogenous, which are allowed to respond contem-
poraneously to all structural shocks. Thus, we order Unemployment and Infla-
tion, assuming that they cannot react to the shock on the same month. A severe
problem arises from the three financial variables that our VAR incorporates. Obvi-
ously, they always react to all the available information and so there is no convinc-
ing way of ordering them. Considering this issue, we take a more agnostic stance.
Within the financial block, we consider all the possible orderings and we report
the median and percentiles of the impulse responses and Forecast Error Variance
(FEV). In this way, we identify 6 rotations and, for each of those, we compute 100
bootstrap replications. Figure 3.4 displays the Impulse Response Functions (IRFs)
to a one standard deviation BAS shock (i.e. a decrease in liquidity). We report
the median together with 68% and 90% confidence bands that include both the
identification (from the different Cholesky orderings) and statistical uncertainty.
An increase in the BAS induces an increase in Unemployment which lasts 10
months and a slight decrease in CPI inflation. However, the remaining financial
variables do not react to the BAS shock. Similar results hold if we estimate the
same VAR using the pre-2009 and the crisis sample.14 Thus, shocks to the BAS
have strong effects on economic activity. In order to understand the channels
behind this relationship and to see whether results are robust, in the next section
we consider a large scale VAR.
3.3.2 Full Specification
We aim at assessing the macroeconomic effects of BAS shocks, with special em-
phasis on the comparison with other financial shocks. For this purpose, we en-
large the previous VAR system with other variables. This system features six
macroeconomic variables (Unemployment, CPI Inflation, Public Debt, ECB Repo,
Italian M2, Consumer and Business Confidence) plus five financial indicators
(stock prices, Spread, CDS, BAS and VSTOXX). This set of variables is necessary
13We check that the residuals are normally distributed and they do not exhibit autocorrelation.
14For ease of exposition, we present these results in the Appendix.
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to identify financial shocks and assess their transmission to the real economy.15
Like in Section 3.3.1, we identify the liquidity shock through recursive ordering.
In particular, we assume that macroeconomic variables cannot react contempora-
neously to the financial shocks and we order them as follows: [UNEMPLOYMENT,
CPI, PUBLIC DEBT, M2, CONSUMER CONFIDENCE, BUSINESS CONFIDENCE].
Again, within the financial block, we consider all the possible orderings (120
rotations), compute five bootstrap replications for each of them and report the
median and percentiles of the impulse responses and FEV. Different possible or-
derings across the financial block lead to very similar results, which means that
the covariance matrix of the reduce form residuals is close to a diagonal matrix.
Figure 3.5 displays the IRFs to a one standard deviation BAS shock, where
68% and 90% confidence bands include both the identification (from the different
Cholesky orderings) and statistical uncertainty. A negative liquidity shock in-
duces an increase in unemployment that reaches its maximum after four months
without a significant effect on inflation, comparable to the findings of the VAR
presented in Section 3.3.1. The stock of government debt falls with a lag whereas
there is no reaction in the Repo rate and M2. Both business and consumer con-
fidence indicators decline in response to the shock and reach their trough four
months after the shock. The response of confidence is strong across all the specifi-
cations and could reflect a fall both in current and future consumption, which may
help to explain the strong response of unemployment (Ludvigson (2004)). More-
over, these dynamics are consistent with the findings of Garcia and Gimeno (2014)
for flight-to-liquidity episodes. The FEV contributions of BAS to consumer confi-
dence, business confidence and stock prices are respectively 15%, 9% and 7% one
year after the shock. Moving to the financial block, the equity premium, CDS and
spread increase and the FTSE declines by 1%, all of them with a lag. Responses of
financial variables are in line expected movements: a decrease in the BAS, which
could be interpreted as an increase in the uncertainty regarding the value of the
underlying asset, reduces prices (i.e. increases the Yield), confidence, and stock
prices and increases volatility and CDS.
A key point in our analysis, in light of the outstanding literature on the Euro
Crisis, consists of the comparison between BAS (Figure 3.5) and Spread shocks
15As in Section 3.3.1, we estimate the VAR in (log) levels by OLS equation by equation. The
optimal number of lags is one. Our sample consists of 130 observations which leaves us with
enough degrees of freedom for the estimation (15 coefficients in each equation).
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(Figure 3.6). The Spread shock induces a similar effect on unemployment slightly
less persistent and significant. However, this shock has a negative effect on CPI
inflation, which declines by 0.04% points 2 months after the shock. Even if the
response of CPI inflation is different with respect to a BAS shock, in Section 3.3.3
we show that, by using the Proxy-SVAR, the IRF of CPI to a BAS shock is also
negative.16 Unlike in the previous case, consumer confidence and business con-
fidence do not display a significant reaction. Regarding the financial block, the
responses are similar in magnitude (even if less significant) but less lagged than
the case of a BAS shock. An increase in Spread induces a delayed raise in BAS.
While the effects on unemployment are similar to the ones reported by Neri and
Ropele (2015) using a similar sample, the ones on inflation are the opposite from
theirs. This difference may be due to the omission of the liquidity dimension.
For a more comprehensive comparison among financial shocks, in Figure 3.7
we report the FEV decomposition of unemployment (i.e. how much each financial
shock explains of unemployment’s volatility). BAS shocks explain approximately
15% of unemployment fluctuations at a two year horizon. The second largest
shock in relevance is the stock prices, accounting for 7%. The remaining financial
shocks do not explain a significant fraction of fluctuations in unemployment. All
in all, exogenous fluctuations in financial variables explain around 30% of the total
variability of unemployment. From this analysis, we can conclude that liquidity is
a major driver of unemployment, out of all the financial variables, for the period
under analysis.17
3.3.3 Proxy-SVAR
While the results of Section 3.3.2 are robust to the different Cholesky orderings,
still, in each rotation, we are constraining (some) financial variables not to react
on impact to other financial shocks. In this section, we relax this assumption by
applying the so called Proxy-SVAR identification developed by Stock and Watson
(2012) and Mertens and Ravn (2013). The main idea is to use information external
to the VAR system as a proxy for the structural shock of interest, the BAS shock
16As we show later on, CPI is the only variable whose dynamics changes across the two method-
ologies. Notice that this difference comes from the years 2004-2009 as we display in Figure A2. The
response of Spread is robust for the sub-sample 2009-2014.
17The relative contribution of each financial shock changes if we consider the sub-sample 2009-
2014 (Figure A3 in Appendix C.4). In this case, the contribution of spread is similar to the one of
BAS, which is quantitatively stable over the full sample.
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in our case. In practice, the proxy constitutes an instrument for the reduced form
residuals of the VAR and provides partial identification of the structural shocks.
The instrument is assumed to be correlated with the structural shock of interest
but not with the remaining ones. An advantage of this technique is that, as long
as the proxy is a relevant and valid instrument, the identification relies on a much
weaker set of assumptions than the recursive identification scheme.18 In other
words, no assumptions are made on the contemporaneous relationship among
the variables in the system. Appendix C.3 contains a detailed explanation of this
methodology.
In order to obtain a valid instrument for BAS, we propose a new way to iden-
tify the proxy for the Proxy-SVAR at high frequency. We label this identification
“Bridge Proxy-SVAR” because the Proxy-SVAR links two VAR systems that include
data at different frequencies. In Gazzani and Vicondoa (2016b), we illustrate ana-
lytically the properties of Bridge Proxy-SVAR the and test it via Monte Carlo simu-
lations. The procedure consists of the following steps:
1. Construct two VARs systems. The first one is a VAR that incorporates daily
financial variables relevant for the analysis, defined as High Frequency VAR
(HF-VAR). This VAR features [BAS, CDS, Yield, FTSE, Eonia, VIX]. The sec-
ond one is a VAR, defined as Low Frequency VAR (LF-VAR), that includes
variables at monthly frequency. In particular, it is the same system that we
define in Section 3.3.2. Again, the financial variables in the LF-VAR are in-
cluded as monthly averages.
2. Estimate the HF-VAR and identify the structural shock of interest εBASHF with
the most appropriate identification scheme. Given that economic theory
does not support identification via sign restrictions, we apply the recur-
sive ordering Cholesky decomposition. Notice that the biases implied by
Cholesky in the HF-VAR are much lighter than in the LF-VAR. Since we ob-
serve a structural break in the daily volatility of financial variables in 2009,
we estimate a VAR at daily frequency to identify structural innovations in
the BAS during the period 2009m1-2014m11 and we use them as an instru-
ment for the structural BAS shocks at monthly frequency.
3. Aggregate εBASHF into monthly frequency obtaining ε¯
BAS
HF .
18The proxy is not assumed to be perfectly correlated with the structural shock, but only to be a
component of it.
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4. Estimate the LF-VAR and apply the Proxy-SVAR identification, where ε¯BASHF
is employed as a proxy for the for the structural shock of interest in the
LF-VAR εBASLF . Namely, the reduced form residual u
BAS
LF is instrumented






) 6= 0 , and the validity, corr (ε¯BASHF , εjLF) = 0 ∀j 6= BAS
, of the instrument.
This proxy explains a significant fraction of BAS reduced form residuals from the
monthly VAR. The statistics of the first stage are F-stat = 29.465 and R2 = 0.30231,
which satisfies the requirements of a strong instrument suggested by Stock and
Yogo (2002). This means that a relevant fraction of the reduced form residuals
are explained by the daily shocks to the BAS.19 Figure 7 reports the IRFs to an in-
strumented shock to the BAS. The BAS shock induces a significant and persistent
effect on unemployment, very similar both quantitatively and qualitatively to the
ones described in Section 3.3.2. Unlike with the recursive ordering, CPI inflation
decreases by 0.02% after the shock. As displayed in Figure A2, this difference is
not due to the methodology but to the shorter sample used. The remaining vari-
ables in the macroeconomic block display a comparable reaction to the recursive
ordering case. In particular, the BAS shock generates a strong response in the
indicators of confidence. All the financial variables display a significant lagged
response, except for the Equity Premium that reacts on impact.
Even if the Proxy-SVAR relies on a weaker set of assumptions, we include
it only as an alternative because this approach just reaches partial identifica-
tion. This implies that we cannot explicitly compare liquidity and spread shocks.
Nonetheless, the results from the Proxy-SVAR confirm the validity of the recur-
sive ordering identification previously applied, that is the standard methodology.
Notice that, with the Proxy-SVAR, even without imposing any contemporane-
ous restriction, financial variables do not display a significant response on impact
(apart from the Equity Premium). However, under this methodology, we can still
compute the historical contribution of liquidity shocks to unemployment, which
help us to assess the relevance of these shocks during the recent crisis. In fact,
Figure 3.9 provides the historical interpretation of our results by displaying the
19Figure 8 in Appendix C.3 includes a figure with the first stage results.
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component of unemployment explained by the BAS. In the upper panel, unem-
ployment is expressed in deviation from the trend whereas, in the lower one, at
the business cycle frequency.
The BAS explains the initial increase of unemployment, with respect to its
trend, in 2010 and 2013 and also the reduction observed in 2014. Finally, it is also
relevant to explain the increase observed during the last stage of 2014. Similar
conclusions hold if we look the contribution at business cycle frequencies.
Our findings, which are robust across the two different identification strate-
gies, suggest that liquidity shocks have significant effects on unemployment.
These results also hold if we consider industrial production and the ITA-coin.20 A
question that may arise naturally is why this peculiar financial variable, not even
on the focus of media’s attention, has so strong real effects. First, we find that
all the measures of confidence decline significantly in response to the decrease in
liquidity. This could point to a decrease in aggregate demand that explains the
decrease in economic activity (Ludvigson (2004)). Second, in Section 3.4, we show
that commercial banks change their lending conditions in response to liquidity
shocks.
3.3.4 Alternative VAR Specifications
Shocks to the BAS are a major driver of unemployment for the period under anal-
ysis. In this subsection, we consider additional specifications to assess the robust-
ness of our findings. For the ease of exposition, the IRFs of the exercises performed
in this section are presented in the Appendix C.4.
3.3.4.1 Indicator of Liquidity
The BAS is one of the most popular indicators of liquidity. However, it captures
only the price dimension of liquidity while another relevant feature is the quantity
side. A fall in liquidity equally distributed across price and quatities would gen-
erate an increase in the BAS and a fall in the quantity traded. In order to explore
whether this relationship holds in our analysis, we estimate the Full VAR includ-
ing the Turnover, volume traded normalized by the stock of the outstanding asset,
20Appendix C.4 displays the IRFs using each indicator.
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as an additional variable in the system. While responses of macroeconomic vari-
ables to a BAS shock remain unchanged, the turnover displays a significant reduc-
tion. This result conforms with the theoretical predictions of the model proposed
by Cui and Radde (2015).
In order to explicitly take this double dimension of liquidity into account,
we compute a liquidity index indicator that is defined as the ratio between the
Turnover and the BAS.21 Thus, when the liquidity index is higher (lower), the as-
set can be considered more (less) liquid. We estimate the same baseline VAR but
replacing the BAS with the Liquidity Index. Both responses of variables in the
system and the contribution of liquidity to explain fluctuations in unemployment
remain practically unchanged.
3.3.4.2 Measures of Economic Activity
All the results presented so far rely on Unemployment as a proxy for economic
activity. Alternatively, we estimate the VAR including Industrial Production and
a Coincident Indicator of Economic Activity (Indicatore Ciclico Coincidente (ITA-
coin)), a monthly indicator of economic activity published by the Bank of Italy.22
Results are comparable with the ones using Unemployment.
3.3.4.3 Different Samples
Figure 3.2 shows that financial variables display a change in volatility at daily
frequency after 2009. Moreover, in the same window there is also a stark fall in
interest rates that can constitute another source of structural break. To see whether
this fact affects our findings, we estimate our baseline VAR for the sub-sample
2009-2014. The main results remain unchanged. To tackle the possibility that our
results are driven only by the Euro crisis, we run the same analysis in 3.3.1 over the
sample 2004-2009. Once again, we find very similar results in this short sample.
21The correct measure would employ the quantity bid and asked, but unfortunately we cannot
access this data. Therefore, we use the actual number of trades (turnover on the secondary market)
compiled by MTS.
22See https://www.bancaditalia.it/statistiche/tematiche/indicatori/
indicatore-ciclico-coincidente/ for more information about ITA-coin.
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3.3.4.4 Corporate Liquidity
The finance literature has reported sizable fluctuations of the market liquidity
of corporate bonds in the U.S during the financial crisis (see Dick-Nielsen et al.
(2012)). Even if Italian firms rely more on banks as a source of finance, we analyze
the interrelation between sovereign and corporate liquidity. For this aim, we use
the BAS of a representative corporate bond and include it in the VAR instead of
the Equity Premium.23 A couple of interesting facts emerge. First, the effects of
sovereign BAS shocks remain unchanged. Second, an exogenous increase in the
private BAS generates a significant effect on Unemployment, which is comparable
to the one induced by the sovereign BAS. Finally, an exogenous change in the pri-
vate BAS does not affect significantly the sovereign BAS. These findings suggest
that both BAS are relevant to explain economic activity. Finally, we also consider
the BAS as a spread between the corporate and sovereign. A shock to this spread
induces also sizable effects on economic activity.
3.3.4.5 Market Stress Index
As we show in Figure 3.3, the BAS reflects some relevant European events, which
may be regarded as periods of Market Stress. To assess potential omitted variable
biases, we replace the Equity Premium with the Composite Indicator of Systemic
Stress (computed by the ECB) in our VAR. IRFs are comparable with respect to the
baseline specification. Thus, these results confirm that our results are not biased
by omitting other measures of stress in financial markets.
3.3.4.6 Financial Volatility
Financial variables display a time varying volatility at high frequency which is
not reflected at monthly frequency. To control for these changes, we compute the
monthly volatility of BAS, CDS and Spread using daily data. We build the first
principal component that explains 78% of the variability of these three measures.
Then, we include this index in the VAR instead of the Equity Premium. The IRFs
and the FEV are unaffected. This suggests that previous findings are not driven
by changes in volatility.
23We use the BAS of a bond issue by Telecom (TELECOM ITALIA TITIM 5 3/8 01/19) which is the
longest series available. Moreover, it is highly correlated with the liquidity of the other bonds (e.g.
0,91 with Unicredit - UCGIM 4 3/8 01/20 and 0,65 with ENI - ENI INTERNATIONAL FINANCE
ENIIM 5 1/27/19. Source: Bloomberg.
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3.4 Transmission Channels
The easiness of trading sovereign bonds is particularly relevant for Italian banks
because they hold exceptional amounts of Italian sovereign debt. Gennaioli et al.
(2014) show that banks hold large amounts of public bonds due to their liquidity
properties. The European Stress Test carried out in 2010 provides some insights
on the amount of these assets held by the main Italian commercial banks: Banca
Popolare, Intesa San Paolo, Monte dei Paschi, UBI Banca and Unicredit. Ital-
ian banks’ holding of national securities accounts for 74% of their total govern-
ment bond holdings. This share is even higher if we consider only the trading
book: 84%.24 Moreover, Italian sovereign bonds constitute 6.13% of the total as-
sets owned by those five Italian banks (Gennaioli et al. (2014)). In this Section,
we assess whether and how changes in sovereign debt liquidity and spread affect
banks’ lending decisions using two official surveys. First, we employ the ISTAT
Business Confidence Survey, which is carried out at monthly frequency. Second, we
use the Bank Lending Survey from the Bank of Italy, which is available at quarterly
frequency. Unlike statistics about total amount of loans that include both demand
and supply effects, survey data allows us to disentangle more precisely the trans-
mission channels.
3.4.1 ISTAT Business Confidence Survey
We employ data from the ISTAT Business Confidence Survey to assess the effects
of liquidity and spread shocks on firms’ credit conditions. This survey, which is
carried out by ISTAT at a monthly frequency since March 2008, covers a represen-
tative sample of 4,000 firms in the manufacturing sector and includes information
about firms’ assessments and expectations on the Italian economic situation.25 To
assess how changes in sovereign debt liquidity and spread affect the credit mar-
ket, we focus on questions regarding credit supply and demand and include them
24For regulatory purposes, banks divide their activities into two main categories: banking and
trading. The trading book was devised to house market-related assets rather than traditional bank-
ing activities. Trading book assets are supposed to be highly liquid and easy to trade.
25See http://siqual.istat.it/SIQual/visualizza.do?id=8888945&refresh=
true&language=UK for a detailed description of this survey. There is an analogous survey for
the service sector but the sample is shorter. However, results are similar to the ones reported in
this section.
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as an additional variable in our baseline VAR.26 Given that the sample is shorter,
we estimate the baseline VAR described in section 3.3.2 since August 2009, when
all the variables are available, including one variable at the time to avoid loosing
degrees of freedom. In particular, we assume that credit decisions cannot react
on impact to financial shocks and place these credit variables before the consumer
confidence, business confidence and the financial block.27 Figure 3.10 displays the
IRFs to a liquidity deterioration and a positive sovereign spread shock.
Liquidity and sovereign spread shocks have different effects on the credit mar-
ket. On the one hand, a BAS shock (i.e. a decrease of liquidity) does not change
the index on perceived credit conditions but induces worse conditions in terms of
interest rate, size of the credit, and costs other than the interest rate. Moreover, the
BAS leads to an rise in the number of denied loans by banks with a lag. On the
other hand, a spread shock immediately reduces the credit access and increases
the number of denied loans by banks and a rise in the interest rate charged by
banks. Notably, the reason why credit is not obtained by firms (credit not obtained)
is not related with firms rejecting the loans offered by the banks (credit not obtained
- too heavy conditions), but due to banks denying the loan (credit not obtained - bank
denial). In other words, credit supply is driving the lower access to credit. While
the spread shock affects mostly the interest rate and the size of the credit, a liq-
uidity shock also induces higher costs (apart from the interest rate). These higher
costs reflect higher commissions, extra-costs and tighter deadlines. For what con-
cerns the timing, we observe a more lagged response to a liquidity shock than to
a spread one. This is consistent with the delayed response of financial variables
presented in Section 3.3.3.
After analyzing firm’s survey responses, in the next subsection we assess
whether these results are consistent with bank’s replies. Additionally, we investi-
gate the reasons that drive banks behavior.
3.4.2 Bank Lending Survey
We exploit the Bank Lending Survey (BLS) on Italian commercial banks to deter-
mine the effects of liquidity and spread shocks. This survey, which is carried
out by Banca d’Italia in collaboration with the European Central Bank at quarterly
26TheAppendix contains the questions that we consider from the ISTAT Business Confidence
Survey.
27Results remain unchanged if we place this variable last in the VAR.
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frequency since January 2003, contains very detailed information about bank’s
decisions on different dimensions.28 Unlike in the previous subsection, we can-
not include the replies to the survey in the baseline VAR due to the differences in
frequencies. For this reason, we aggregate the monthly BAS and spread shocks













t denote the change in bank’s behavior and quarterly BAS
and spread shocks, respectively. We follow Romer and Romer (2004) and choose
eight lags for the autoregressive part and twelve for the effect of the shock. Then,
we compute the IRF to a BAS and spread shock for the main bank decisions avail-
able in the Survey (Figure 3.11).29
Banks increase their credit standards to firms in response to liquidity and
spread shocks with a similar magnitude. However, the reasons for increasing
standards differ. On the one hand, in response to negative liquidity shock, banks
react due to changes in their liquidity position and costs related to their capital
position. On the other hand, banks do not report changes in the relevance of the
asset and liquidity position in response to a spread shock. These differences in be-
havior suggest that banks increase their focus on their own balance sheet in case
of a liquidity deterioration in sovereign debt markets. Moreover, banks adjust im-
mediately their standards for mortgage loans while they do not change it for the
case of spread shocks. Mortgages are collateralized loans and, in case of no re-
payment and liquidity problems, banks may not find it easy to release the house
and that may explain why they increase their standards. Finally, both shocks are
associated with an increase of similar magnitude in the perception of risk about
economic activity.
With the evidence presented in Sections 3.3 and 3.4, we conclude that liquidity
shocks have relevant real effects on the Italian economy and we document that
transmission is through changes in the credit supply. In the next section, we ana-
lyze whether liquidity shocks are also relevant for the other three major Eurozone
economies: Germany, France, and Spain.
28More information about this survey can be found at BLS .
29The Data Appendix contains the detailed questions we consider from the Bank and Lending
Survey.
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3.5 Comparison with other European Countries
In order to assess whether liquidity shocks are also relevant drivers of the business
cycle in other European economies, we perform the previous analysis also for Ger-
many, France, and Spain. First, in Table 3.2 we analyze if sovereign BAS are cor-
related across countries, which would indicate to what extent they are explained
by common shocks. We observe that BASs are positively correlated across the
biggest four Eurozone economies. While BAS for Germany seems to be less cor-
related with the rest of the countries, the correlation is stronger between France,
Italy and Spain.
Second, we estimate the baseline VAR described in Section 3.3.2 for each coun-
try to determine whether the macroeconomic results for Italy also hold for the
other countries.30 A first relevant finding is that the identified BAS shocks are
positively correlated across countries: the correlation ranges from 0.3, France-
Germany, to 0.21, France-Italy.31 Both the correlation of the variables in levels and
of the shocks indicate that liquidity in sovereign markets is driven by a relevant
European component.
We present the macroeconomic relevance of the financial shocks, across the
four countries, in Figure 11 through the FEV decomposition of unemployment.
There is a clear heterogeneity between the Mediterranean countries and the cen-
tral European ones. On the one hand, changes in BAS are an important driver of
unemployment for Spain and Italy. For both cases, BAS shocks account for 15% of
unemployment fluctuations.32 A special feature of Spain is the relevance of CDS,
which might be due to the perceived higher default risk. On the other hand, ex-
ogenous fluctuations in stock markets are the most relevant source of unemploy-
ment fluctuations for Germany and France. In fact, neither BAS nor sovereign
spread seem to be relevant to explain unemployment fluctuations in these coun-
tries. Even if financial shocks explain a similar fraction of the total variability of
unemployment (around 30%), the relevance of each financial shock differs across
countries. Although the sources of this difference are beyond the scope of this
30The sample is February 2004-November 2014 for Germany, Italy and Spain. Due to the lack
of CDS data before 2005, the sample for France starts in August 2005. All financial variables are
expressed as monthly averages.
31In particular, the estimated cross-country correlations are statistically significant for all the
cases but between France and Spain.
32Moreover, the IRF to a BAS shock has similar effects both in terms of magnitude and persis-
tence.
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paper, one possible reason could be the lower tensions in sovereign debt markets
in France and Germany. Moreover, while Italian and Spanish banks are heavily
exposed to their national sovereign debt (around 75% in 2010 according to the
European Stress Test), French and German financial institutions hold a more di-
versified portfolio.
3.6 Conclusions
Economists have been focusing on sovereign debt markets due the European
Sovereign Debt Crisis. Contrary to the growing number of theoretical models
that analyze changes in liquidity in those markets, the empirical evidence on their
real effects is still null. In this paper, we provide novel empirical evidence on the
macroeconomic effects of changes in liquidity in secondary sovereign debt mar-
kets. We focus on the Italian economy that was hit both by credit risk and liquidity
shocks during the recent crisis. We use monthly data from 2004 to 2014 in a VAR
analysis and consider two alternative identification strategies: recursive order-
ing and the Proxy-SVAR, which yield consistent results. The former takes into
account all the possible orderings among financial variables. The Proxy-SVAR ex-
ploits a daily financial VAR to control for all high-frequency changes in financial
markets. Specifically, we use daily BAS structural shocks as proxy for the monthly
BAS structural shocks. We find that, contrary to popular perceptions, liquidity is
a major financial driver of economic activity. An exogenous raise in this variable
generates a strong (15% of the Forecast Error Variance) and persistent (10 months)
surge in unemployment. The other variables that are mostly affected are confi-
dence indicators as Stock Prices, and Consumer and Business Sentiment. Banks
and firms survey data reveal that liquidity shocks have significant effects on banks
standard, in terms of loan’s size and through additional costs, particularly due to
the asset and liquidity position of Italian banks. Similar macroeconomic effects
hold for Spain, whereas liquidity shocks are not a significant driver for France
and Germany.
Our results differ from existing models, as Del Negro et al. (2011) and Benigno
and Nistico (2014), where liquidity shocks induce a pronounced deflation. There-
fore, in particular in the light of our findings related to the banking channel, we
believe that models that focus on the asset and liquidity position of financial in-
termediaries can enhance our understanding of these phenomena. We regard Cui
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and Radde (2015) as a first step towards this interesting direction for future re-
search. Frameworks of this kind, which can generate macroeconomic effects con-
sistent with the empirical evidence, can be used to assess whether and how policy
makers should react to changes in liquidity (Cui (2016)). They mainly focus on
the liquidity of corporate bonds as their reference is the US economy. Instead, by
studying European economies we conclude that the liquidity of sovereign bonds
is a key financial dimension for the business cycle. Liquidity shocks to these two
different assets may involve diverse policy reactions and have different implica-
tions.
3.7 Tables
Levels BAS Spread CDS
BAS 1 0.24*** 0.36***
Spread 0.24*** 1 0.91***
CDS 0.36*** 0.91*** 1
Growth Rates BAS Spread CDS
BAS 1 -0.03 -0.03
Spread -0.03 1 0.23
CDS -0.03 0.23*** 1
Table 3.1: Contemporaneous correlation between financial variables
Contemporaneous daily correlation between Italian financial variables at daily frequency: BAS,
Spread, CDS. All the variables correspond to 2 years maturity. Left-panel in levels, right-panel in
growth rates. ***, **, * denote 99%, 95% and 90% confidence intervals.
Italy Spain France Germany
Italy 1 0.49*** 0.56*** 0.24***
Spain 0.49*** 1 0.69*** 0.32***
France 0.56*** 0.69*** 1 0.42***
Germany 0.24*** 0.32*** 0.42*** 1
Table 3.2: Daily correlation of European BAS
Daily correlations of 2 year sovereign BAS across countries (source: Bloomberg).
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3.8 Figures















Figure 3.1: Key financial variables
Italian (standardized) BAS, CDS and Yield (monthly average). Each variable corresponds to the first
principal components of 2, 5, 10 years bond maturities. Source: Bloomberg (BAS) and Banca d’Italia.
Figure 3.2: Daily dynamics of the main financial variables
Financial variables: BAS Italy, Spread Italy, CDS Italy, FTSE MIB (main Italian Stock Price index),
Vstoxx (European Implied Volatiliy Index), Euro Overnight Index Average (Eonia). All variables
are expressed in levels for all the business days since September 2004 to November 2014. All
variables but the Spread are expressed as an index=100 at the beginning of the sample. Spread is
computed as the difference between German and Italian yields and expressed in basis points
times 10.
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Figure 3.3: Daily BAS and key European events
Daily BAS Italy 2 Years (blue line) and key European events (red dots). Appendix A displays the
list of all the events.
Figure 3.4: IRF to a BAS shock in the small system
IRFs to a 1 std BAS shock (liquidity deterioration) identified through the following ordering
[Unemployment, pi, FTSE, Spread, BAS]. The median point estimate, 68% and 90% confidence
bands are reported in blue and light blue, respectively. 50%, 68% and 90% bands include
statistical and identification uncertainty (from all the possible ordering within the financial
block).
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Figure 3.5: IRF to a BAS shock in the large system
IRFs to a 1 std deviation BAS shock (liquidity deterioration) identified through the following
ordering [Unemployment, pi, Public Debt, R, M2, CC, BC, Financial Block]. The median point
estimate, 68% and 90% confidence bands are reported in blue and light blue, respectively. 50%,
68% and 90% bands include statistical and identification uncertainty (from all the possible
ordering within the financial block).
Figure 3.6: IRF to a Spread shock
IRFs to a 1 std deviation Spread shock identified through the following ordering
[Unemployment, pi, Public Debt, R, M2, CC, BC, Financial Block]. The median point estimate,
68% and 90% confidence bands are reported in red and light red, respectively. 50%, 68% and 90%
bands include statistical and identification uncertainty (from all the possible ordering within the
financial block). Dotted line denotes the mean response to a 1 std deviation shock to BAS.
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Figure 3.7: FEV of unemployment
FEV of Unemployment in the VAR [Unemployment, pi, Public Debt, R, M2, CC, BC, Financial
Block]. The bars denote the contribution of each financial shock in explaining the volatility of
Unemployment at each horizon (expressed in months).
Figure 3.8: IRF to a BAS shock: Bridge Proxy-SVAR
IRFs to a 1 standard deviation BAS shock (liquidity deterioration) in the VAR [Unemployment, pi,
Public Debt, R, M2, CC, BC, Financial Block]. The shock is identified through the unpredictable
variation of the BAS in a daily VAR system. Sample: Jan:2009-Nov:2014. The median point
estimate, 68% and 90% confidence bands are reported in blue and light blue, respectively.
Confidence bands are computed using wild bootstrap with 1,000 replications. Dotted lines
denote the mean responses of each variable to a 1 standard deviation BAS shock identified via
recursive ordering.
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Figure 3.9: Historical contribution of BAS to unemployment: Bridge Proxy-SVAR
Historical contribution of BAS to Unemployment. Identified in the VAR [Unemployment, pi,
Public Debt, R, M2, CC, BC, Financial Block] through the unpredictable variation of the BAS in a
daily VAR system. Upper panel - Unemployment in deviation from trend. Lower panel -
Unemployment at the business cycle frequency (18 to 96 months).
Figure 3.10: Changes in credit market conditions for manufacturing firms
NOTE. Changes in the credit market for manufacturing firms in response to a one standard posi-
tive BAS (blue) and sovereign spread (red) shocks. All figures denote change in the corresponding
index reported by ISTAT. Blue and red areas denote the 68% confidence intervals computed using
bootstrap and include both identification and statistical uncertainty.
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Figure 3.11: Change in banks lending decisions
Change in banks decisions in response to a positive shock in BAS and Spread. All the figures
denote the change in the corresponding index as reported in the BLS. Blue and red areas denote
the 90% confidence intervals computed using 500 bootstrap replications.
Figure 3.12: FEVD of unemployment for European countries
FEVD of Unemployment for Italy, France, Germany, and Spain. The FEVD is computed estimating
a VAR for each country that includes: [Unemployment, pi, Public Debt, R, M2, CC, BC, Financial
Block]. BAS shocks are identified from all the possible rotations across the financial variables.
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Appendix A
Appendix: News and Noise Bubbles
in the Housing Market
A.1 Econometric Framework
I describe briefly the methodology of FGLS in what follows: I first present a simple
case, in which the fundamental news shock is anticipated one period ahead, to
provide intuitively the mechanism behind the identification and then I describe
a more general case. Notice that the actual identification employs (rents at) 40
quarters as the horizon to determine whether a shock to the signal is fundamental
or noisy.













it is trivial to see that the associated matrix has determinant 0 for L = 0 (comes
from the lagged impact of the news shock). Therefore, the MA representation is
non-fundamental and non-invertible. In this case, noise and news shock cannot
be expressed as a linear combination of present and past reduced form residuals.
Thus, a VAR representation in the structural shocks, news and noise, does not exist.
Intuitively, agents cannot distinguish the two shocks given their information set
and the same holds for the econometrician. Adding other variables to the system
cannot solve this issue. What the econometrician can recover is the following













 ut + Lσ2fσ2s st
st
 (A.2)
where ut can be defined as unanticipated fundamental shock. The signal extrac-
tion problem depends on the relative importance of the news and noise shocks in
driving the signal: Et−1 (∆rt) =
σ2f
σ2s
st−1. In other words, ut is the forecast error of
the fundamental:






































can be identified through a standard VAR and, once the news to noise
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Notice that by inverting L we are employing present and future values of the
unanticipated fundamental and signal shocks, which, in other words, means we
are using future reduced form residuals.1A
The news shock can be expressed and thus recovered as the sum of the ex-ante
expectation of the fundamental and the realized forecast-error of the fundamental:
ft = ut+1 +
σ2f
σ2s






st = ∆rt+1 (A.6)
The noise shocks is instead the component of the signal that is not reflected in
future changes of the fundamental:










st = st − ∆rt+1 (A.7)
Consider a more comprehensive case, using a more general polynomial struc-
ture for the bivariate case (it is very easy to extend the scheme to the multivariate
case). We define
∆rt = c(L) ft (A.8)








with k j j = 1, 2, ..., n are the roots of c(L) smaller than one in modulus with kj
the respective complex conjugates. Following ?, it is not possible to invert b(L) in




















































We can generalize the system by assuming that, even if the agents’ expecta-
tions are not perfectly observable, the econometrician has access to a variable in-

















































The steps above exploit the relationship σu =
σf σn
σs
. The identification strategy
comprises of the following steps:





and obtain the corresponding MA
representation
Step 2: a11(0) =
c(0)σu
b(0) = 0 ⇒ c(0) = 0. This restriction implies that the sig-
nal does not affect the fundamental measure contemporaneously. Unantic-
ipated fundamental and signal shocks are identified at this point for the bi-
variate case.
Step 3: Given the estimate aˆ12(L) =
ĉ(L)σ2f
σs
take the roots of aˆ12(L) smaller than
one in modulus in order to estimate b(L) as shown in (14)
Step 4: aˆ11(1) is estimated as
ĉ(1)σu












2AIn practice, the ratio
σ̂f
σn
is computed as the ratio of the cumulated long-run
responses CIRF(∆rtto st)CIRF(∆rtto ut) . Notice that the theoretical restriction of a null effect of the noise shock








= 1, σ̂f = sin(arctan(
σ̂f
σn




directly computed. At this point the variance of the news and noise shock is
identified.












one can recover the struc-
tural shocks.
on the fundamental should hold at every horizon. In practice, this is imposed on impact and in
the long-run (40 quarters), but it is used for testing at the other horizons (noise has no significant
effect on the fundamental at each horizon).
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A.2 Empirical Results
A.2.1 Risk Free Rate and Risk Premia Shock
Figure A.1: IRFs to risk free rate and risk premium shock - decomposition
IRFs to a risk free rate shock and to risk premium shock. The responses are reported in terms of the standard deviation of
the variables in the system. The solid blue line is the median, the dark and light blue shaded areas represents 68% and
90% confidence bands respectively (2000 bootstrap replications). The shocks are identified through the following
ordering: [Rents, Housing Prices, 3 Months Bill Rate, Aaa Moody’s Corporate Bond Yield]. The red line reports the
median IRFs obtained by the recursive ordering [Rents, 3 Months Bill Rate, Aaa Moody’s Corporate Bond Yield, Housing
Prices]. Sample: 1963:Q1 - 2016:Q3.
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A.2.2 Granger Tests
Variable Source Code
Real GDP FRED GDPC1
GDP Implicit Price Deflator FRED GDPDEF
Private Residential Fixed Investment FRED PRFI
Average Sales Price of Houses Sold FRED APSUS
Median Price of New Houses Sold FRED MSPNHSUS
Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: Rent of primary residence FRED CUUR0000SEHA
Personal Consumption Expenditures: Rents Quantity Index FRED DTENRA3
Personal Consumption Expenditures: Rents Price Index FRED DHUTRC1Q027SBEA
Shiller Housing Price Index R. J. Shiller
New Private Housing Units Started FRED HSTARTS
New Housing Permits FRED HPERMITS
Standard and Poor Composite Index R. J. Shiller
Effective Fed Fund Rate FRED FFR
Moody’s Seasoned Aaa Corporate Bond Yield FRED AAA_yield
Civilian Non-institutional Population FRED CNP16OV_NBD19480101
US Treasury Yield Adjusted to Constant Maturity 10 years FRED GS10
US Treasury Yield Adjusted to Constant Maturity 20 years FRED GS20
3 Month Treasury Bill Rate FRED TB3MS
Buying Conditions for Housing Michigan Survey of Consumers Table 41
Personal Consumption Expenditures: Price Deflator FRED DPCERD3Q086SBEA
Households and Nonprofit Organizations: Home Mortgages FRED HHMSDODNS
Mortgage Debt Outstanding, All holders FRED MDOAH
Real Estate Loans, All Commercial Banks FRED REALLN
Price of New One-Family Houses Sold Including Value of Lot FRED USHSN1FLF?
Civilian Unemployment Rate FRED UNRATE
Table A.1: Variable employed in orthogonality test
Variables employed for the Granger Test of information sufficiency
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Shock Lags
Principal Components
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Surprise
2 0.17 0.34 0.36 0.12 0.00 0.00
4 0.30 0.22 0.28 0.11 0.02 0.02
Signal
2 0.61 0.72 0.33 0.04 0.10 0.05
4 0.36 0.24 0.03 0.03 0.08 0.06
News
2 0.47 0.25 0.09 0.02 0.02 0.01
4 0.48 0.52 0.02 0.05 0.04 0.03
Noise
2 0.18 0.13 0.19 0.11 0.20 0.06
4 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.00
Table A.2: Orthogonality Test - Decomposition
Results of the test for informational sufficiency in the four variables VAR including [Rents, Housing Prices, 3 Month T-Bill
Rate, Aaa Moody’s Corporate Yield]. The identified shocks are regressed on the lagged (two and four lags) principal
components of the variables listed in Table A.1. The table reports the p-values of the F-test in the regression.
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Shock Lags
Principal Components
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Surprise
2 0.38 0.68 0.80 0.49 0.49 0.61
4 0.64 0.72 0.87 0.36 0.18 0.33
Signal
2 0.86 0.96 0.64 0.76 0.84 0.71
4 0.92 0.93 0.93 0.98 1.00 0.91
News
2 0.57 0.84 0.70 0.82 0.86 0.80
4 0.92 0.84 0.47 0.65 0.64 0.60
Noise
2 0.81 0.86 0.82 0.91 0.96 0.96
4 0.87 0.90 0.90 0.94 0.92 0.88
Table A.3: Orthogonality Test - Macro Analysis
Results of the test for informational sufficiency in the six variables VAR including [Rents, Housing Prices, GDP,
Residential Investment, Aaa Moody’s Corporate Yield, S&P Composite Index]. The identified shocks are regressed on the
lagged (two and four lags) principal components of the variables listed in TableA.1. The table reports the p-values of the
F-test in the regression.
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A.2.3 Expectations from Surveys
Figure A.2: IRFs Surprise and Signal Shocks - Expectations from surveys
IRFs to a surprise shock to rents and to a signal shock. The responses are reported in terms of the standard deviation of
the variables in the system. The solid blue line is the median, the dark and light blue shaded areas represents 68% and
90% confidence bands respectively (2000 bootstrap replications). The shocks are identified through the following
ordering: [Rents, Buying Conditions for Housing, GDP, Residential Investment, Housing Prices, Aaa Moody’s Corporate
Bond Yield, S&P Index]. Sample: 1963:Q1 - 2016:Q3.
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Figure A.3: IRFs News and Noise Shocks - Expectations from surveys
IRFs to news and noise shocks. The responses are reported in terms of the standard deviation of the variables in the
system. The solid red line is the median, the dark and light red shaded areas represents 68% and 90% confidence bands
respectively (2000 bootstrap replications). The shocks are identified through the following ordering: [Rents, Buying
Conditions for Housing, GDP, Residential Investment, Housing Prices, Aaa Moody’s Corporate Bond Yield, S&P Index].
The blue dotted line reports the median IRFs obtained by the recursive ordering [Rents, GDP, Residential Investment, Aaa
Moody’s Corporate Bond Yield, Housing Prices, Buying Conditions for Housing, S&P Index]. Sample: 1963:Q1 - 2016:Q3.
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Figure A.4: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition - Expectations from surveys
Forecast error variance decomposition of the variables in the system. The plot display the share of the variance explained
by news and noise at each horizon (not cumulatively). The shocks are identified through the following ordering: [Rents,
Buying Conditions for Housing, GDP, Residential Investment, Housing Prices, Aaa Moody’s Corporate Bond Yield, S&P
Index]. Sample: 1963:Q1 - 2016Q3.
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Figure A.5: Historical Decomposition - Expectations from surveys
Historical decomposition of housing prices (dotted blue) into a fundamental component (blue) and noisy component
(orange). The shocks are identified through the following ordering: [Rents, Buying Conditions for Housing, GDP,
Residential Investment, Housing Prices, Aaa Moody’s Corporate Bond Yield, S&P Index]. Sample: 1963:Q1 - 2016Q3.
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A.2.4 Expectations from the Stock Market
Figure A.6: IRFs to Surprise and Signal Shocks - Expectations from stock prices
IRFs to a surprise shock to rents and to a signal shock. The responses are reported in terms of the standard deviation of
the variables in the system. The solid blue line is the median, the dark and light blue shaded areas represents 68% and
90% confidence bands respectively (2000 bootstrap replications). The shocks are identified through the following
ordering: [Rents, Home Builders Stock Price Index, GDP, Residential Investment, Housing Prices, Aaa Moody’s Corporate
Bond Yield, S&P Index]. Sample: 1973:Q1 - 2016:Q3.
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Figure A.7: IRFs to News and Noise Shocks - Expectations from stock prices
IRFs to news and noise shocks. The responses are reported in terms of the standard deviation of the variables in the
system. The solid red line is the median, the dark and light red shaded areas represents 68% and 90% confidence bands
respectively (2000 bootstrap replications). The shocks are identified through the following ordering: [Rents, Home
Builders Stock Price Index, GDP, Residential Investment, Housing Prices, Aaa Moody’s Corporate Bond Yield, S&P
Index]. The blue dotted line reports the median IRFs obtained by the recursive ordering [Rents, GDP, Residential
Investment, Aaa Moody’s Corporate Bond Yield, Housing Prices, Home Builders Stock Price Index, S&P Index]. Sample:
1973:Q1 - 2016:Q3.
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Figure A.8: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition - Expectations from stock
prices
Forecast error variance decomposition of the variables in the system. The plot display the share of the variance explained
by news and noise at each horizon (not cumulatively). The shocks are identified through the following ordering: [Rents,
Home Builders Stock Price Index, GDP, Residential Investment, Housing Prices, Aaa Moody’s Corporate Bond Yield, S&P
Index]. Sample: 1973:Q1 - 2016Q3.
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Figure A.9: Historical Decomposition - Expectations from stock prices
Historical decomposition of housing prices (dotted blue) into a fundamental component (blue) and noisy component
(orange). The shocks are identified through the following ordering: [Rents, Home Builders Stock Price Index, GDP,
Residential Investment, Housing Prices, Aaa Moody’s Corporate Bond Yield, S&P Index]. Sample: 1963:Q1 - 2016Q3.
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A.3 Robustness Exercises
A.3.1 Long Term Rates
Figure A.10: IRFs to Surprise and Signal Shocks - Long term rates
IRFs to a surprise shock to rents and to a signal shock. The responses are reported in terms of the standard deviation of
the variables in the system. The solid blue line is the median, the dark and light blue shaded areas represents 68% and
90% confidence bands respectively (2000 bootstrap replications). The shocks are identified through the following
ordering: [Rents, Housing Prices, GDP, Residential Investment, Treasury Yield at Constant 20 year Maturity, S&P Index].
Sample: 1963:Q1 - 2016:Q3.
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Figure A.11: IRFs to News and Noise Shocks - Expectations from stock prices
IRFs to news and noise shocks. The responses are reported in terms of the standard deviation of the variables in the
system. The solid red line is the median, the dark and light red shaded areas represents 68% and 90% confidence bands
respectively (2000 bootstrap replications). The shocks are identified through the following ordering: [Rents, Housing
Prices, GDP, Residential Investment, Treasury Yield at Constant 20 year Maturity, S&P Index]. The blue dotted line reports
the median IRFs obtained by the recursive ordering [Rents, GDP, Residential Investment, Treasury Yield at Constant 20
year Maturity, Housing Prices, S&P Index]. Sample: 1963:Q1 - 2016:Q3.
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Figure A.12: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition - Long term rates
Forecast error variance decomposition of the variables in the system. The plot display the share of the variance explained
by news and noise at each horizon (not cumulatively). The shocks are identified through the following ordering: [Rents,
Housing Prices, GDP, Residential Investment, Treasury Yield at Constant 20 year Maturity, S&P Index]. Sample: 1963:Q1 -
2016Q3.
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Figure A.13: Historical Decomposition - Long term rates
Historical decomposition of housing prices (dotted blue) into a fundamental component (blue) and noisy component
(orange). The shocks are identified through the following ordering: [Rents, Housing Prices, GDP, Residential Investment,
Treasury Yield at Constant 20 year Maturity, S&P Index]. Sample: 1963:Q1 - 2016Q3.
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A.3.2 Case & Shiller Corelogic Home Price Index
Figure A.14: IRFs to Surprise and Signal Shocks - C&S Corelogic
IRFs to a surprise shock to rents and to a signal shock. The responses are reported in terms of the standard deviation of
the variables in the system. The solid blue line is the median, the dark and light blue shaded areas represents 68% and
90% confidence bands respectively (2000 bootstrap replications). The shocks are identified through the following
ordering: [Rents, Housing Prices, GDP, Residential Investment, Treasury Yield at Constant 20 year Maturity, S&P Index].
Sample: 1963:Q1 - 2016:Q3.
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Figure A.15: IRFs to Surprise and Signal Shocks - C&S Corelogic
IRFs to news and noise shocks. The responses are reported in terms of the standard deviation of the variables in the
system. The solid red line is the median, the dark and light red shaded areas represents 68% and 90% confidence bands
respectively (2000 bootstrap replications). The shocks are identified through the following ordering: [Rents, Housing
Prices, GDP, Residential Investment, Treasury Yield at Constant 20 year Maturity, S&P Index]. The blue dotted line reports
the median IRFs obtained by the recursive ordering [Rents, GDP, Residential Investment, Treasury Yield at Constant 20
year Maturity, Housing Prices, S&P Index]. Sample: 1963:Q1 - 2016:Q3.
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Figure A.16: Forecast Error Variance Decompostion - C&S Corelogic
Variance Decomposition - share of the variance explained by News and Noise at each quarter (not cumulative)
APPENDIX A. NEWS AND NOISE BUBBLES IN THE HOUSING MARKET 127















































Figure A.17: Historical Decomposition - C&S Corelogic
Historical decomposition of housing prices (dotted blue) into a fundamental component (blue) and noisy component
(orange). The shocks are identified through the following ordering: [Rents, Housing Prices, GDP, Residential Investment,
Treasury Yield at Constant 20 year Maturity, S&P Index]. Sample: 1963:Q1 - 2016Q3.
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A.3.3 Pre-2007 Crash Sample
Figure A.18: IRFs to Surprise and Signal Shocks - pre 2007
IRFs to a surprise shock to rents and to a signal shock. The responses are reported in terms of the standard deviation of
the variables in the system. The solid blue line is the median, the dark and light blue shaded areas represents 68% and
90% confidence bands respectively (2000 bootstrap replications). The shocks are identified through the following
ordering: [Rents, Housing Prices, GDP, Residential Investment, Aaa Moody’s Corporate Bond Yield, S&P Index]. Sample:
1963:Q1 - 2006:Q4.
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Figure A.19: IRFs to Surprise and Signal Shocks - pre 2007
IRFs to news and noise shocks. The responses are reported in terms of the standard deviation of the variables in the
system. The solid red line is the median, the dark and light red shaded areas represents 68% and 90% confidence bands
respectively (2000 bootstrap replications). The shocks are identified through the following ordering: [Rents, Housing
Prices, GDP, Residential Investment, Aaa Moody’s Corporate Bond Yield, S&P Index]. The blue dotted line reports the
median IRFs obtained by the recursive ordering [Rents, GDP, Residential Investment, Aaa Moody’s Corporate Bond
Yield, Housing Prices, S&P Index]. Sample: 1963:Q1 - 2006:Q4.
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Figure A.20: Forecast Error Variance Decompostion - pre 2007
Forecast error variance decomposition of the variables in the system. The plot display the share of the variance explained
by news and noise at each horizon (not cumulatively). The shocks are identified through the following ordering: [Rents,




B.1 Conservative Identification - Orthogonalization
Our contribution concerns the way of studying the relationship between HF
and LF variables, independently of the particular identification scheme chosen.
Nonetheless, we can take an additional step if we restrict the class of DGPs to the
subset in which each structural shock is associated with one variable.1B Using the
representation in eq. (2.3), this assumption means that B11 > B21; B22 > B12.2B
Then, consider a case in which the HF identification employs a VAR, and the re-
searcher does not dispose of other, economic based, identification schemes (first
best). In this setting, we can think of a recursive ordering where y is placed last,
after all the variables that constitute the information set Ψ, as a second best iden-
tification. Such procedure is namely an orthogonalization and it is equivalent to
use the residuals from the regression of the variable of interest y on its previous
lags p (where p are the lags included in the HF-VAR) and on the contemporaneous









αlΨt−l + et et ∼WN (B.1)
If each shock is associated with a variable, regressing the variable of interest
yt on Ψt yields the new information introduced in the system uniquely by yt, that
we label εyt .
1BThis means that each innovation enter the system mainly through a specific variable. For
example, we call structural shock an innovation in the variable y which is orthogonal to the inno-
vations in other variables. Notice that this is one of the many interpretations of innovation.
2BThe assumption is implicit in our notation εyt and ε
x
t , but Section 2.2.2 is actually more general.
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Intuitively, the econometrician is likely to face identification trade-offs across
different schemes in applied research. The researcher observes the high frequency






= b22 (µ1ςt + µ2φt) + b21εxt (B.2)
Suppose that ςt satisfies the strength requirement of an IV, such that the resulting






= µ1 6= 0. Given this condition, the
econometrician should favor the most conservative HF identifications that, even
washing out the component φt, does no capture in the proxy any other shocks εxt .
While the former issue does not yield distorted estimates, this latter event would
induce biases by violating the exclusion restriction.
Furthermore, we wish to highlight two advantages of this conservative iden-
tification. First, the orthogonalization is robust to misspecifications thanks to the
instrumental variable approach embedded into it. The IV approach allows us to
employ only an exogenous variation (a component of the true structural shock)
and not the whole structural shocks. Second, this identification yields identified
shocks orthogonal with respect to the remainder of the current and past informa-
tion set. Macroeconomic variables are explicitly unobservable at LF and cannot
be included in the HF system. However, financial variables respond to the new
available information on macroeconomic variables in real-time.
B.1.1 An Illustrative Example
Let us consider how the conservative identification performs with respect to a
more relaxed identification. We study a simply bivariate system and compare
violations in the exclusion restriction in our instrument εˆyt , i.e. how large is the
component of εxt captured in εˆ
y























where we normalized b11 = b22 = 1. Recall the assumption b11 > b12 and b22 > b21
such that there is a mapping between variables and shocks. We restrict the pa-
rameter space to positive values of b12 and b21 to simplify the analysis. Moreover,
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Under the relaxed identification scheme, we simply take the reduced form resid-
ual of y as structural shock. The component of εxt captured in this measure is b21,








Under the conservative identification scheme, we regress yt on xt and take the
residuals:









+ et et ∼WN (B.6)
Applying the definition of OLS we obtain:




























The residuals are computed as






































Γ represents a measure of violation in the exclusion restriction. In two extreme
cases: b21 = 0 ⇒‖ Γ ‖= b121+b212 and b12 = 0 ⇒‖ Γ ‖= 0. The comparison be-
tween relaxed and conservative identification reduces to the comparison between
Γ and b21. The condition Γ < b21 is satisfied ∀{b12, b12} as εxt enters negatively
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in εˆyCt . This is likely to downward bias εˆ
yC
t and make the first stage in the Bridge
ineffective. However, let us consider the modulus of Γ for completeness:





A graphical representation of the analytical results is provided below in Fig. B.1.
The same results hold in a simulation design (Fig. B.2). The conservative identifi-
cation is overall better in building an exogenous instrument than a more relaxed
identification. The exception comes from low values of b21. However, when b21
overcomes a certain threshold than the gains from the conservative over the re-
laxed identification are exponentially increasing (and the value of b12 does not
matter anymore). In terms of economic interpretation, the Bridge is designed to
study the effect of a shock to an HF variable y. b21 represents how much y re-
sponds to other shocks on impact. We can realistically state that, if y is financial
variable, b21 takes large values and, in such a way, the conservative identification
dominates the relaxed identification.
Figure B.1: Violation of the exclusion restriction - analytical case
Comparison of the violation of the exclusion restrictions between our conservative and rough (relax) identifications over
the parameter space {b12, b21} = {0, 1}x{0.1}. The left panel is a 3D plot, while in the right panel the size of the violation
of the exclusion restriction have been collapsed. Where colors are cold b21 < Γ, where they are warm b21 > Γ. In black we
report the analytical condition where b21 crosses Γ.
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Figure B.2: Violation of exclusion restriction - simulation
Comparison of the violation of the exclusion restrictions between our conservative and rough (relax) identifications over
the parameter space {b12, b21} = {0, 1}x{0.1}. The left panel is a 3D plot, while in the right panel the size of the violation
of the exclusion restriction have been collapsed. Where colors are cold b21 < Γ, where they are warm b21 > Γ. In black we
report the analytical condition where b21 crosses Γ.
B.1.2 Monte Carlo Performances
Figure B.3: MAD comparison in the two variable system: mispecification
Mean Absolute Distance (MAD) of IRFs estimated with the HF-VAR, LF-VAR and Bridge Proxy-SVAR in the 13 DGP
cases. Time aggregation follows a skip-sampling scheme. Our conservative identification at HF is applied in this case.
IRFs are standardize with respect to the true size of the shock.
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Full information at HF for Bridge: Quarterly-Monthly Frequency Mismatch
HF-VAR 21.2% 41.4%
Bridge 20% 36.7%
Bridge - conservative identification 21.7% 38.3%
Full information at HF for Bridge: Monthly-Daily Frequency Mismatch
HF-VAR 70% 81.2%
Bridge 65.6% 72.6%
Bridge - conservative identification 65.2% 74.7%
Table B.1: Performance comparison in Monte Carlo simulations - additional cases
Performance comparison across the counter-factual HF-VAR, the LF-VAR and the Bridge Proxy-SVAR. Performances are
evaluated in terms of the Mean Absolute Distance (MAD) between the true IRFs and the estimated IRFs in 100 randomly
parametrized DGPs. One summary statistic is computed based all the combinations of shocks-variables in the system. The
gains are expressed as percentage MAD gains over the LF-VAR. We analyze different cases for a VAR(1) DGP: I) The Bridge
employs full information at HF and the impact matrix B is diagonally dominated; II) The Bridge employs full information
at HF and no restrictions are imposed on the impact matrix B; III) The Bridge employs only partial information at HF and
no restrictions are imposed on the impact matrix B. The system features nine variables and the frequency mismatch is three
(quarterly-monthly case). When possible, i.e. under full information, for the Bridge, we report both the results under the
same identification of LF/HF-VAR and our conservative identification.
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B.2 Skip Sampling Temporal Aggregation
B.2.1 Temporal Aggregation Bias
Following the recursive structure embodied in the impact matrix B, a Cholesky








However, when we move to the time aggregation case, even the correct iden-
tification scheme yields biases. In fact, we impose the zero restriction on the time
aggregated reduced form residuals, whose variance-covariance matrix is given
by:









a12b222 + b21 (a11b11 + a12b21)
]
+ b211 + a11b11 (a11b11 + a12b21)
ω12 = a22
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where {c11, c12,c22} 6= {b11, b12,b22} and the bias depends on the parametriza-
tion of of the DGP.
B.2.2 Monte Carlo - Additional Content
The parametrizations of the DGP (eq. 2.28) that we employ in the bivariate Monte
Carlo simulations are:
{ρ, ρl , , ρ} = {0.5, 0.4, , 0.4} ; {0.5, 0.08, , 0.4} ; {0.9, 0.08, , 0.08} ; {0.9, 0.1, , 0.08} ;
{0.1, 0.1, , 0.1} ; {0.1, 0.4, , 0.4} ; {0.1, 0.08, , 0.08} ; {0.5, 0.1, , 0.1} ;
{0.5, 0.2, , 0.2} ; {0.5, 0.4, , 0.2} ; {0.9, 0.01, , 0.01} ; {0.9, 0.04, , 0.04} ;
{0.9, 0.08, , 0.04} ;
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Figure B.4: IRFs2 in the two variable system: misspecification
IRFs to a shock in the second variable (y) in the bivariate system. The true IRF is represented by the dotted black line. The
shock is identified through a wrong recursive structure in the HF system (blue), LF system (green) and Bridge Proxy (red).
Shaded areas correspond to the 90% confidence bands across 1000 replications. Time aggregation follows a skip-sampling
scheme.
Figure B.5: IRF2 in the practical case
IRFs to a shock in the second variable (z) in the three variable system. Left panel - first variable (x); middle panel - second
variable (z); right panel - third variable (y). The shock is identified through a wrong Cholesky in the HF system (blue), LF
system (green) and Bridge Proxy (red). Shaded areas correspond to the 90% confidence bands. The black line is the true
IRF. Time aggregation follows a skip-sampling scheme.
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Figure B.6: IRF3 in the practical case
IRFs to a shock in the third variable (y) in the three variable system. Left panel - first variable (x); middle panel - second
variable (z); right panel - third variable (y). The shock is identified through wrong a Cholesky in the HF system (blue), LF
system (green) and Bridge Proxy (red). Shaded areas correspond to the 90% confidence bands. The black line is the true
IRF. Time aggregation follows a skip-sampling scheme.
Figure B.7: MAD in the two varriable system: wider frequency mismatch
Mean Absolute Distance (MAD) between the true IRFs and the IRFs estimated by the HF-VAR, LF-VAR and Bridge
Proxy-SVAR (through the correct recursive scheme). Results are reported for 13 parametrization of the DGP. The MAD is
computed by averaging the MAD over the 1000 replications. Time aggregation follows a skip-sampling scheme.
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Figure B.8: MAD in the two variable system under measurement error
Mean Absolute Distance (MAD) between the true IRFs and the IRFs estimated by the HF-VAR, LF-VAR and Bridge
Proxy-SVAR. Results are reported for 13 parametrization of the DGP. The MAD is computed by averaging the MAD over
the 1000 replications. Time aggregation follows a skip-sampling scheme.
Figure B.9: MAD in the practical case: the wrong high frequency
Mean Absolute Distance (MAD) between the true IRFs and the IRFs estimated by the HF-VAR, LF-VAR and Bridge
Proxy-SVAR. Results are reported for 13 parametrization of the DGP. The MAD is computed by averaging the MAD over
the 1000 replications. Time aggregation follows a skip-sampling scheme.
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Figure B.10: MAD in each of the 100 large randomly parametrized systems
Mean Absolute Distance performances in the 100 randomly parametrized large systems of the HF-VAR, LF-VAR and
Bridge Proxy-SVAR. The summary static is based on the percentage MAD between the true and estimated IRFs in each
combination of shocks-variables in the system. Time aggregation follows a skip-sampling scheme.
B.3 Averaging Temporal Aggregation
B.3.1 An Illustrative Example
This section presents the same derivations of Section 2.2.3.1 but when time ag-
gregation follows an averaging scheme. Averaging usually modifies the AR com-
ponent in the same way as point-in-time sampling but induces higher order MA
components.
Yt = AYt−1 + Bεt εt ∼ N (0, I)
(I − AL)Yt = Bεt εt ∼ N (0, I) (B.13)
To move to the time aggregated representation under averaging, we first apply
the filter w(L) = I + L to transform the series as sum (average is just a linear
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transformation of it) and then we skip-sample through D(L) = I + AL:
D(L)w(L) (I − AL)Yt = D(L)Bw(L)εt (B.14)(
I − A2L2
)
(I + L)Yt = (I + L) (I + AL)Bεt
Yt +Yt−1 = A2 (Yt−2 +Yt−3) + B (εt + εt−1) + AB (εt−1 + εt−2)
Yτ = CYτ−1 + υτ vτ ∼ (0, BB′ + (I + A) BB′ (I + A)′ + ABB′A′)
Yτ = CYτ−1 + Bξt + ABξt−1 ξt ∼ (0, I), corr (ξt, ξt−1) = AB′B
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In this case, we employ as a proxy the first HF shock in the LF period to recover
the true impact matrix. Namely, zτ = ε
y












































































= (b22 + a22b22)
= b22 (1+ a22) (B.17)
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and the fitted values are
βˆ1szτ = b22 (1+ a22) ε
y
t−1
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It is important to highlight that, even if we are able to recover the true IRFs
on impact, the estimated autoregressive matrix of the LF-VAR is biased due to the
VARMA structure of the temporally aggregated process.3B VARMA models are
not used in empirical application due the high parametrization and severe prob-
lems in defining an economic interpretable structure (SVARMA). Therefore, we
do not tackle this issue as the improvement in identification over a LF-VAR is the
3BThe bias in the estimated A matrix induces a bias also in the estimated reduced form residuals.
However, the IRFs on impact (B) would be biased only if the bias in the A matrix were correlated
with the structural shocks. In a simple AR(1) process, the bias is a constant and so does not in-
terfere with the estimates of the B matrix. Moreover, our simulations of more complex processes
indicate that the Bridge always recover the impact response.
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best we can reach through our methodology. This steams from the fact that we
derive identifying restrictions at HF but we still rely on the LF-VAR representa-
tion for the transmission of the shocks. On the contrary, the state space MF-VAR
improves the estimates of the A matrix by shifting the representation of the LF
variables at HF.
B.3.2 Comparison Bridge - Mixed Frequency VAR
If financial processes are part of the analysis, the shortcoming of the MF-VAR
consists of the inability to use daily data.4B To the best of our knowledge, the
MF-VAR can exploit at most weekly data. Therefore, there is a trade-off between
the identification of the impact matrix B, favorable to the Bridge, and the estimates
of the autoregressive matrix A, favorable to the MF-VAR.5B Finally, notice that
sample size is quite relevant in this trade-off: the biases in the estimate A matrix
are decreasing in the sample size as the VARMA process is well approximate by a
VAR in large samples but not in short samples.6B
We design two Monte Carlo experiments to compare the performances of
the Bridge versus the MF-VAR. On the one hand, we quantitatively illustrate
this trade-off. On the other hand, and more importantly, our goal is to study
the dependence of the relative performances of the two methodologies on the
parametrization of the DGP. Our intuition suggests that when the variables in
the system are very responsive to other shocks on impact, i.e. the simultaneity
problem is very severe, improving the estimation of the impact matrix is crucial.
We consider both a full information and partial information setup. In the full
information case, the Bridge employs all variables in both stages, whereas the MF-
VAR is actually the counter-factual HF-VAR. In the partial information case, we
4BFor example, in a quarterly-weekly (m = 12) Monte Carlo simulation Foroni and Marcellino
(2016) report:
1. “For computational reasons (the number of missing values is high and therefore the com-
putational time increases substantially), we fix the number of replications to R = 500.”
2. “Due to the higher number of missing values when m = 12, we increase the size to 300
quarterly observations to obtain more stable results when running the Kalman filter.”
5BIf the true process occurs at daily frequency while the MF-VAR employs weekly data, the
estimates of the A matrix will still be biased, even if less than the monthly estimates.
6BNotice that, on the one hand, the strength of the instrument and the precision of the estimates
is increasing with the sample size for the Bridge. On the other hand, the computational burden of
the MF-VAR increases with the length of the sample.
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run the practical case presented in Section 2.3.3. The first variable in the system
is effectively unobservable at HF, so the Bridge employs only two variables in re-
covering the shocks at HF (first stage). The MF-VAR estimates in a state space
representation the missing observations of the LF variable.
Full Information We employ a nine variable system to quantitatively evaluate
the A-B trade-off, but we study also a two variable system to illustrate how this
trade-off depends on simultaneity. The true frequency of the process is daily but
macro variables are available only at the monthly frequency. We compare the best
performances of a MF-VAR (HF-VAR) on weekly data with the best performances
of the Bridge (full information) using daily as HF data and monthly as LF data.
Once again, we run a 100 random parametrization experiment in a three variable
system as we want to analyze the trade-off between Bridge (advantage in identify-
ing the impact matrix) versus MF-VAR (advantage in estimating the autoregres-
sive matrix). We do not constrain the generated parameter in anyway other than
maintaining a mapping variables-shocks. Overall, we obtain the results displayed
in Table B.2.
More importantly, for the bivariate case we build an index of relative perfor-
mances for the cross impacts of the shocks and regress it on the parameters of
the B matrix. Our index capture the percentage difference in the MAD between
the MF-VAR and Bridge. Table B.3 confirms our priors: when the off-diagonal
elements in the B matrix are large, the (daily-monthly) Bridge is preferred to the
(weekly) MF-VAR.
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Identification MAD GAINS OVER LF-VAR (MONTHLY)
Bivariate system
MF-VAR (HF-VAR weekly) 70.6%
Bridge (full-information daily) 78.7%
9 variable randomized system
MF-VAR (HF-VAR weekly) 67.4%
Bridge (full-information daily) 66.2%
Table B.2: Performance comparison in Monte Carlo simulations - Bridge and MF-
VAR
Performance comparison across the MF-VAR (weekly HF-VAR), the LF-VAR (monthly) and the (full information) Bridge
Proxy-SVAR (daily-monthly). Performances are evaluated in terms of the Mean Absolute Distance (MAD) between the true
IRFs and the estimated IRFs. The gains are expressed as percentage MAD gains over the LF-VAR. We report the results
for I) the bivariate case used to evaluate the dependence of the performances on the structure of the DGP; II) a 9 variable
randomly parametrized system in 100 randomly parametrized DGPs.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS Probit Probit
VARIABLES % ∆ MAD MF-B % ∆ MAD MF-B % ∆ MAD MF-B % ∆ MAD MF-B
Variable 2 - Shock 1 Var 1 - Shock 2 Var 2 - Shock 1 Var 1 - Shock 2
|b12| 0.40*** -0.25 1.07*** 0.93*
(0.13) (0.18) (0.27) (0.49)
|b21| -0.05 0.47*** -0.31 0.51
(0.12) (0.17) (0.23) (0.38)
Constant -0.19 1.10*** -0.73*** 0.39
(0.15) (0.21) (0.28) (0.38)
Observations 100 100 100 100
R-squared 0.09 0.09 0.14 (pseudo) 0.11 (pseudo)
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table B.3: MAD comparison as function of DGP: full information
Relationship between relative performances of the (daily-monthly) Bridge over the (weekly) MF-VAR and the structure of
the impact matrix. In particular, we study the relationship between the estimated cross IRFs with the absolute values of the
off-diagonal elements in the B matrix: b12 and b21. The higher the degree of simultaneity, the wider the gains from using
daily data (Bridge) over weekly data (MF-VAR).
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Partial Information We turn next to a three variable system where one variable
is actually unobserved a HF and compare how the MF-VAR and Bridge cope with
this lack of information. The LF variable is observable only once each 24 periods
as average.7B The MF-VAR aggregates the HF over 8 periods and jointly esti-
mate the relationship with the LF variable. Basically, the MF-VAR reverse to the
monthly-quarterly case. Finally, the Bridge recovers shocks at the true frequency
by using a bivariate system with the two variables available at HF. In terms of
MAD percentage gains over the LF-VAR, the MF-VAR improves by 46.7%, while
the Bridge by 70.5%.
However, more than providing a quantitative comparison across the two
methodologies, we are interested in analyzing the cases that suit one or another
procedure. As in the previous case, we regress the relative performances of the
Bridge versus the MF-VAR on the parametrization of the B matrix. In particu-
lar, we focus on the simultaneity between the variables observable at the highest
frequency. We analyze how this simultaneity affects the bias in the estimated re-
sponses of the low frequency variable to the high frequency shocks. Namely, we
regress the bias in the IRF of variable x to shocks in z and y on b23 and b32.8B The
results presented Table highlight that the gains from using the Bridge increasing
in the simultaneity across the high frequency variable. This finding suggests that
the Bridge is particularly suitable to study macro-financial linkages where high
frequency variables contemporaneous co-move significantly.
7BThis number may be interpreted as the working days within one month.
8BWe include b22 and b33 to take into account the size of the shock.
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(1) (2)
VARIABLES % ∆ MAD MF-Bridge ∆ MAD MF-Bridge













Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table B.4: MAD comparison as function of DGP: partial information
Relationship between relative performances of the (daily-monthly) Bridge over the (weekly) MF-VAR and the structure of
the impact matrix. In particular, we study the relationship between the estimated cross IRFs with the absolute values of
the off-diagonal elements in the B matrix: b23 and b32. These two parameters represent the degree of simultaneity between
variable 2 (z) and variable 3 (y). The higher the degree of simultaneity, the wider the gains from using daily data (Bridge)
over weekly data (MF-VAR).
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B.3.3 Monte Carlo Simulations - Averaging Case
Figure B.11: MAD in the two variable system - averaging
Mean Absolute Distance (MAD) between the true IRFs and the IRFs estimated by the HF-VAR, LF-VAR and Bridge
Proxy-SVAR (through the correct recursive scheme). Results are reported for 13 parametrization of the DGP. The MAD is
computed by averaging the MAD over the 1000 replications. Time aggregation follows an averaging scheme.
Figure B.12: MAD in the two variable system: mispecification - averaging
Mean Absolute Distance (MAD) between the true IRFs and the IRFs estimated by the HF-VAR, LF-VAR and Bridge
Proxy-SVAR. Results are reported for 13 parametrization of the DGP. The MAD is computed by averaging the MAD over
the 1000 replications. Time aggregation follows a skip-sampling scheme.
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Figure B.13: IRFs from large randomized Monte Carlo experiment - averaging
Example of the IRFs of the system to a shock in the first variable in the system, estimated by the HF-VAR, LF-VAR and
Bridge Proxy-SVAR in one of the 100 randomly parametrized DGPs. Shaded areas correspond to the 90% confidence
bands across 1000 replications. The true IRF is represented by the dotted black line. Time aggregation follows an
averaging scheme.
Figure B.14: MAD heatmap from large randomized Monte Carlo experiment -
averaging
Mean Absolute Distance (MAD) between the true IRFs and the IRFs estimated by the HF-VAR, LF-VAR and Bridge
Proxy-SVAR in one of the 100 randomly parametrized DGPs. Results are reported for each combination of
shocks-variables in the system (81). The MAD is computed by averaging the MAD over the 1000 replications. Time
aggregation follows a skip-sampling scheme.
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Figure B.15: MAD in each of the 100 large randomly parametrized systems
Mean Absolute Distance performances in the 100 randomly parametrized large systems of the HF-VAR, LF-VAR and
Bridge Proxy-SVAR. The summary static is based on the percentage MAD between the true and estimated IRFs in each
combination of shocks-variables in the system. Time aggregation follows a skip-sampling scheme.
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B.4 Empirical Application
Name Datastream Code
Fed Funds Future 3 months ahead CFFCS30
S&P 500 S&PCOMP
Oil Price Index OILBREN
Oil Price Future 3 months ahead NCLCS30
BBA Corporate Spread LHIGBAA
Dollar-Euro Exchange Rate USEURSP
Dollar-Sterlin Exchange Rate USDOLLR
Commodity Price Index CRBSPOT
Gold Price Index GOLDHAR
Oil Future 3 months ahead NCLCS30
Eurodollar Future 3 months ahead NCLCS30
Cleveland Financial Stress Index USCVFSI
CBOE VXO - Stock Volatility Index CBOEVXO
Bid Cover Ratio in Trasuries Auctions (26 weeks) USBCR26
Bank of America Merril Lynch Asset Backed Security Index MLR0A2L
US Federal Funds Target Rate USFDTRG
US Treasury Term Premia 1 years USTTP1Y
US Treasury Term Premia 5 years USTTP5Y
US Treasury Term Premia 10 years USTTY10
Conventional Fixed Mortgage Rate FRCMORT
Table B.5: Data description
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Figure B.16: Comparison TFFR and FF4
Comparison Target Fed Fund Rate - Fed Fund Rate Future 3 month ahead
B.4.1 Shocks identified from the Daily VAR
B.4.1.1 Baseline Identification
Table B.6-B.7 point out that, even without imposing any particular role for the
FOMC meeting days, our conservative identification highlights a special role for
these days. In fact, both mean and standard deviation of the shocks on FOMC
meeting days are twice as sizable as the same statistics computed over the whole
sample. Not surprisingly, this difference is more relevant for future contracts at
shorter horizons. More formally, we also regress the size of the shocks over a
dummy that reflect the FOMC meeting days, finding the same pattern (Table B.8).
Finally, we provide anecdotal evidence on the identified shocks. Specifically,
the daily framework allows us to track the events that occurred on the days in
which we register the most sizable shocks. Description and references are in-
cluded in Table B.9.
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Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
|TFFR*| 0.444 0.838 0 15.136
|fut4* | 0.6 0.747 0 10.156
|fut1| 0.53 0.79 0 15.973
|fut4| 0.598 0.739 0 10.151
|fut7| 0.614 0.726 0 8.268
|fut18| 0.559 0.769 0 15.361
Observations 4352
Table B.6: Descriptive statistics of monetary policy shocks - comparison across
maturities
Shocks in the whole sample - * refers to section 2.4.1; others show the robustness to using different future contracts (over a
slightly shorter sample).
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
|TFFR*| 2.832 3.422 0.015 15.136
|fut4* | 1.139 1.303 0.01 7.184
|fut1| 1.092 1.346 0.002 9.587
|fut4| 0.856 0.969 0.008 6.524
|fut7| 0.813 0.930 0.001 7.104
|fut18| 0.765 0.841 0.011 5.966
Observations 148
Table B.7: Descriptive statistics of monetary policy shocks on FOMC meeting
dates - comparison across maturities
Shocks in the FOMC dates - * refers to section 2.4.1; others show the robustness to using
different future contracts (over a slightly shorter sample).
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES |TFFR*| |fut4*| |fut1| |fut4| |fut7| |fut18|
FOMC 2.47*** 0.56*** 0.58*** 0.27*** 0.21*** 0.21***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Constant 0.36*** 0.58*** 0.51*** 0.59*** 0.61*** 0.55***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Observations 4,352 4,352 4,352 4,352 4,352 4,352
R-squared 0.29 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01
Table B.8: Regression of monetary policy shocks on FOMC meeting dates dummy
- comparison across maturities
Daily shocks regressed on FOMC days dummy - * refers to Section 2.4.1; others show the robustness to using different
future contracts (over a slightly shorter sample).
Bridge TFFR Event 1 Event 2 Event 3
Dates 18 March 2008 22 January 2008 15 November 1994
Description FOMC meeting FOMC meeting FOMC meeting
Reference Event 1a; Event 1b Event 2a; Event 2b Event 3
Shock −15 std −13.1 std 15.9 std
Bridge FF4 Event 1 Event 2 Event 3
Dates 02 January 2001 22 January 2008 02 January 1995
Description Anticipation FOMC 03 Jan 2001 FOMC meeting $50 billion bailout Mexican tequila crisis
Reference Event 1 Event 2a Event 2b Event 3
Shock −7.9 std −7.5 std 10.5 std
Table B.9: Largest monetary policy shocks
Main shocks (reported in standard deviation units) identified in our daily VAR and corresponding events - section 2.4.1
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Figure B.17: Comparison of TFFR shocks with Romer and Romer shocks
Comparison of monetary policy shocks from different identifications. Bridge TFFR (blue) refers to the series of shocks
identified using our daily VAR. RR refers to the series of shocks build as Romer and Romer (2004), extended by Coibion
et al. (2012).
Figure B.18: Comparison of FF4 shocks with Gerter and Kararadi shocks
Comparison of monetary policy shocks from different identifications. Bridge FF4 (red) refers to the series of shocks
identified using our daily VAR. GKFF4 refers to the series of shocks employed by Gertler and Karadi (2015).
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Figure B.19: Explanatory power of TFFR shocks for Romer and Romer shocks
Romer and Romer (2004) shocks, extended by Coibion et al. (2012), fitted by your TFFR series of shocks estimated in a
daily VAR.
Figure B.20: Explanatory power of TFFR and FF4 shocks for Romer and Romer
shocks
Gertler and Karadi (2015) FF4 shocks fitted by your TFFR and FF4 shocks estimated in a daily VAR.
B.4.1.2 Alternative Identifications
Our two alternative identification strategies yield series of daily monetary policy
shocks that are very correlated with our baseline series. Moreover, they generate
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very similar macroeconomic effects. In Tables B.10-B.11 we report the correlations
among the shocks identified with all the strategies that we have employed.
Identification Via Heteroskedasticity
In short, the identification proposed by Rigobon (2003) exploits the change in the
volatility of the structural shocks across (at least) two regimes. Consistently with
our finding reported in Table B.6-B.7, we assume that the variance of the
monetary policy shocks changes across FOMC meeting days and non-FOMC
meeting days. We estimate a bivariate VAR including FF4 and SP&500 and
exploit the change in the variance of the shocks in FF4 across the two regimes for
identification. In this way, we obtain a series of shocks that correlates 0.9998 with
the shocks identified by ordering the TFFR last in our large scale VAR. The same
result hold in three and four variable daily VARs, which additionally include the
commodity price index and commodity price index plus the Cleveland Financial
Stress index. Finally, notice that event-based identification is equivalent to the
identification via heteroskedasticity where the change in the volatility across the
two regimes is assumed to be infinite.
Identification Via Independent Component Analysis
Detailed reference on the application of Independent Component Analysis (ICA)
to VARs can be found in Capasso and Moneta (2016) and Gourieroux et al. (2017).
Intuitively, ICA can be seen as a generalization of principal component analysis
(PCA). While PCA looks for uncorrelated latent components, ICA minimizes the
statistical independence among such components. Obviously, if the data is
normally distributed, the two concept are equivalent. However, when departing
from gaussianity, ICA can solve the identification problem in VARs. While the
reduced form residuals can be decomposed in uncorrelated structural shocks in
infinite ways, ICA searches for the (unique) combination of the most statistically
independent components.
Both visual inspection and the Kolmorogov-Smirnov reject the normality of the
18 reduced form residuals in our daily VAR. We do not assume any particular
distribution of the reduce form residuals but we estimate semi-parametrically the
independent components.9B We consider as monetary policy shock the structural
9BWe employ the algorithm Icasso v1.22 and FastICA v2.5.
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shock that contributes the most to the variance of the FF4 on impact. The
resulting series of structural shocks correlates 0.89 with the shocks in the TFFR
and 0.9 with the shocks in the FF4 identified with our baseline recursive ordering.
Target FFR - Last FF4 - Last FF4 - Heteroschedasticity FF4 - ICA
Target FFR - Last 1 * * *
FF4 - Last 0 1 * *
FF4 - Heteroskedasticity 1* 0 1 *
FF4 - ICA 0 0.92* 0 1
Table B.10: Correlation among monetary policy shocks across different identifica-
tions - daily frequency
Correlations among monetary policy shocks recovered at the daily frequency through different identification strategies: 1)
Target FFR ordered last in recursive identification; 2) Fed Future (3 months ahead) ordered last in recursive identification;
3) Fed Future (3 months ahead) exploiting the change volatility in FOMC meeting days and other days
(heteroskedasticity); 4) Fed Future (3 months ahead) exploiting the non-normality of the reduced form residuals
(Independent Component Analysis - ICA) . All coefficients different from 0 are statistically significant at the 1% level.
Target FFR - Last FF4 - Last FF4 - Heteroschedasticity FF4 - ICA
Target FFR - Last 1 * * *
FF4 - Last 0.1 1 * *
FF4 - Heteroskedasticity 1 * 0.11 1 *
FF4 - ICA 0.1 0.93* 0.11 1
Table B.11: Correlation among monetary policy shocks across different identifica-
tions - monthly frequency
Correlations among monetary policy shocks recovered at the daily frequency through different identification strategies
and aggregated at the monthly frequency: 1) Target FFR ordered last in recursive identification; 2) Fed Future (3 months
ahead) ordered last in recursive identification; 3) Fed Future (3 months ahead) exploiting the change volatility in FOMC
meeting days and other days (heteroskedasticity); 4) Fed Future (3 months ahead) exploiting the non-normality of the
reduced form residuals (Independent Component Analysis - ICA) . * denotes statistical significance at the 1% level.
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B.4.1.3 Impulse Response Functions
Figure B.21: IRFs FF4
IRFs to a monetary policy shock identified using Bridge Future using all the available days (FOMC and non-FOMC).
From the first stage, F− stat = 7.7. The VAR is estimated in log-levels with the optimal number of lags (2) and includes a
deterministic constant. Shaded areas correspond to 95% bootstrapped confidence bands.
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IRFs in the Medium System of Gertler and Karadi
Figure B.22: IRFs TFFR - medium system
IRFs to a monetary policy shock identified using Bridge Target. From the first stage, F− stat = 10.2. The VAR includes
[FFR, CPI, Industrial Production, Excess Bond Premium, Mortgage Spread, Commercial Paper Spread] and it is estimated
in log-levels with the optimal number of lags (2) and includes a deterministic constant.Shaded areas correspond to 95%
bootstrapped confidence bands from 1000 replications.
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Figure B.23: IRFs FF4 - medium system
IRFs to a monetary policy shock identified using Bridge Future (FOMC and non-FOMC). From the first stage,
F− stat = 7.44. The VAR includes [FFR, CPI, Industrial Production, Excess Bond Premium, Mortgage Spread,
Commercial Paper Spread] and it is estimated in log-levels with the optimal number of lags (2) and includes a
deterministic constant. Shaded areas correspond to 95% bootstrapped confidence bands.





Unemployment ISTAT Ministry of Economy
Industrial Production ISTAT INE
CPI Inflation ISTAT INE
Central Government Debt Bank of Italy Ministry of Economy
ECB Repo ECB ECB
M2 Bank of Italy Banco de España
Consumer Confidence ISTAT Ministry of Economy
Business Confidence ISTAT Ministry of Industry
Volatility Index ASR-Absolute Strategy VSTOXX
CDS Thomson Reuters CDS Thomson Reuters CDS
Bid-Ask Spread Bloomberg Bloomberg
Yield Spread ECB ECB
Stock Prices FTSE MIB IBEX 35
France Germany
Unemployment INSEE OECD
Industrial Production INSEE Federal Statistical Office
CPI Inflation Thomson Reuters Thomson Reuters
Central Government Debt Banque de France Deutsche Bundesbank
ECB Repo ECB ECB
M2 Banque de France Deutsche Bundesbank
Consumer Confidence DG ECFIN DG ECFIN
Business Confidence DG ECFIN DG ECFIN
Volatility Index Euronext Paris Deutsche Boerse
CDS Thomson Reuters CDS Thomson Reuters CDS
Bid-Ask Spread Bloomberg Bloomberg
Yield Spread ECB ECB
Stock Prices CAC 40 MDAX Frankfurt
Table C.1: Data Sources
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All the variables are seasonally adjusted originally or by using the X-13ARIMA
procedure. We deflate nominal variables by the corresponding CPI price index in
order to estimate the VAR with real variables.
In Section 3.4.2, we refer to the following questions from the Bank and Lending
Survey:
1. Firm ∆ Standards: Changes in bank’s credit standards for approving loans or
credit lines to enterprises, Overall (all firms and types of loans), Past three
months.
2. Firm: Costs-Asset Position: Changes in the contribution of cost of funds and
balance sheet constraints (costs related to bank’s capital position) affecting
credit standards for approving loans or credit lines to enterprises.
3. Firm: Liquidity Position: Changes in the contribution of cost of funds and bal-
ance sheet constraints (bank’s liquidity position) affecting credit standards
for approving loans or credit lines to enterprises.
4. Firm: Risk-Economic Activity: Changes in the contribution of perception of
risk about general economic situation and outlook affecting credit standards
for approving loans or credit lines to enterprises.
5. Mortgages: ∆ Standards: Changes in credit standards for approving loans to
households, loans for house purchase in the last three months.
6. Mortgages: Costs-Funding: Changes in the contribution of the following fac-
tors affecting credit standards for approving loans to households for house
purchase, cost of funds and balance sheet constraints.
Concerning the ISTAT survey, the questionnaire can be found at ISTAT question-
naire (only in Italian). We refer to the following questions/answers:
43 Today, in our opinion, are the credit conditions more or less favorable com-
pared to three months ago? (Possible answers: More; Constant; Less)
45 Have you obtained the loan you requested to the bank or financial institution?
(Possible answers: Yes, at the same conditions; Yes, at worse conditions; No; Only
asking information)
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46 In case answer to 43 was No - Has the bank reject your request or you have
not accepted their offer due to the conditions they were setting? (Possible
answers: The bank has not offered a loan; We have not accepted the loan due to not
favorable conditions)
47 In case answer to 45 was Yes, at worse conditions - Why the conditions have be-
come worse? (Possible answers: Higher rate; More personal collateral requested;
More real collateral requested; Limits on the amount of the loan; Additional costs)
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C.1 High Frequency Variables
Date Events
2/7/07 HSBC issue with subprimes
6/7/07 Bearn Sterns first bad news
8/9/07 BNP Paribas
9/13/07 Northern Rock
2/18/08 Northern Rock Nationalized
3/14/08 Bearn Sterns bought by JP Morgan
9/15/08 Lehman




5/17/11 Portugal asks help
8/5/11 Letter to Mr. Berlusconi from ECB
8/16/11 ECB buys after Ita take measures
10/4/11 Downgrade ITA-SPAIN
10/11/11 CDS-ban announced
10/31/11 Draghi takes over
11/1/11 CDS-ban in place
11/14/11 Mr. Monti takes over




6/26/12 Cyprus requests aid




11/7/13 ECB cuts Rate
Table C.2: List of European and Italian events
APPENDIX C. LIQUIDITY SHOCKS 169











Figure C.1: Italian BAS and Turnover on the MTS platform
Figure C.2: Dyanmic correlations among Spread, CDS and BAS over 2004-2014.
Correlations are computed over a 90 days rolling window
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C.2 Financial Variables at Monthly Frequency
Table A3 summarizes statistics of the financial variables used in the empirical
analysis at monthly frequency:
Full Sample 2009-2014
BAS Yield CDS BAS Yield CDS
Mean 0.017 4.318 98.278 0.020 4.41 169.58
Max 0.037 7.057 546.159 0.037 7.057 546.159
Min 0.007 1.990 2.343 0.007 1.990 36.352
St. Dev. 0.007 0.809 124.411 0.007 1.008 128.619
Auto Corr. 0.836 0.956 0.964 0.782 0.957 0.940
Table C.3: Descriptive statistics of sovereign debt financial variables at monthly
frequency. Sources: Bloomberg, Datastream and Bank of Italy. Maturities: BAS
and CDS 2 years; Yield 10 years.
There is no significant change in volatility and standard deviation in the period
of the sovereign debt crisis at monthly frequency.
C.3 Proxy-SVAR
We describe the the Proxy SVAR methodology that we use to identify the effects
of BAS shocks and the first stage results (i.e. the linear projection of the reduced
form residuals on the exogenous variations of BAS identified at daily frequency).
C.3.1 Theoretical Reference
Consider the following VAR:
Yt = AYt−1 + ut (C.1)
with Yt a vector of endogenous variables and ut is a vector of reduced form
residuals with variance-covariance matrix Σu. The objective is to recover the struc-
tural form of the VAR, characterized by the vector of structural shocks εt = B−1ut:
Yt = AYt−1 + Bεt (C.2)
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The Proxy-SVAR is an identification strategy that (potentially) partially identi-






which would allows us to compute the IRFs of the system to a structural innova-
tion in the BAS. In order to reach the identification, we exploit information from
outside the VAR system. We use the variable zt as a proxy for the true structural
shock εbast . zt is assumed to be a proxy for (a component of) the true ε
bas
t with the
















by taking an instrumental variable approach:
First Stage: regress ubast = βzt + ξt obtaining uˆ
bas
t




Given that the BAS reacts one to one to its own structural shock (on impact), we
can normalize B21B11 = B21. The IRFs to a BAS shock can be then computed across
different horizons as:
IRFX0 = B21
IRFXn = An−1IRFXn−1 ∀n > 0
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C.3.2 First Stage
Figure A4 displays the RF residuals predicted by the proxy, compared to the orig-
inal RF innovation series.










8 Instrumented VAR Residuals
VAR Residuals
Figure C.3: First stage result of the Bridge Proxy-SVAR identification
The blue line represents the RF residuals of the BAS from the VAR featuring [Unemployment, pi,
Public Debt, R, M2, CC, BC, Financial Block]; the red bar is the RF residuals predicted by the Proxy
(BAS shocks identified in a daily VAR including [BAS, CDS, Yield, FTSE, Eonia, VIX])
C.4 Alternative VAR Specifications
We present the results from alternative VAR specifications described in Section
3.3.4. To keep the appendix short, we only report results using some particular
identification schemes (Basic, Full or Proxy SVAR). Results are robust using the
other identification schemes and are available from the authors upon request.
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C.4.1 Indicator of Liquidity
The following figures report the IRFs to a BAS shock of the Full VAR and Proxy-
SVAR specifications including the Turnover instead of the Equity Premium, re-
spectively. Moreover, we also display the IRFs and the FEVD of Unemployment
from the Full VAR including the Liquidity Index instead of the BAS. An increase
(decrease) in the Liquidity Index is analogous to a decrease (increase) in the BAS.
Figure C.4: IRFs to a BAS Shock - Choleski identification
IRFs to a 1 std BAS shock identified through the following ordering [Unemployment, pi, Public
Debt, R, M2, CC, BC, Financial Block]. The turnover of Italian sovereign bonds is included in
place of the equity premium. The median point estimate, 68% and 90% confidence bands are
reported in cyan, blue, and light blue, respectively. 50%, 68% and 90% bands include statistical
and identification uncertainty (from all the possible ordering within the financial block)
.
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Figure C.5: IRFs to a BAS Shock - Bridge Proxy-SVAR identification
IRFs to a 1 standard deviation BAS shock in the VAR [IP, pi, Public Debt, R, M2, CC, BC, Financial
Block]. The turnover of Italian sovereign bonds is included in place of the equity premium. The
shock is identified through the unpredictable variation of the BAS in a daily VAR system.
Sample: Jan:2009-Nov:2014. The median point estimate, 68% and 90% confidence bands are
reported in blue and light blue, respectively. Confidence bands are computed using wild
bootstrap with 1,000 replications.
Figure C.6: IRFs to a Liquidity Index shock - Choleski identification
IRFs to a 1 std Liquidity Index shock (liquidity improvement) identified through the following
ordering [Unemployment, pi, Public Debt, R, M2, CC, BC, Financial Block]. The median point
estimate, 68% and 90% confidence bands are reported in cyan, blue, and light blue, respectively.
50%, 68% and 90% bands include statistical and identification uncertainty (from all the possible
ordering within the financial block).
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Figure C.7: FEVD of unemployment - Choleski identification
FEVD of unemployment including the Liquidity Index identified through the following ordering
[Unemployment, pi, Public Debt, R, M2, CC, BC, Financial Block].
Liquidity accounts for around 20% of Unemployment fluctuations in the pe-
riod under analysis, in line with results presented in Section 3.3.2.
C.4.2 Measures of Economic Activity
In this case, we use alternative measures of economic activity and present the
corresponding IRFs. We include results both with our small VAR system and with
the Proxy-SVAR. We employ Industrial Production and the ITA-Coin.
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Table C.4: IRFs to a Liquidity Index shock - Choleski identification and industrial
production
IRFs to a 1 std Liquidity Index shock (liquidity improvement) identified through the following
ordering [Industrial Production, pi, FTSE, Spread, BAS]. The median point estimate, 68% and 90%
confidence bands are reported in cyan, blue, and light blue, respectively. 50%, 68% and 90%
bands include statistical and identification uncertainty (from all the possible ordering within the
financial block).
Figure C.8: IRFs to a Liquidity Index shock - Choleski identification; industrial
production
IRFs to a 1 std Liquidity Index shock (liquidity improvement) identified through the following
ordering [Itacoin, pi, FTSE, Spread, BAS]. The median point estimate, 68% and 90% confidence
bands are reported in cyan, blue, and light blue, respectively. 50%, 68% and 90% bands include
statistical and identification uncertainty (from all the possible ordering within the financial
block).
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Figure C.9: IRFs to a BAS shock - Bridge Proxy-SVAR identification; industrial
production
IRFs to a 1 standard deviation BAS shock (liquidity deterioration) in the VAR [IP, pi, Public Debt,
R, M2, CC, BC, Financial Block]. The shock is identified through the unpredictable variation of
the BAS in a daily VAR system. Sample: Feb:2004-Nov:2014. The median point estimate, 68% and
90% confidence bands are reported in blue and light blue, respectively. Confidence bands are
computed using wild bootstrap with 1,000 replications.
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Figure C.10: IRFs to a BAS shock - Bridge Proxy-SVAR identification; Itacoin
IRFs to a 1 standard deviation BAS shock (liquidity deterioration) in the VAR [IP, pi, Public Debt,
R, M2, CC, BC, Financial Block]. The shock is identified through the unpredictable variation of
the BAS in a daily VAR system. Sample: Feb:2009-Nov:2014. The median point estimate, 68% and
90% confidence bands are reported in blue and light blue, respectively. Confidence bands are
computed using wild bootstrap with 1,000 replications.
C.4.3 Alternative Samples
We study the dependence of our findings on the sample used. We display the
IRFs to a BAS shock and FEV of Unemployment using the sample January 2009-
November 2014 and on the pre-crisis sample (February 2004-December 2008). The
main conclusions remain unchanged.
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Figure C.11: IRFs to a BAS shock - Choleski; sample 2009-2014
IRFs to a 1 std BAS shock identified through the following ordering [Unemployment, pi, Public
Debt, R, M2, CC, BC, Financial Block]. The median point estimate, 68% and 90% confidence
bands are reported in cyan, blue, and light blue, respectively. 50%, 68% and 90% bands include
statistical and identification uncertainty (from all the possible ordering within the financial
block).
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Figure C.12: IRFs to a BAS shock - Choleski; sample 2009-2014
FEVD of unemployment including the Liquidity Index identified through the following ordering
[Unemployment, pi, Public Debt, R, M2, CC, BC, Financial Block].
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Figure C.13: IRFs to a BAS shock - Choleski; sample 2004-2008
IRFs to a 1 std Liquidity Index shock (liquidity improvement) identified through the following
ordering [Unemployment, pi, FTSE, Spread, BAS]. The median point estimate, 68% and 90%
confidence bands are reported in cyan, blue, and light blue, respectively. 50%, 68% and 90%
bands include statistical and identification uncertainty (from all the possible ordering within the
financial block).
C.4.4 Corporate Liquidity
In this section, we consider the relationship between the Corporate and Sovereign
liquidity. Figure A16 displays the evolution of the Corporate BAS together with
sovereign variables aggregated at monthly frequency. Figure A17 displays the IRF
to a shock to corporate BAS and compares it to the one to a sovereign BAS. Finally,
Figure A18 shows the IRFs using as a variable the spread between Corporate and
Sovereign BAS instead of the BAS.
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Levels BAS-S Spread CDS BAS-C
BAS-S 1 -0.08 0.39* 0.31*
Spread -0.08 1 0.35 0.5*
CDS 0.39* 0.35 1 0.9*
BAS-C 0.31* 0.5* 0.9* 1
Table C.5: Sovereign and Corporate Liquidity
Correlation over the 2004-2014 among Sovereign and Corporate BAS, Spread and CDS (as
monthly averages).
Figure C.14: Comparison among Sovereign and Corporate BAS, Spread and CDS
(as monthly averages). Source of Corporate BAS: Bloomberg.
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Figure C.15: IRFs to a BAS shock- Choleski identification; sovereign and corporate
liquidity
IRFs to a 1 std Corporate BAS shock (compared to a sovereign BAS shock in blue) identified
through the following ordering [Unemployment, pi, Public Debt, R, M2, CC, BC, Financial Block].
The median point estimate, 68% and 90% confidence bands are reported in cyan, blue, and light
blue, respectively. 50%, 68% and 90% bands include statistical and identification uncertainty (from
all the possible ordering within the financial block).
Figure C.16: IRFs to a BAS shock- Choleski identification; corporate bond liquidity
IRFs to a 1 std (Corporate-Sovereign) BAS shock identified through the following ordering
[Unemployment, pi, Public Debt, R, M2, CC, BC, Financial Block]. The median point estimate,
68% and 90% confidence bands are reported in cyan, blue, and light blue, respectively. 50%, 68%
and 90% bands include statistical and identification uncertainty (from all the possible ordering
within the financial block).
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C.4.5 Market Stress Index
Figure A19 displays the IRFs to a BAS shock of the enlarged VAR that includes
the Composite Indicator of Systemic Stress, computed by the ECB.
Figure C.17: IRFs to a BAS shock- Choleski identification; CISS
IRFs to a 1 std BAS shock identified through the following ordering [Unemployment, pi, Public
Debt, R, M2, CC, BC, Financial Block]. The CISS Index is included in place of the the equity
premium. The median point estimate, 68% and 90% confidence bands are reported in cyan, blue,
and light blue, respectively. 50%, 68% and 90% bands include statistical and identification
uncertainty (from all the possible ordering within the financial block).
C.4.6 Financial Volatility
We report the IRFs to a BAS shock of the enlarged VAR that includes an indicator
that account for volatility in sovereign debt markets. This indicator is defined as
the first principal component of the realized monthly volatility of sovereign BAS,
Spread and CDS, computed using daily data.
APPENDIX C. LIQUIDITY SHOCKS 185
Figure C.18: IRFs to a BAS shock- Choleski identification; financial volatility
IRFs to a 1 std BAS shock identified through the following ordering [Unemployment, pi, Public
Debt, R, M2, CC, BC, Financial Block]. A principal component that summarizes the volatility of
financial variables is included in place of the equity premium. The median point estimate, 68%
and 90% confidence bands are reported in cyan, blue, and light blue, respectively. 50%, 68% and
90% bands include statistical and identification uncertainty (from all the possible ordering within
the financial block).
